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JULY

COMMENTARY

The Anglo-American Report Points the Way

MOSCHE SMELANSKY

The Germans and the Jews: Postwar Report

MOSES MOSKOWITZ

Grace After Bread

DAVID BAUMGARDT

A Peaceable Answer to the Russian Challenge

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The Study of Man—

Government by Manipulation

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COMMENTARY

INCORPORATING CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RECORD

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Editor

ELLIOT E. COHEN

Associate Editor

CLEMENT GREENBERG

Editorial Assistant

ANNE MAGNES

Assistant Editors

NATHAN GLAZER, ROBERT S. WARSHOW

Business Manager

FRANCES GREEN

Contributing Editors

SALO W. BARON, SIDNEY HOOK, H. L. LURIE, JACOB R. MARCUS, SHALOM SPIEGEL

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COMMENTARY

INCORPORATING CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RECORD

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REPORT POINTS THE WAY

A Zionist Pioneer's Reaction

MOSCHE SMELANSKY

SAD it is indeed that the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry are still being debated two months after their publication by the very same people who had pledged themselves in the beginning to accept and immediately carry them out. Because it was understood that the situation was urgent, a time limit of one hundred and twenty days was originally set for the completing of the Committee's work. But the situation is still urgent, it is a matter of life and death for many human beings; and it has become more important than ever that its settlement not be delayed a single hour more.

Few among us believed that the Commit-

MOSCHE SMELANSKY's article, "A Palestinian's Solution," in the March COMMENTARY was quoted at a crucial point in the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry's report on Palestine. It appears also that the Committee took guidance from Mr. Smelansky's views in more than one question. Born in Russia in 1874, Mr. Smelansky went to Palestine at the age of sixteen and has remained there ever since, living and working as a planter in the great colony he helped build at Rehovot. Not only has he made himself an authority in agrarian matters; he has also found time to write novels, stories, and articles and to collaborate regularly with Dr. Judah Magnes' *Ihud* group. In 1934 the colony of Kefar Mosheh was founded at Benyamina to celebrate his sixtieth birthday.

tee's heavy task, which involved a great deal of arduous work and the grasp of weighty and difficult problems in a variety of countries, could be finished in so short a time. To our pleasant surprise, the Committee finished its work fourteen days before the expiration of the time limit. How bitter then is our disappointment now, after the passing of two months, to see not a single initial step yet taken toward the realization of the Committee's great and humane recommendations.

This bitter fact does not, however, detract one hair's breadth from the historical importance of the Committee's conclusions. The Committee has (1) established a basis for a mutual understanding and, presumably, for mutual cooperation between Great Britain and the United States in matters affecting us in Palestine; (2) confirmed anew the Balfour Declaration and abolished the White Paper that brought calamity to Palestine and stained Britain's fair name; and (3) laid the foundation for Hebrew-Arab understanding in the future.

Mighty voices raised on both sides do not seem at first sight to confirm the last statement. However, we have learned from experience that "mighty" voices do not always come from the heart—often only from the throat. Let us begin to act, and the noise will cease.

I do not intend here to discuss the Inquiry Committee's report in detail; I am writing an article, not a book. I want only to draw attention to a few things that lie nearest my heart—and which happen, incidentally, to constitute the essence of the report.

In its second conclusion the Committee recommends the *immediate* rescue and deliverance of a hundred thousand Jewish souls from internment camps in Europe, and their return, after years and years of the tortures of concentration camp life, to a normal home life—their translation from a life of idleness to one of creativity, from a life of quivering expectation to one of hope. This section of the report is a magnificent human contribution that bears witness to the high level of humanity and social understanding of the twelve Britons and Americans who formulated it. President Truman initiated the recommendation, the Committee reaffirmed it—then why tarry? Why delay its realization by even so much as one day? What a pity! Some people “win their chance for eternity in one hour.” Some, on the other hand, lose theirs in an equal amount of time. A pity indeed!

In a previous article in COMMENTARY (March 1946) I did not conceal my apprehension that the Yishuv may be on the brink of an economic crisis such as is inevitable in every period of transition and adjustment from war to peace. Signs of such a crisis are already noticeable. But this should not be permitted to delay in the least the transfer of the hundred thousand Jews from Europe. Delay in this matter is in fact likely to encourage economic crisis. Nor is this a mere paradox. The procrastination in the transfer of the hundred thousand depresses us in the Yishuv; and nothing is more concretely valuable than high spirits, or morale, once an economic crisis threatens.

It hardly needs to be emphasized that the Yishuv is in no position to absorb, entirely unaided, a hundred thousand fresh immigrants in the space of a single year—immigrants, moreover, who altogether lack material means. (The Committee of Inquiry realized this.) Nor will the Jewish Agency's

efforts suffice by themselves to meet the challenge. The transfer, which will be a great human achievement, calls also for the combined and high-minded help of Great Britain and the United States.

And although the blood that flows in the veins of these hundred thousand rescued Jews may not be that of sound, healthy bodies, its infusion into the Yishuv will renew the latter's forces and drive it to fresh efforts. The economic crisis will pass, to make way for a new epoch of creativity.

BUT it should not be forgotten for a moment that if the hundred thousand go to swell the population of our cities alone, their transfer will be but a temporary salvation and not an everlasting redemption. Our people is in a weakly condition because of its exaggerated concentration in urban occupations. We are faced with the vital necessity of returning—in an appreciable proportion, at least—to agriculture, to the tilling of the soil and to the making of bread with the sweat of one's brow. It is our duty to settle these hundred thousand on the land and, even more, to settle on the land those brought by the steady immigration that will come in the future. This brings me to the seventh conclusion of the Inquiry Committee. I consider it no less and perhaps even more important than the second one.

The Committee recommends the abrogation of the shameful prohibition, embodied in the 1940 Land Regulations, of Jewish purchases of land in the greater part of Palestine. This recommendation testifies to the intelligence as well as sense of justice of the members of the Committee; it shows how well they have grasped the full reality of our situation in so short a space of time.

Many official experts, inspired apparently by the policy of a certain interested party, have been laboring for years to obliterate the facts. And certain loud voices have come to their aid with a hue and cry about “Jewish invasion” and the “ousting of the fellah.” Between them they built that “calf” before which some people kneel, and on which is written that discrimination is to be practiced

between two peoples living in the same country in regard to that most vital of all things to life—land.

I am a Zionist. I imbibed my Zionism in earliest childhood from the Bible. But the Bible taught me not only to love and yearn for the land of my ancestors, but also to love all mankind. And I must admit that of all mankind I love the tiller of the soil most. Had I ever thought that the realization of Zionism would be likely to uproot the fellahin, I would have summoned up the moral strength to uproot Zionism from my heart. But this, fortunately, has not been the case.

For more than fifty-five years I have lived in the land of my ancestors and have "walked through it, in the length of it and in the breadth of it." There is not a region in Palestine that I do not know. I have spent a good deal of my life going through the country, traveling over its highways and byways on foot and in the saddle. I know our country and I know, also, what *soil* is like. I was born on the countryside, of a family of farmers. During my years in Palestine I have been occupied with all kinds of agriculture—and have burned my fingers at it more than once or twice; but I got to know our agriculture. And I say, from my innermost convictions as a man and as a farmer, that there is ample room in Palestine for many new Jewish settlers on the land, and not a single Arab peasant would have to be dispossessed to accommodate them. On the contrary, experience has already shown that Jewish land colonization in Palestine strengthens the position of the Arab fellahin and will continue to do so.

By far the greater part of our land is still desolate. But wonders can be produced out of this desolation by the threefold means of sunshine, water, and fertilizer. Of sunshine we have plenty, and free of charge. Water exists but it has to be made accessible and brought into the desolate places. As for fertilizer—water power can be used to produce electricity, which can in turn be used to extract nitrogen from the air. Potash is obtained from the Dead Sea, and phosphates

can be found in our mountains. And the more cattle that irrigation permits us to graze, the more manure we shall get for our fields—and the more milk for our stomachs.

The members of the Committee of Inquiry had the chance to learn what the truth and reality of Palestine are with their own eyes. They could compare what they saw in our Jewish settlements with the desolate wilderness surrounding them. The howls they heard about "invasion" did not, therefore, mislead them. Was there ever a country that actually welcomed "invaders" coming to dispossess its native inhabitants? The Arabs of Palestine did in fact welcome the "invasion" here complained against; for not a single Arab family, including those of the howlers, failed to snap up any chance to sell land to the Jewish "invaders" on which the latter could erect their "bridgeheads." And these Arabs sold their land of their own free will; whether under Turkish or British rule, no external force coerced them to do so.

THE Committee succeeded in grasping the nature of our two most vital and fundamental problems: immigration and land. The Jewish people will never forget such sympathetic understanding. The Committee was not taken in by the loud cries of the other party, and it discriminated properly between the vital problems and those created merely by the mouth.

I consider the Committee's third conclusion: "No Arab, no Jewish state," as of decisive historical importance. It lays the foundation for a final Jewish-Arab understanding; and this will come once the hue and cry on both sides have subsided. There are two reasons for the justice and wisdom of this recommendation:

First: it is impossible, because impractical and immoral, to impose the political rule of one people upon another—especially when the two nations concerned live in the same country. The supremacy of either would mean an everlasting bloody struggle.

Second: no tiny state has, under modern conditions, a right to existence. A tiny state is a curse rather than a blessing—a curse upon

itself and the whole of humanity. Like every small state, our own "statelette" would be unable to maintain itself politically and economically by its own sole efforts. It would be surrounded by enemies on all three of its land frontiers; and enemies would also dwell within it. The Arabs for still a long time to come would constitute the majority, and when they did become a minority they would be a mighty one. Despite all the heroism animating our sons, we would not be able to maintain ourselves without aid against all our internal and external foes. Consequently, we would be constrained to sell our political "independence" to some military power that consented to spread its wing over us. That would be the reward of our "independence." And notwithstanding our protector, the more or less permanent state of war in which we would be placed would force us to support armed forces that would drain away our wealth. In this connection attention should be directed to a statistical item contained in the Committee's report.

The government of Great Britain spent \$18,000,000 on the maintenance of order in Palestine during the fiscal year 1944-45, as against \$2,200,000 spent on health services and \$2,000,000 on education. It is no secret that at the same time the Yishuv itself openly or secretly expended sums on the "maintenance of order" that were far from modest. The budget of our future state, which would have to maintain armed forces on all its frontiers and a large police force internally, would be even more of a caricature of a national budget than the present one of the British government in Palestine. The "maintenance of order" would swallow up "health" and "education"—and not merely in a budgetary sense either.

And who would pay the huge taxes to assure the budget of our future state? Would the Arabs, a majority first and then a great minority, be expected to do so? Or the new immigrants, who will need help during their first years in the country? Or our industry, which would have to fight against a boycott in all the neighboring countries?

We can be almost absolutely certain that

the Jewries of the Diaspora, particularly those of America and Great Britain, will make a great effort to help us in our work of colonization, so that we shall be able to absorb our hundreds of thousands of new immigrants. But it seems most doubtful whether they would consent or be able to contribute heavily and steadily enough for the maintenance of government machinery, an army, and armaments.

There are "daydreamers" among us who plan for the immediate transfer of two million immigrants and who think that our "state" will be able to get huge international loans for the realization of its political aims. For my part I doubt very much whether an incipient "state," faced with the necessity of keeping its "army" constantly on the alert, would inspire much trust in the money markets of the world. And I suspect that to do so much as even request such loans would destroy the possibility of obtaining other more sensible and modest ones.

The "daydreamers" are now trying to calculate how much of the "royal" budget will be covered by customs duties—forgetting that high tariffs would undermine our economic existence. Our country could not survive very long without exports, and we would have to enter into customs agreements with the countries most interested in our products in order to forestall their placing high tariffs upon them. In return we would have to bind ourselves not to put high duties on the products sold to us. Moreover, there are many vital necessities—raw materials first and foremost among them—that we are more interested in buying than the producers concerned are interested in selling—at least to us. Thus a budgetary structure based on tariff duties would be a castle in the air for Jewish Palestine.

Despite all our achievements and successes, we will never become a great force on the world market; our country is too small. Our economic future in the world depends entirely upon the extent to which we succeed in integrating ourselves in a centralized economic bloc with the countries around us, and upon the extent to which we establish

connections with the great and decisive economic forces of the world. It is quite doubtful whether any "independent" political machinery could help us in this course.

AND now let me admit another of my "foibles": the prospect of the moral curse that rests upon every miniature state frightens me even more than the economic curse. We are still, thank God, very far from a state. But ever since we "promulgated" one in the platform adopted at the Biltmore Hotel in New York, a certain "royal" atmosphere has begun to impose itself upon life in the Yishuv.

The first in the Zionist camp to proclaim the "state" as a fundamental tenet were the Revisionists—they who until the Biltmore days were, rightly, like pariahs in the Zionist movement. Formerly only the Revisionist youth were brought up in the spirit of chauvinism and militarism, which crass ignorance and short-sightedness considered "nationalism." Today, however, most of our youth are brought up in this spirit. The most reliable sign of the presence of this sort of "education" is the fact that our youth have learned to think mechanically. Some invisible "unknown," some "instructor" or "head" pushes a secret button and, lo!—the young man's brains begin to spin.

The Hagana was a pure creation in the beginning, clean of purpose and pure of motive. From the day we ploughed the first furrow in our country's soil we knew that the blades of the ensuing crop would have to be guarded against the beast of the desert. We have learned to hold the plow with one hand and the gun with the other. But we had taken upon ourselves with vow and oath not to use the arms in our possession for anything but the protection of our persons and property and not, heaven forbid, for aggressive purpose. For we are first and foremost Jews. Accordingly we took upon ourselves the oath never to use our arms for anything except self-defense, and we adhered to that oath under the most trying circumstances. Even during the years of the disturbances, which lasted from the

spring of 1936 to the autumn of 1939, we held fast to this tradition and coined a new term "Havlaga" (Restraint), which we kept sacred. To wit: To defend and not to attack. And when, near Rosh Pinna, three mad boys sniped at Arab passers-by we declared them: "Unclean." But the promulgation of a "state" and the preparations that led to it have turned the Hagana's dish upside down, putting that organization in the same rank as the murderers of the Irgun Zevai Leumi and the Stern Group.

Since the Biltmore days, freedom of thought and speech have been banned. Scribes have turned into "shofars" trumpeting the slogans dictated from above.

Anyone that dares to have an opinion of his own is considered a traitor. Writers of any independence have for a long period been forced to remain dumb. When the Committee of Inquiry was here in Palestine, strict orders were issued that no one was to testify before it along any but "official" lines. Even the largest groups in the Yishuv submitted to this "edict" for fear of losing their influence with a public steeped in such a poisoned atmosphere.

Our whole public life is lived in accordance with "edicts" from above. The great wave of volunteers for the war against Hitler, borne forward by a lofty enthusiasm, was broken into eddies and made turbid by a series of "edicts" that sought to capitalize politically on this movement.

That is what a "state" is like.

The Jewish National Fund, on the other hand, did not engage in "warfare" but continued its creative efforts. It has, in spite of everything, acquired 360,000 *dunams* of land in the six years since the promulgation of the White Paper! (In the thirty-five years preceding it had acquired 460,000 *dunams*.) And had it not been for a shortage of funds, twice as much land would have been acquired in those six years. And the Colonization Department of the Jewish Agency has likewise refrained from "war" and confined itself to creation. Since the White Paper days it has, with the assistance of Keren Hayesod, established fifty new

agricultural settlements. Similarly, the Joint Distribution Committee has saved hundreds of thousands of human beings from death by murder or starvation at the hands of the European Tophet.

But the Political Department of the Jewish Agency—the “Biltmore men”—occupied themselves meanwhile with the creation of a “state” and with secret immigration into Palestine. What have they achieved? They failed to realize that the more they busied themselves with their “state,” frittering away strength, enthusiasm, and money on it, the less became the opportunities for clandestine immigration. Why was the “Patria” scuttled, the Arabs, and the Arabs put pressure upon the British—who *cannot* disregard Arab pressure. I feel sure that, without the Biltmore tumult, ten times as many immigrants could have been smuggled into Palestine than were actually landed since the issuance of the White Paper.

We know with what results the bombs of the underground “armies” as well as the *shofars* “came to the rescue” of the secret immigration. Why was the “Patria” scuttled, with the loss of two hundred and fifty Jewish lives? These immigrants could have come to Palestine if they had been sent to Mauritius; immigrants have already come to Palestine from there. But none will ever return from the bottom of the sea. Why were coast-guard stations bombed where women and children were living? Have not all the ships carrying illegal immigrants been always brought to Haifa by the authorities, and from there taken to Athlit, where they were later freed? Why then was precious blood spilled? Why were British policemen and soldiers and Jewish boys and girls sent to their deaths? Was it merely to show off the power of the future “state”?

THE Peel Commission made the well-known proposal for a partition of Palestine between Jew and Arab. Many accepted this proposal as the lesser or minimum evil,

the only way out. I was among those who did so. Yet there was a fundamental difference between the group to which I belonged (the men of the Farmers’ Federation) and the other supporters of partition. Our group set forth its views clearly in our organ *Bustenaey*. We were against the establishment of two “statelettes” in Palestine, for reasons already given above, advocating instead the retention of the British Mandate over the two regions into which Palestine would be divided, with each region to constitute an independent economic and cultural entity. For the miniature “state” has continued to alarm me ever since I saw—once, twice, thrice—what small states could do in Central Europe and neighboring regions; I saw these “states” groveling before the mighty and felt their animosity and all-consuming envy. Therefore I was against two such states in Palestine.

Now, after the long years of “education” under Hitler and after beholding the moral and spiritual ruination of the postwar period, *I am against the partition of Palestine in any way, shape, or form*—including even that which I considered acceptable in the days of the Peel Commission. Today two armed camps face each other in my country, ready to exploit any pretext for open warfare; they would drown us in our sons’ blood. Today there is no way out except the retention of the British Mandate—or if possible, the establishment of an Anglo-American mandate.

But in either case it should be a mandate grounded strictly on the principle of free Jewish immigration in accordance with the country’s absorptivity; on the freedom of land transfer as well as on the protection of the plowland of the fellah and farm tenant; and on the increasing participation of Palestinian Jews and Arabs alike in the administration of the country (they should be admitted to all except the very highest official posts). And we should also aspire to eventual dominion status for Palestine.

This is the road. There is no other.

THE GERMANS AND THE JEWS: POSTWAR REPORT

The Enigma of German Irresponsibility

MOSES MOSKOWITZ

A MIDST the ruins of an ancient German city, the leader of a crew that was clearing away wreckage pointed to an inscription on a toppling wall near the site of the former Nazi party headquarters. "What does it read?" he asked. "*Die Juden sind unser Unglück*" (The Jews are our misfortune). After a moment's pause, he added: "This inscription is incomplete; it should read: *Die Juden-Pogrome waren und sind unser Unglück*" (The pogroms against Jews were and are our misfortune). That crew leader, who was supervising a crew of "party members," was an old Social Democrat. He believed that anti-Semitism was the beginning of Nazism, and that Auschwitz, Dachau, and Maidanek were the end of Germany.

So clear-cut a point of view is, however, quite exceptional. Not that anyone has found a single German today who tries to justify the mass murder of Jews, the burning of synagogues, the *Ausschaltung* of a Jewish friend, neighbor, or acquaintance. Indeed, there is hardly a German who

doesn't express horror at the mention of concentration camps and crematoria. As a matter of fact, if we were to take every German at his word, the number of Nazis—if by Nazi we mean a conscious or convinced believer in Nazi doctrine—must have been exceedingly small. Most Germans produce one excuse or another to explain away their former association with the Nazi activities. Some will say it was coercion, pressure, blackmail, and superior force; others that it was misguidance, deception, or ignorance. And, after talking to hundreds of former Nazis, one comes to the conclusion that this disclaimer of Nazi belief and conviction is not deception prompted by fear or expediency. It is sincere—and in some ways this makes the phenomenon more frightening. There is a kind of passivity and indifference, a wholesale absence of any sense of responsibility.

A further fact underlines this. If the number of Germans who admit having approved of Jewish extermination is *nil*, the number who would agree that the pogroms were Germany's misfortune is not much larger. In the recitals of Nazi crimes now featured at public forums and party meetings in Germany, the six million Jewish dead in Europe do not loom large. The role of anti-Semitism in the rise of Nazism to power is rarely discussed in public, and German newspapers have shied away from the subject. To date no one (except the philosopher Jaspers) has arisen in Germany to exhort his people to repentance and expiation for the mass graves of Jews dotting half the European continent.

WHAT accounts for this absence of a sense of guilt, of remorse, and a spirit of atonement? Six million Jews have been

As an officer with the American Military Government service in Germany concerned particularly with the handling of displaced persons, MOSES MOSKOWITZ had an opportunity to observe at close range the relationships of Germans and Jews since the end of the war. This article presents some of the insights he gained in Germany. Mr. Moskowitz was born in Poland in 1910 and came to the United States in 1927. He is a graduate of the College of the City of New York and has had several years of graduate study at Columbia University in the field of international law and international relations. Since 1937 he has been in the Foreign Affairs Division of the American Jewish Committee, except for his three and one-half years of Army service. He has published articles on Eastern European affairs and minorities problems.

killed, and those who inspired and did the killing were Germans. Perhaps these Germans belong to a particular type that is not to be identified with the average run of Germans. Yet even so, the German people are in the position of a parent sheltering a wayward son who has terrorized his neighbors, and this parent has accepted the proceeds of his son's crimes. Sins of omission are sometimes as great as sins of commission, and the failure of the German people to protest against the mass execution of Jews implicates them in this, the most hideous of Nazi crimes. "Am I my brother's keeper?" is a Cain's excuse.

There is in addition a special kind of shamelessness. The Nazis represented anti-Semitism as an emanation of the German soul, racial Aryanism as an integral part of the German's personality. Yet came liberation, and Jewish parentage was at once at a premium in Germany. One corpuscle of Jewish blood was highly prized, while former associations with Jews were invoked as personal recommendations. The files of the Special Branch sections of Military Government are stuffed with documents submitted by Germans in support of their claims to political reliability. These almost invariably refer to past social and business relations with Jews.

Today the German woman who consorts freely with non-Jews also consorts with the Jewish soldier and officer. German women have been known to be on intimate terms with Jewish men who only a year ago were behind concentration-camp gates. Among these women are a number who held leading positions in the *Bund der Deutschen Mädel*, the Nazi organization for girls. One former group leader of the Bund was very earnest in her endeavors to join her Jewish "sweetheart" in the United States; and her Nazi father, who had been dismissed from office by Military Government, was very much concerned lest his compromised political record might interfere with his daughter's happiness. German men and women have sought and found employment with re-established Jewish professionals, while in

hospitals and sanatoriums German nurses work side by side with their Jewish colleagues.

AGAIN the question: Was it mere opportunism that, after their defeat, prompted the Germans to advertise their "Jewish blood" and their Jewish "friends and associations," in the belief that it would help them escape some of the consequences of de-Nazification? The sight of the emaciated Jews who then walked the streets of Germany and the no less pathetic sight of those who congregated in front of the guarded gates of bleak displaced-persons camps could not have inspired fear of Jewish might and power. The demeanor of the "liberated" Jews was not such as to give support to Goebbels' warning that the Allied admirals and generals were so many "agents of Jewish-Bolshevism."

Opportunism there undoubtedly was. But people who adhere to a tenet of faith that expresses their innermost feelings, and in the name of which six million human beings have been slaughtered, do not readily disavow their belief in a moment of adversity. The Germans have not, for example, abandoned their faith in German nationalism and in the resurrection of the German state.

Nor is the German woman impelled by any political motives, or intriguer's desire to learn the "secret" of the Jew, any more than the Jewish man is especially interested in fathoming the mind of the German. Quite simply, her blood does not revolt against the crime of "racial defilement," for which she would have been decapitated the year before. She violates the racial theory that was the cornerstone of the entire anti-Semitic structure in Germany without giving it a thought.

One saw many German homes celebrating the return of one or more Jewish members of the family. In some cases it was a Jewish wife or husband, in others, a Jewish son-in-law or daughter-in-law. The celebrations were not strictly family affairs. Friends, neighbors, and acquaintances were

invited and they came with gifts and presents. The return from abroad of the Jewish wife of a highly placed public official was made practically a gala occasion. Not all of the returnees readily adjusted themselves to their new environment. But in many cases they drifted back to their old circles of friends and acquaintances. A Jewish lawyer was swamped by his old clientele. A Jewish physician now enjoys a lucrative practice among his old neighbors.

ONE ventures some generalizations: Genetically the Germans are no more anti-Semitic than any other people in the world; anti-Semitism is not an hereditary quality. It is an ancient social disease that most virulently attacks people with the weakest political character, and the weakest spiritual and moral convictions. It thrives best in an atmosphere of lawlessness, sadism, and moral chaos. Had the German people been more mature politically, Nazism would never have come to power or assumed the form it did. Had they shown greater spiritual and moral stamina, millions of human beings would not have been sacrificed to their presumed glory and honor. Those Jews in Europe who escaped the concentration camps and crematoria owe their lives to Gentile neighbors who hid and protected them. But few indeed were the German homes that sheltered Jews. This was not because the German hated the Jew with all his heart and soul, and sought to deliver him into the hands of the executioner. It was because persecution was on the order of the day, and he did not have the *moral conviction* to oppose it. The German people's deadly sin was—and is today—aquiescence.

At the moment the order of the day is anti-Nazism. The German masses have abandoned Nazism with the same readiness with which they embraced it in 1933.

Certain conclusions seem warranted. The community of blood and soil, in whose name and for whose glory Hitler conquered Germany within and sought to conquer the world without, has been dissolved. The

hundreds of thousands of German refugees, the "racial" Germans expelled from Sudetenland, Poland, Russia, Rumania, Hungary, come into a strange land and among strange people when they reach Germany. They are greeted with scorn, suspicion, and hate. Among the most pathetic sights today in the German countryside are the caravans of tired horses and broken-down wagons carrying half-starved, dirty, sickly people who have come across half the European continent, only to find themselves unwelcome, refused lodging for the night and even water for their horses. Similarly, the denunciations of Nazis, the refusal on the part of the average German to share responsibility for the events of 1933-1945, and his perennial cries against the deceit and betrayal practiced by his recent rulers, all indicate that Nazism as a political, social, and cultural philosophy is no permanent part of the make-up of the German masses.

Nor has racism, the Nazi form of anti-Semitism, sunk any more deeply into German consciousness than the equally Nazi blood-and-soil philosophy, with its national consciousness founded on "community of fate." After Nazi defeat, long-interrupted courtships between "racially incompatible" men and women were resumed and marriages that were not sanctioned by Nazi law were made. In one town, at least, the conclusion of such a marriage was hailed by the *bürgermeister* as marking the dawn of a new era. The frequent sight of German girls walking arm in arm with our colored troops offers additional evidence that the racial theory of the Nazis has not survived their defeat. Indeed, an informal poll among approximately one hundred German men and women of all ages revealed that only nine had a clear notion of what the racial theory and the Nuremberg Laws were all about.

IN THE course of a year this writer interviewed hundreds of German men and women from all classes of German society. Few of them were free from anti-Jewish bias of one kind or another. But the num-

ber who betrayed the specific influence of Streicher's propaganda was not much larger. Many of those interviewed made distinctions between one Jew and another, between Jews from the East and West, North and South. None of them betrayed the personal, emotional animosity towards Jews that was to be found, for example, among Polish displaced persons.

There were no typical answers, and their replies could not be reduced to a tabular form, but some comments were more striking than others. A middle-aged tavern keeper remarked that Bismarck had been a greater statesman than Hitler. "Bismarck," he said, "first waged successful wars and then proclaimed the Empire. Hitler first proclaimed a thousand-year Reich and then waged a losing war. Bismarck fought only against one church and went to Canossa. Hitler fought heaven itself and went to hell. Bismarck founded a German nation and it prospered. Hitler founded an Aryan race and it perished. Bismarck fought in alliance with the Jews and won. Hitler fought against the Jews and lost."

The young manager of an industrial plant remarked, "I can understand why a man like Hitler, who dealt with absolutes, hated an Einstein, who dealt with relativities. I can also understand why he hated the Jewish shopkeepers whose prices were relative. But I cannot understand why he hated my Jewish friends and neighbors, who were absolutely good Germans."

"I think," said a young tinsmith, "that every race and nation has a right to clean its own house. Hitler made a big mistake when he tried to clean other peoples' houses, too. If it is true that the Jews are really a destructive force, then Hitler should not only have let the Jews outside Germany stay alive but encouraged them to multiply. The countries outside would then have become weaker vis-a-vis Germany and Germany would have come out on top anyway." And an elderly woman, a retired hospital nurse, remarked, "Please don't ask me why this and that happened. Psychologists will be busy for the next thousand years trying

to explain the phenomenon of Hitler and his regime. I am not the one to supply the answer. By the way, do you know the answer to the riddle of anti-Semitism? The only thing I do know is that if such a good and kind people as the Germans are capable of killing millions of human beings, as you say they did, humanity is fundamentally beastly."

PERHAPS the most common mechanism by which the German masses avoid a sense of guilt for the fate of the first and most tragic victims of Nazism, the six million Jewish dead, is to convince themselves that they, too, have been victims of Nazism, and possibly in greater measure than any other people.

Our propaganda to the effect that the destruction of Hitler's regime was not only a necessary condition for the peace of the world, but was also a boon to the Germans themselves since it freed them from the threat of perpetual enslavement, must have made a deep impression on their minds. They came to regard themselves as another oppressed people deserving not blame but sympathy. How can they feel guilty of crimes committed by a criminal who "threatened" them, too? Unanimously they complain that they were deceived and betrayed.

Typical of this attitude is the comment made by an intelligent German business executive, formerly a member of the Nazi party but otherwise politically inactive. We discussed the events in Germany during the past twelve years and we spoke of the conditions that followed the last war, of the rise of Hitlerism, the character of the German people, anti-Semitism and the extermination of the Jews of Europe, the military occupation of Germany, etc. At the conclusion of our talk, he remarked, "Yes, we were all in the same boat. Who knows but that we, too, would have ended up in concentration camps and crematoria. Jews, Germans, Catholics, Protestants, Communists, Socialists, and Democrats, we were all oppressed and we all suffered. Look what happened to Germany! But for the

Nazis, Germany would have remained a happy land."

Moreover, to confess a sense of guilt would simply imply the acceptance of the collective-guilt principle. The German masses recoil from this instinctively. In the early days of the occupation there were a few Germans who attempted to convince their compatriots that they could expect no salvation until they confessed the sins they themselves had committed or permitted others to commit in their name. These prophets won no ready listeners and were finally banished from the public forums. Today all the major political parties in Germany emphatically reject the collective-guilt theory. If they disclaim responsibility for the regime, they certainly will not accept responsibility for any of its individual acts.

When all is said and done, the most striking over-all impression is *the absence in the German of any emotional reaction towards Jews*, be it positive or negative. It was shocking at times to listen to people decrying the evils of Nazism, reciting the horrors of concentration camps, detailing the enormities committed in the torture chambers and crematoria, without expressing one word of sympathy for the victims. A former German army reporter, who witnessed many "offensives" against Jewish quarters in Poland, was unsparing in his denunciation of Nazi cruelty. But at no time did he betray any emotion or express any sympathy with the victims of that cruelty. "I was filled with disgust," he would say, "at the sight of strong armed men running after men, women, and children. Their cries and lamentations were worse than the crossfire of guns and mortars, than the din of exploding rockets. These people knew that they were meeting their doom." If the Germans had been emotionally antagonistic towards Jews, Nazism would not have had to expend so much intellectual effort to enlist the people in the anti-Semitic campaigns. But if they had had more warmth for their Jewish friends and neighbors, the Nazis would not

have realized their anti-Jewish program so fully.

The Germans have talked themselves into innocence. We cannot, therefore, expect them to atone for a sin they do not admit having committed. Like human beings in general, the Germans, too, prefer to delete from their minds painful past experiences; because they now realize how cruel, senseless, and unprofitable the entire Nazi system was, they have convinced themselves they always thought so.

I once interrogated a group of Germans with a view to establishing their qualifications for a particular position. Every time I pointed out to them that certain of their activities in the past were incongruous with their present declarations, they tried to prove that these activities had always been in accord with the opinions they hold today. Only one admitted that he had been wrong and that he had changed his mind.

JUST as the German masses feel no sense of guilt for the six million Jewish dead in Europe, so the great majority of the surviving Jews feel no particular vindictiveness towards the German people. The day the Landsberg concentration camps were uncovered in April 1945, an incident occurred that was difficult to explain at the time but which, in retrospect, has a symbolic significance. German prisoners of war were on hand to clear the barracks of the dead, to dig graves, burn infested clothes, and do menial labor of every kind. When they lined up for their evening meal, one of the Jewish inmates spotted a pair of shiny boots on the feet of a German soldier. He approached him and forced him to follow him into a vacated barracks. I decided to look.

The half-naked, skeleton-like Jew was stripping the soldier of his boots and in the process ceremoniously addressing him, half in Yiddish and half in German, as follows: "In reality, I should take not only your boots, but your life as well. You and your kind killed my wife and my children, my mother, my aunts and uncles, my cousins, and everybody who was dear to me. You

killed all the Jews, burned all the synagogues, and trampled upon everything that was holy to us. Why don't I kill you? Because I only want your boots and not your life. God will take care of you and mete out the punishment you deserve. Who am I to sit in judgment?" The soldier remained seated throughout in stony silence. After the Jew tried on the boots and thought they fitted him, he asked the soldier to step into his worn-out wooden clogs. The soldier obeyed, but his face turned blue with agony.

"They are not very comfortable," the Jew remarked, and launched into another tirade. "In reality," he said, "you don't deserve even these wooden clogs. But what shall I do with you, let you go barefoot? I shall give you a piece of advice. If you want to be more comfortable, pad the inside with some cloth or cotton. Stand up and let me see how you walk. Good, you will get used to them. Now get back to the chow line." With what looked like a pat on the soldier's back, he escorted him to the field kitchen.

If the Jews had been given to vindictiveness, they would have had many opportunities to avenge themselves. But there has been no recorded incident of Jews who took the law into their own hands, unprovoked. Very few Jews regard German property as legitimate booty, even though many suspect that the clothes worn by German men, women, and children were once theirs. To be sure, they deeply resent the freedom enjoyed by those Germans whose rightful place is behind bars, and the comfortable quarters of others who belong in dungeons. But they are careful to distinguish between innocent and guilty, and to think clearly about the Germans as a political and human problem. Among Jewish displaced persons one can hear the most objective discussions on de-Nazification and the political trends of the different German political parties.

The attitude of the Jews towards Germans seems to be guided by an unshaken belief in humanity, a deep sense of justice,

plus incurable optimism. A Jewish physician, who, together with his twenty-year-old son, survived six years of the most cruel tortures in Dachau and other concentration camps, once remarked that if it were proven that all the seventy-odd million Germans were capable of committing the crimes perpetrated against him and his thousands of fellow inmates, Jews and minorities in general were threatened everywhere. But he refused to condemn the entire human race by condemning so large a segment of it. In the interest of justice, he preferred to see the million or so Germans who engineered and executed the enormities against the human race hang, rather than to distribute the guilt among seventy million people and reduce their sentences proportionately. Like the Rabbi of Berdichev, the Jews in Germany, native or foreign, bend over backwards to find some goodness in the German so as to justify his existence on this earth.

OF COURSE, German-Jewish postwar relations have not yet even begun to be tested in the crucible of experience. Comparatively few of the surviving German Jews have returned to their former homes and occupations. With the abolition of Nazi discriminatory legislation, they regained their former rights of German citizenship; but that is no particular privilege today, and its liabilities are great. Those who did return and re-establish themselves have found no particular difficulties because of their Jewish antecedents—perhaps because they have been "blessed" with German relatives. Half-Jews, quarter-Jews, and decimal-Jews are to be found among the higher state and municipal officials, in industry and in commerce. At least one of the highest German state officials in the American zone has close Jewish relations and his political position has not been impaired on that account. Indeed, one of the local leaders of the Christian Democratic Union, a school superintendent, is heavily mortgaged with close Jewish blood relations.

So far the Germans' principal contacts with Jews have been with displaced persons, former concentration-camp inmates, slave laborers, and infiltrates—and the Germans have met these people more as groups than as individuals. Their contacts have in a number of instances led to unfortunate results, to rioting and bloodshed. Are these incidents to be construed as meaning that the Germans are beginning to show their true colors again? No, the origin of these incidents is local in character and is part of the general displaced-persons situation in Germany. The Germans are deeply resentful of the latter's privileged status, their preferential treatment in respect to food and shelter, and certain freedoms and immunities they receive that are denied to the Germans. The Germans are bitter because they have in many cases been dispossessed of their houses and apartments, and they begrudge the displaced persons the extra rations they may receive from UNRRA, the Red Cross, and other public, quasi-public, and private organizations. They are also in mortal fear lest the burden of feeding the displaced persons soon be thrown upon the meager German larder. Besides, the lawlessness of certain groups of displaced persons, especially Poles—who have been terrorizing the German countryside, and against whom the Germans were totally powerless until recently because of restrictions on their police power—has immeasurably increased German hostility towards the displaced persons. And the relatively easy access of the displaced persons to black-market merchandise, which they in turn sell to Germans, certainly does not conduce to friendly relations.

The fact that the majority of the displaced persons were brought into Germany against their will, tortured in concentration camps, or compelled to work for a cause hostile to the most vital interests of their own countries, is lost upon the Germans. Such being the case, the tension between Germans and Jewish displaced persons is not necessarily to be attributed to a recrudescence of anti-Semitism—al-

though the personal attitude of the individual German has no doubt been a contributing factor. To say the least, however, this tension on the German side does indicate a painful lack of sympathetic understanding for the most tragic victims of Nazism. After all, the cause of the tension lies in the Jews' more than justifiable resentment over their position in Germany. But the Germans are not prepared to abandon even a minimum of their comforts to make the lives of Jews more bearable.

THE fact that the German people feel no compulsion to make amends for the crimes of Nazism is the most important reason why a substantial part of the few surviving German Jews have decided to emigrate. If a man confesses that he has sinned and begs for absolution, there is reasonable ground to believe that he will not sin again. But for a sinner incapable of realizing his errors there is no hope. In the last analysis, the self-assumed role of the Germans as victims instead of victimizers is not only unbecoming—it is the greatest single obstacle to their own salvation.

At the same time, a new form of anti-Semitism may be arising in Germany. The Jews now in Germany, both native and foreign, are the *corpus delicti*, the accusers who haunt the Germans and will continue to haunt them until the thousands or millions of individual Germans who had a personal part in the extermination of the Jews are brought to justice. The Germans know very well that the extermination of Jews was a large-scale enterprise and that an untold number of people were directly engaged in it. Until they are identified, every German is suspected of having been one of them. As long as the Germans lack the moral courage to accept the consequences of the Nazi crimes against the Jews, they will seek to banish the accuser and they will denounce him as a disturber of their peace.

"I do wish," a well-meaning German remarked, "that you Americans would do something for the Jews. Give them a

chance to start life anew. Why, they do more to remind one of the black pages of our recent history than the ruins of all the German cities."

Then there are Germans who are fearful for the property and possessions they acquired from Jews, and which they may have to give up if a policy of restitution is enforced.

AND finally, there is the problem of the German youth, which, after twelve years of Hitler, has not yet been fathomed. Whether German youth can be cured of the Nazi malady is one of Germany's greatest social and political problems. That the youth has been indoctrinated with the racial theory is unquestionable. In a recent poll in one of the larger cities of southern Germany, 35 per cent of the young people questioned declared Jews to be inferior to Germans. (At the same time, however, approximately 25 per cent rated Italians as inferior to Jews.)

The impact of German-Jewish relations

is not limited to the several thousand Jews who have not irrevocably severed their ties with their native land. It is of interest to Jews everywhere and also perhaps to the world at large. If the Jews decide to abandon Germany forever and excommunicate it as they did Spain of old, it will be a terrible admission of the hopelessness of the Jewish position in the heart of Europe. The implication will be inevitable that all efforts to regenerate Germany from within are condemned to total failure, and that anti-Semitism is incurable. If the German Jews decide to remain and start life anew, their treatment by their neighbors will be the true measure of the German people's progress towards decency, progress, and democracy.

According to Jewish tradition, no condolence is offered to the family of a dead person until the third day after burial. The millions of Jewish dead have not yet all found their final resting place; the wounds of the handful that survive still remain to be bound.

GRACE AFTER BREAD

The Jewish World-View as Reflected in a Prayer

DAVID BAUMGARDT

WHEREVER Jews live in accordance with their traditions, they are united at "all the ends of the earth" by similar forms of prayer. They share the Bible with many others, but their prayers belong to them alone. And this holds true not only today; in many cases it has been true for nearly two thousand years. A British scholar recently showed me an excerpt from the Jewish *Eighteen Benedictions* that had caught his fancy in a collection of the proverbs of different peoples. It was as if I had come upon my mother's picture in a gallery of strange portraits.

These prayers, with their elemental simplicity, their plain vitality, their fervent but never declamatory passion, have always been the Jew's first and most direct teacher. It is in their strains above all that he has found self-resignation and pride, the strength to bear up under life's hardest blows, and glamor in the dullest monotony of everyday existence.

These prayers are filled with gratitude

DAVID BAUMGARDT is a German scholar and author, now consultant in philosophy to the Library of Congress. A former professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin, he studied at universities in Freiburg, Munich, Vienna, Heidelberg, and Berlin. He was invited by the Spanish Government to give the principal lecture during the state festival in honor of Maimonides in 1935. Dr. Baumgardt fought on the Russian front during World War I and was decorated with the Iron Cross; he was dismissed from his chair at the University of Berlin by Hitler in consequence of the Nuremberg racial laws. He became Visiting Professor at the University of Birmingham, England. His prolific writings include several books on philosophy in German, and essays in German, French, and English. Dr. Baumgardt was born in Erfurt, Germany, in 1890.

to the creator of the universe, and to life itself. Amid countless vicissitudes, Jews have here expressed their thanks for the gift of life and for their Jewish destiny, however burdensome it may be. But no one has thought to give thanks for the prayers themselves. In the following lines I shall try, in the simplest way, to make some amends for the omission.

We do possess basic historical studies on the origins of Jewish prayers—though much remains to be done even here. For the moment, however, I shall attempt only to show, by the example of the after-dinner grace, the "practical wisdom" and the "ethical-religious" philosophy expressed in the Jewish *tefillah* (prayer).

At this moment when the image of bread looms so large over the world it cannot seem strange that the whole spirit of a people should be found crystallized in the ceremonial words spoken after eating.

THE longer grace, which Jews are accustomed to recite at least once a day after a main meal, is more than a detailed expression of thanks for food and drink: this thanksgiving reflects the whole private, communal, and even cosmic life of the worshiper.

When a meal is eaten by three or more men, the prayer is introduced through alternate eulogies by the participants, and—as is so often the case in collective religious acts—each individual is brought into the ceremony independently and positively.

As a matter of fact, in no phase of Judaism does any rigid opposition of priest and laity, reciter and congregation, appear. Every "lay" person may be called upon to recite in the synagogue. In addition, he may be called upon to read the Torah or to

assist in taking out and replacing the Torah scrolls. When he is in mourning he is accompanied in the synagogue on the Sabbath by the whole congregation. As a scholar, he may also serve as the "bridegroom" of the Torah. This wise gradation of communal religious activities has brought with it a series of richly colored social-religious ceremonies of reverence and consolation, and through these there has been built up in the course of centuries that manifold, intensive, and peculiarly intimate Jewish sense of religious community.

So the custom has developed, in connection with the longer prayer said after meals taken in company, that the reciter first asks the host for permission to pronounce the benediction (*bentshen*). Only then may he recite: "Let us bless our Lord of whose bounty we have partaken." And the others, receiving this cue, respond: "Blessed be he of whose bounty we have partaken, and by whose goodness we live." The reciter then takes up this call again and brings it a step further: "Blessed be he of whose bounty we have partaken, by whose goodness we live. Blessed be he, and blessed again be his name."

By this time the rhythm of the invocation, raised at each step to a higher level, has become so clear that it might become monotonous if carried further. The reciter therefore breaks off, and now, in the most earnest prose, he expresses his thanks in the broadest possible terms. God, he says, in his grace, love, and pity, daily invites all creation to partake of his bounty.

The Hebrew language is known to be especially rich in shades of meaning for love and anger; the nuances for love used here are hardly translatable. *Chen* may mean: grace, gracefulness, charm; *rachamim* is far from the connotation of condescending pity: in its original meaning it is closely connected with the word for womb. Samson Raphael Hirsch's interpretation, according to which *chen*, *chesed*, and *rachamim* are here meant to signify gradations of love according to the merit of the recipient, seems to me too moralistic, for the phrase

is clearly "he giveth food to all flesh"—and, even more explicitly, "all thy creatures whom thou hast created." The reference is not to moral beings but to the totality of beings in the universe.

All these beings, it is stated with the fullest confidence, will be always provided with nourishment. And we, too—the assurance is given with the same firmness and faith—we, too, have never lacked nourishment nor shall we ever lack it. Therefore: "Praised be the Lord who giveth food unto all." This is the first *brachah* (benediction), in which thanksgiving for food is linked in accents of unswerving trust to praise of the never-failing providence for everything that exists.

THE second *brachah*, however, speaks of the nourishment derived from the Jewish soil of *Eretz Yisrael*. This establishes a connection between the cosmic-universal framework and the national-historical life of the Jews. "We thank thee, O Lord our God," the prayer continues, "because thou didst give as an heritage unto our fathers a desirable, good, and ample land, and because thou didst bring us forth, O Lord our God, from the land of Egypt, and didst deliver us from the house of bondage, as well as for thy covenant which thou hast sealed in our flesh, thy Law which thou hast taught us, thy statutes which thou hast made known unto us, the life, grace, and loving kindness which thou hast vouchsafed unto us, and for the food wherewith thou dost constantly feed and sustain us on every day, in every season, at every hour."

The benediction then touches upon the words of the commandments of the Torah (Deuteronomy, iii, 8) in which the Jews are enjoined to praise the land whose yield they have enjoyed. But here too the praise of the Jews is connected with the praise that is due to God "from the mouth of all that lives."

In this way the prayer expresses the worshiper's relationship to the security of the whole life of the cosmos and to the supposed security of the nation on the soil of

Palestine. As if only *Eretz Yisrael* could nourish the Jews of the world; as if it really did continue to nourish all Jews so long a time after their dispersion!

It has been with this strange and anachronistic sense of security that the Jews in the Diaspora have continued for more than a thousand years to offer thanks to God for the possession of their lost country, from which after long and bloody wars they were cruelly uprooted and scattered over the world. That such a people could be said to be without love of home, and altogether without love of the soil, is one of history's jokes. For the Jew's loyalty to his homeland has remained strong to the point of paradox—as we can see here and in countless others of his prayers and rites.

But the intrinsic audacity of Jewish feeling does not lie here alone—in that *Eretz Yisrael* should be loved to this day, in the face of all the facts, as the provider of the Jews, that the loss of the homeland should be simply ignored, and that the bitter fact of that loss should be considered as not having happened. There is a still higher boldness, a more astonishing paradox in this simple prayer: right next to the eulogy of the lost homeland as the constant provider of the people, a plea is offered that the land be reclaimed! The uninterrupted text reads as follows: "Blessed be thou, Lord, for the land of Palestine and for the nourishment it gives us. Have mercy, Lord, upon Jerusalem thy city, and upon Zion, the abiding place of thy glory, which is destroyed." Seen in purely rational terms, this is the most absurd nonsense. But I think a closer insight into this paradox will reveal something of the inner, unconscious, secret strength of Judaism.

Judaism rests on absolute trust in life, in successful and joyful living. Against all the evidence to the contrary, Judaism dares to assert that all living beings will always find nourishment. But the Jews do not remain blind to the facts that so clearly contradict this. They know well enough that in the long run not even the most courageous silence can wipe out their sorrow for the

loss of their temple and their anxiety over daily bread. And so in this prayer they also make open appeals for the resurrection of their national freedom and for their daily bread.

I HAVE always found these appeals the most affecting part of the prayer, its very core and climax: "Have mercy, O Lord our God, upon Israel thy people, upon Jerusalem thy city, upon Zion the abiding place of thy glory, upon the kingdom of the house of David thine anointed, and upon the great and holy house that was called by thy name." And then even more affectingly, proceeding from the cosmic and national to the personal: "O our Lord, our Father, feed us, nourish us, sustain, support, and relieve us, and speedily, O Lord our God, grant us relief from all our troubles. We beseech thee, O Lord our God, let us not be in need either of the gifts of flesh and blood or their loans, but only of thy helping hand, thy full and open, thy holy and ample hand, so that we may not be ashamed nor confounded for ever and ever."

Franz Rosenzweig, in his German version of this after-meal prayer, has rendered this desperate plea for "economic independence" in a much more subdued form. Several particles not present in the Hebrew, and a quieter rhythm, effected this change. Indeed, I have heard this passage recited in something resembling Rosenzweig's manner in Russia as well as Germany. The soft, peaceful, murmuring tone usually reserved for the rest of the *birkath hamason* (after-dinner grace) is in this case introduced earlier, thus subduing the outcry in conformity with the spirit of peaceful and joyous thanksgiving that has pervaded the prayer up to this point. Nevertheless, I have heard my father, and, on one occasion, the scholar and mystic Martin Buber, speak these words in very different and passionate tones. In view of recent events the more passionate tone of delivery must again appear to be the more suitable; the Jews of Europe no longer enjoy the relative security of the 19th century. And something of the

emotional stress of this middle passage may even flow backwards and color the opening words of the prayer.

In spite of all the aforesaid religious trust, an anxiety over the daily means of survival breaks out here—an anxiety so much more understandable among the Jews, supposedly so "rich," than among other peoples who have at least been able to remain on their own soil—that perpetual fear of the Jewish individual that he may be without bread in his landless exile. And it is noble that this fear should manifest itself not as naked fear of hunger, but as fear of the shame of being forced to beg for bread.

The whole field of world literature can hardly show another passage that presents more sharply and truly this hard antithesis: on the one hand, economic dependence and distress—today once again the haunting fear of the free man—is pictured as dependence on alien, flesh-and-blood hands, as begging for alms from strangers; on the other hand, and in complete contrast, economic freedom and independence is pictured as the privilege of receiving from the full and open, the holy and infinitely large hand of God.

FINALLY, the delicate conjuncture of wish and trust is compressed with classical brevity into the two lines: "And rebuild Jerusalem thy holy city speedily in our days. Blessed art thou O Lord who in thy compassion rebuildest Jerusalem. Amen." Again there seems to be an irreconcilable contradiction, but in reality the two formulas at once comprehend and remove the anxieties expressed in the earlier passages.

This juxtaposition of trust and fear is then carried further, with far greater passion than was shown in the still undiminished confidence with which the prayer began. A more urgent and more fervent appeal is revealed in the cumulative and precipitate succession of invocations: "Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, O God our Father our King, our Mighty One, our Creator, our Redeemer, our Maker, our Holy One, the Holy One of Jacob, our Shepherd, the Shepherd of Israel, our

King who art kind and dealest kindly with all day by day."

The great inner commotion is also betrayed by the passionate and impressive repetitions: "thou hast dealt kindly, dost deal kindly, and wilt deal kindly with us; thou hast bestowed, thou dost bestow, thou wilt ever bestow benefits upon us." These turns of speech have in addition a special loftiness of sound, and the meticulous division of God's actions into past, present, and future brings out sharply the human being's position in time, as he stands between gratitude for the past and hope and fear for the future.

Once more the emotional tension manifests itself in a rapid enumeration of all that man hopes for: goodwill, love, compassion, amplitude of life, freedom, happiness, blessing, aid, consolation, support and care, life, peace—all that is good.

Then again come simple appeals, without this double movement of gratitude for the past and hope for the future. At first these appeals come on the highest and most universal level: "The Almighty shall be blessed in heaven and on earth. The Almighty shall be praised throughout all generations, glorified among us to all eternity, and honored among us for everlasting." Then the leading motif of the prayer is resumed: "May the Almighty grant us an honorable livelihood." Then the question of nourishment is grasped at its root: "May the Almighty break the yoke from off our neck and lead us upright to our land." And again the prayer connects these hopes for the national and human future with the most personal hopes and appeals: "May the All-merciful bless the master of this house, and his spouse; them, their household, their children, and all that is theirs, us also and all that is ours, as our fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were blessed each with his own comprehensive blessing."

Towards the end of the prayer, a greater repose and confidence come again to the fore, and we find this beautiful and peaceful picture: "Both on their and on our behalf may there be such advocacy on high as shall

lead to enduring peace; and may we receive a blessing from the Lord and righteousness from the God of our salvation; and may we find grace and good understanding in the sight of God and man." Without fear of being reproached for holding to an ethics of rewards, an honest and naive appeal is made here for that which is aimed at in the actions of even the sternest moralists, though they may not admit it to themselves: happiness and understanding among men, and beyond that, true and not false peace—peace, which in Hebrew means also a life of fullness and integrity.

The efforts of Maimonides, and the still stronger efforts of Hermann Cohen and of many Talmudists before him to purge Judaism of every trace of eudaemonism, are still maintained against all sordid lust for happiness; but this proven and unquenchable desire, this ingenuous and natural will to happiness that is manifested everywhere in ancient Judaism, and later in Jewish prayers, is far superior to the enforced impulses of so-called "pure" duty. For the happiness sought by the Jew is, as we learn further on, that "towering joy" that also makes one "worthy of the days of the Messiah." Only as "God maketh peace [or perfection] in his high places, may he make peace for us and for all Israel."

AND at last, in a passage pronounced according to custom in a low voice, the true meaning of the many apparent contradictions and obscurities of the whole prayer is revealed to us. There is a plain modification of the first *brachah's* original expression of trust: "Young lions do lack and suffer hunger; but they that seek the Lord shall not want any good . . . I have been young and now I am old; yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging for bread. The Lord will give strength unto his people; the Lord will bless his people with peace."

The line of thought and feeling followed in this prayer appears again and again in Judaism, and in the most varied terms.

This pattern may be described as follows: The starting point is always a deep trust in the world—at the beginning there is always what is, and must be, the sign of a healthy and good life: true confidence, a heartfelt sense of security in the whole of existence. But then there arise in all their grimness the woes of life: bad luck, grief, pain, guilt, doubt, despair, the senselessness of life, or at least the overabundance of misfortune. But in the end trust in the whole of life triumphs again, with that defiant "and yet . . ." which symbolizes the whole destiny of the Jews as it symbolizes the destiny of no others. The ancient Greeks, perhaps many other nations, surpassed the Jews in intellectual achievements, but no other people on earth has known how to bear its burden through all the world's cataclysms with so much ultimate confidence and so little guarantee for that confidence. This is the true meaning of "Jewish chosenness."

This traditional pattern of Jewish thought may also be defined in theological terms as concerned with the capacity for *tshubah* (repentance). All men start out from security in the Absolute, in God. And separation from God also comes to all of us in the same way: in doubting life, in guilt, and in the suffering that comes of guilt. But the power for *tshubah* must not be dissipated in mere atonement, in new suffering, for *tshubah* does not mean passive atonement, but an active turning back, a return to the Absolute from which we started.

This power of renewed trust, of becoming better and trusting more confidently—it is Judaism that has most strongly exhibited this to the world, in its Job, in its Yom Kippur liturgy, in the *Ethics* of its greatest thinker, Spinoza, and also, simply and unobtrusively, in its daily grace after meals.

A PEACEABLE ANSWER TO THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE

Broadest Possible World Government; Fullest Possible World Democracy

LOUIS FISCHER

PRESIDENT Truman said in his first message to Congress on April 16, 1945: "In this shrinking world, it is futile to seek safety behind geographical barriers. Real security will be found only in law and justice." He said in New York on October 28, 1945: "We do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory in any place in the world." But in the next sentence he added: "Outside the right to establish necessary bases for our protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power." Truman wants island bases for security although he tells Congress that "Real security will be found only in law and justice."

FEW writers can match LOUIS FISCHER's equipment—gained from both lengthy first-hand experience and years of study and research—to deal with the problem of Russia's role in international politics. A foreign correspondent for many years, he lived in Russia from 1922 to 1936; and he is the author of a two-volume book, *The Soviet in World Affairs*, a standard work in the field. He was the European correspondent for the *Nation* for more than eighteen years, and wrote regularly for the *Baltimore Sun*, *l'Europe Nouvelle*, and the *New Statesman and Nation*. An admiring interpreter of the Russian experiment until the middle thirties, he has been in recent years sharply critical of the policies of the Soviet regime. His political touchstones are collective security for peace, expanding democracy, the liberation of colonial peoples, and political freedom. He was born in Philadelphia in 1896 and is a graduate of the Philadelphia School of Pedagogy and Gratz College. During the first war he fought with the Jewish Legion in Palestine. Among his many books are: *Machines and Men in Russia* (1932), *Why Recognize Russia?* (1931), *Soviet Journey* (1935), *Men and Politics, an Autobiography* (1940), as well as two books on India. This article will appear in expanded form in Mr. Fischer's forthcoming book, *The Great Challenge*, soon to be published by Duell, Sloan and Pearce.

Why does Truman talk law one day and island bases or war on another day? Because there can be no law without provision for the enforcement of law, and who can enforce law on great nations? The ultimate way, and in most cases the only way, of enforcing a law on a nation is to make war on it.

America is caught in the contradiction of living as a nation in a world that has split the atom and burst the bounds of nationalism. All nations are caught in the same contradiction. That contradiction may strangle mankind.

Stop Russia, certain people insist. But suppose she does not wish to be stopped? Is the only answer another world war, the first atomic war? Russia is a law unto herself, as every nation, particularly every strong nation, is a law unto itself.

The problem of Russia is thus the problem of nationalism in a world that will get internationalism or get itself into another international war.

Preventing World War III

How could there possibly be a third world war? How could it arise?

Anthony Eden, on the eve of the San Francisco Conference in 1945, when he was still British Foreign Secretary, said in Glasgow: "We have always, though sometimes tardily, as recent history well shows, striven to prevent Europe falling under the domination of one power. We have never sought such a position for ourselves, and we have never allowed any other state to obtain it, for we knew that if this were to happen our own liberties would soon be gone with those of the rest of Europe. We have fought three great world wars for this end."

The United States has fought two great world wars for this end.

Having fought the First and Second World Wars to prevent one country from dominating Europe, England and America are interested in preventing Russia from dominating Europe. If Russia succeeded in dominating Europe she would also dominate Asia. The European problem and the Asiatic problem have merged into one Eurasian problem.

Russian aggression against small or weak states in Eurasia can be regarded by the American and British governments as a step towards Russian control of a billion and a half people and therefore as a threat to the rest of the world.

Hitler aggression and Japanese aggression contained the same threat and caused the Second World War.

However disguised and excused, any aggression anywhere may be the signal for a third world war.

The first shot of the Second World War was fired on September 18, 1931, when the Japanese seized Mukden. But many people did not hear it until it re-echoed on the other side of the world ten years later, at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

I have read articles and speeches by seemingly intelligent Americans who say: "America and Russia are so far from one another; they have no territorial differences; why should they fight?" Neither did America have any territorial differences with Germany. Yet America fought two wars with Germany on the one issue of European domination. Those who are comforted by the absence of territorial conflicts between the Soviet Union and the United States pay too much attention to flat geography and too little attention to global politics.

Wars do not commence when a big power attacks a big power. The First World War and the Second World War started when big powers attacked small powers. Aggression against Abyssinia, Spain, Manchuria, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and Poland took boys in Ohio,

Liverpool, and Leningrad out of their homes and into graves all over the world.

What Is Aggression?

AGGRESSION against small countries is the beginning of all our woes.

Has Russia been an aggressor?

There is an excellent Soviet definition of aggression, drafted by Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov and embodied in a "Convention for the Definition of Aggression" signed in London on July 3, 1933 by the Soviet government and the governments of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Lithuania, and subsequently by Poland, Iran, Afghanistan, Finland, Esthonia, and Latvia.

This Convention says, in Article 2:

An aggressor . . . shall be considered to be that state which is first to commit any of the following actions:

1. Declaration of war upon another state.
2. Invasion by its armed forces, with or without declaration of war, of the territory of another state.
3. Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another state . . .
4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state.
5. . . . support to armed bands formed on its territory which have invaded another state . . .

The "Annex" to this Convention is even more interesting and apropos than the Convention itself. It reads:

No act of aggression within the meaning of Article 2 of this Convention can be justified on any of the following grounds, among others:

A. The internal condition of a state, for example: its political, economic, or social structure, alleged defects in its administration, disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions or civil war . . .

According to this official Soviet government definition of aggression, the Soviet government has been the aggressor in Finland, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, and Iran—all of whom signed the Litvinov Convention.

It is futile to expect Big Three unity when one of them is expanding. Unity and aggression are incompatible. Unity and expansion are irreconcilable.

It is equally futile to plead for American-Soviet friendship and simultaneously condone the Soviet expansion which strains that friendship.

Stalin first asked Poland for Polish territory in December 1941, when General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister, visited him in the Kremlin. Moscow told the British in 1943 that it intended to annex the Baltic countries. Moscow asked for Czechoslovak territory in 1943. Russian aggrandizement was confirmed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Teheran in December 1943, and at Yalta in February 1945. That was before there had been any serious tension or friction between the three big war allies. That was before the atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima. That was when the peoples and governments of Great Britain and the United States were vociferously and overwhelmingly friendly and helpful to Russia. Stalin's expansion and aggrandizement, therefore, cannot be attributed to the atomic bomb or to Anglo-American hostility.

We fought the Second World War in order to introduce some semblance of law into international affairs, for there is peace only to the extent that there is law. But aggression in violation of treaties is lawlessness, the maintenance of troops in foreign countries against the wishes of their peoples is lawlessness, pressure on small nations for concessions is lawlessness—the exact kind of lawlessness which brought war in 1939. The law-breaker robs others of their security and usually, in the end, gets himself into trouble.

In *The Soviets in World Affairs* I wrote a detailed history of Soviet Russia's relations with the capitalist world. The Soviet Union was for many years subjected to unwarranted armed intervention, economic boycotts, financial embargoes, and diplomatic exclusions. Its envoys were assassinated, its offices abroad raided.

That was an era. It lasted while Russia

was relatively weak and comparatively Communist. While it lasted Russia was afraid and unaggressive. Now Russia is strong and nationalistic. Now Russia is aggressive. This is an altogether new era. If Russia were afraid she would not be aggressive.

Does Russia Fear the West?

THE Nazis did not understand the democracies. They held them in contempt and underrated their determination. Stalin has behaved as though he held similar views. He could truthfully say to himself: "At Teheran and Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill gave me what I asked for in Germany, Poland, the Balkans, Manchuria, Korea, the Kurile Islands, and Sakhalin. The moment they agreed in principle to my annexation of parts of East Prussia, but before they finally approved of it, I actually incorporated them into the Soviet Union and they did not demur. Then in Rumania, Austria, Poland, and Bulgaria I unilaterally set up governments of my own choosing; this was in contravention of the Yalta agreement [The three governments will jointly assist the people in any European state or former Axis satellite state in Europe . . . to form interim governments broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population]."

"Strange how quietly Truman, Byrnes, Attlee, and Bevin took the whole thing. They do not seem to be very dynamic. England is having trouble in the Empire. The Arabs are stirring. China is divided. The American Communist party and its 'fronts' have done a good job confusing people and paralyzing the action of liberals and labor. The German Communist party is trying to get the upper hand in all Germany. France is unable to act decisively because of the French Communist party. Europe and Asia are starving. I have built up a tremendous new Russian empire. They have swallowed that camel; will they strain at the gnat? I will see what happens if I turn towards Iran and Turkey."

This psychology alone would not make a war. But this psychology together with

strident nationalism and the usual tensions within a totalitarian state might produce a war. They produced the Second World War.

In these circumstances, some Americans and Englishmen propose that America forego the manufacture of atomic bombs. Why not forego the manufacture of TNT bombs and Superfortresses and super-dreadnaughts? Why not disarm? Why are nations not ready to disarm? Because they see potential conflicts between themselves.

Suppose America stopped producing atomic bombs. Is there any guarantee that Russia would not produce them? Would Russia permit inspection of Soviet plants throughout the country, of power stations and power lines, of laboratories? Foreign technical experts to peer into every nook of Soviet industry to discover whether atomic bombs were being made? That is quite inconceivable to anyone who knows a little about the Soviet system. When the United States was giving the Soviet government eight billion dollars' worth of lend-lease arms and materials, American military men were not permitted to go to the front or into Soviet factories for more than a brief perfunctory glimpse.

Shall We Give Russia the Bomb?

GIVE the bomb to Russia, some propose.

What would Russia do with the atomic bomb? Use it against Germany and Japan? This is unnecessary; they have been crushed and occupied. Use it against the United States or England? That is no good reason for giving it to her. Use it against a small country for extortion purposes? That is no good reason for giving it to her.

"But Russia will have the bomb anyway," they argue, "and meanwhile the Anglo-American atomic monopoly sows suspicion in Moscow and widens the rift between the two worlds." Perhaps Russia has the bomb; perhaps Russia will get it. But suppose it is only two years or one year or six months until Russia begins to produce it. The map of Europe and Asia is being made every day, and if Russia has the bomb the map

may be made to the disadvantage of Europe and Asia. The atomic bomb in Russia's hands would make weak nations in Eurasia quail before her even more than they do already. It would make America and England more inclined to appease Russia than they already are. In this sense, the gift of the bomb to Russia would keep us out of war, as appeasement always keeps nations out of war—for a while. Then the war is worse because of the appeasement.

Would the revelation of the atomic secrets to Russia relieve her of suspicion and fear?

"It is untrue that America has the atomic bomb," I have said. Audiences sit up startled. Actually, of course, America possesses the bomb. But under what circumstances would America use it?

It is obvious that the United States government could not conceivably, in peacetime, order an atomic bombing of Mexico, or Argentina, or France, or England because it wished to extort something from the victim. It is inconceivable so long as the United States is a democracy and so long as public opinion remains virile, critical, and free.

There is a defense against the atomic bomb. It is democracy.

Stalin knows that the United States will not use the bomb for aggressive purposes. He probably hopes that the United States will hesitate to use it in defense of a small country.

I have seen many statements in American newspapers that the Soviet authorities are suspicious of or afraid of the United States. I have seen no proof of it in Soviet publications or in Soviet declarations or in Soviet acts. Indeed, Joseph Barnes, a pro-Soviet writer, told a Foreign Policy Association luncheon audience in New York on December 15, 1945, shortly after his return from a trip to Russia, that he had found "arrogance and bumptiousness" there towards the outside world.

Russia is not afraid and not suspicious for two clear reasons: the British Empire is in decline and on the defensive; America rushed from victory to headlong psycho-

logical and military demobilization. Nobody else could attack Russia: not Germany, not Japan, not Iran, not Finland, not China, not France. Britain's weakness and America's unimperialistic demobilization encouraged Stalin. The strong respect strength.

Is my view prejudiced, or unfair to Russia, or too kind to America, or too friendly to England?

I check my opinions carefully. I have never hesitated to criticize and condemn the actions and policies of the American and British governments. My first loyalties are to freedom, progress, peace, and human happiness; when I think anybody interferes with these I speak up. I do not believe that criticism makes wars. On the contrary, lack of criticism may make wars; the soft-pedaling of dangers and mistakes may hasten wars. Hitler did not send his armies across the German frontier because some person delivered a speech or wrote a book. Stalin does not order mobilization when he reads a sizzling denunciation of the Soviet Union; he merely replies with a sizzling denunciation.

Churchill poured forth fire and brimstone on Nazi Germany, yet Hitler did not attack England in 1939; he attacked grimly silent Poland and tried to avoid fighting Britain. From August 23, 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Soviet authorities not only refrained from criticizing Germany, they fawned on Germany; and then Germany invaded Russia.

The reactionary American newspaper syndicate, radio commentators, editorial scribes, and Congressmen who incessantly crusade against Russia are repugnant to me. But they cannot precipitate a war any more than isolationist propaganda before Pearl Harbor kept America neutral. Propaganda can ripen sentiment or delay the ripening of sentiment, but wars are precipitated by concrete military moves, the marching of armies, the bombing of cities—by aggression.

Has the government of Britain or of America given the Soviet Union cause for alarm and concern?

The American government has been criti-

cized for its reluctance to intervene against the Argentine dictatorship and against Franco. I was actively engaged in the fight against Franco, and I loathe any dictatorship. But I think it would be dangerous to the peace of the world to establish the principle that great powers have the right to intervene with armed force in the affairs of another state which is not at war. One day it might be a liberal government intervening to overthrow a dictatorship, and the next day it might be a reactionary government intervening to overthrow a democracy. In one case, the motive might be honestly anti-Fascist; in another, it might be imperialist.

Is Intervention Justified?

FOREIGN intervention rallies the people around the dictator for patriotic reasons even when they are opposed to him for class and economic reasons.

It is significant that those who approve of Soviet intervention and aggression were loudest in urging American intervention in Spain and Argentina. But how could the United States protest Soviet intervention in Eurasia if it intervened itself in Latin America?

Armed intervention in a peaceful state is permissible only in obedience to the voluntary decision of an effective international organization acting under no pressure from the one or two powers that are likely to be chosen as the intervening agents of the organization.

The very fact, however, that the British and American governments avoided armed intervention in Spain and Argentina although they vehemently excoriated, condemned, exposed, and denounced the dictatorships there should reassure Moscow, for it shows how hesitant democracies are in taking military action against weak countries which could only put up a token resistance; how much greater would be the hesitation in attacking a mighty military nation like the Soviet Union.

I see valid ground for censure of the

British government's action in Indonesia, but that was a case, as Jawaharlal Nehru wrote, of "one decadent empire [trying] to help another still more ramshackle empire," and the Kremlin probably took comfort from the cracks in the Dutch and British imperial positions which the bloody Java events disclosed. Certainly Russia is not menaced when colonialists refuse to be ruled by Western imperialists.

The British government has been criticized for its actions in Greece. This is a turgid, complicated situation because the domestic affairs of that unhappy, hungry country, as of several other countries, are less a reflection of political alignments within than of the pull and tug of rival foreign powers.

If the Communist party or the EAM gained the upper hand in Greece (and if Russia obtained the one-power trusteeship of Tripolitania in North Africa) Turkey would be semicircled, Italy would be flanked by Russian power, and the whole British position in the Near East would be menaced. "Russia is reaching across our throat," British Foreign Secretary Bevin said.

Churchill made the mistake, not surprising in his case, of encouraging the Greek royalists. The Labour government had no sympathy with royalists. It tried to follow another line. But it could not easily shake off its Tory legacy. And it felt compelled to try to keep Russia from seizing one of England's few remaining footholds in southern Europe. England fights back with poor weapons.

Germany and China

THE central fields of struggle between Russia and the Western powers are Germany and China. These nations, as well as Greece, as well as Italy, will not enjoy tranquillity and prosperity until the conflict between Russia and England and America is resolved. Today, each side is endeavoring to draw the defeated Axis peoples, the small neutrals, and China or parts thereof into its camp.

The process is shrouded in much murky and dishonest propaganda. When the American and British military authorities do not de-Nazify their zones to the satisfaction of the American and British Communists, the uproar is terrific. When the Communist daily of Berlin, the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, of January 31, 1946, proposes allowing "small Nazis" to join the German Communist party, and when Wilhelm Pieck, top German Communist, in the same week asks Nazis to help the Communists in "reassuring a democratic, anti-Fascist Germany," the critics of American and British de-Nazification are silent. When German industrialists are permitted to operate in the Western zones this immediately becomes a preparation for war against Russia. When German industries are restored in the Russian zone it is regarded as smart politics.

Who runs German industry makes a lot of difference. German industrialists contributed to the advent of Hitler and of the war. A natural, and sometimes a financial, bond exists between them and certain conservative groups in the capitalist West. The international liaisons and the domestic actions of the industrialists should be sternly scrutinized and curbed; yet the British contention is not without validity that the restriction of German factory output creates hunger, unemployment, and unrest, and as a result, new difficulties for the Western powers and new opportunities for Communist aggrandizement. Perhaps the escape from this dilemma is German industry without German industrialists.

But the crowning fact of the German situation is that half of Germany has been annexed by Russia or Poland or is occupied by Russia. This area has been sealed off by Moscow and is irretrievably lost to Western influence. In the remaining half of Germany, on the other hand, German Communists and some German Social Democrats who have fallen under the Communist spell, and certain pro-Soviet American, British, and French trade unionists are furthering Russia's interests and undermining England's and America's.

The eastern half of Germany has been drawn into the dictatorial orbit. Hitler's concentration camps have been reopened and fly the hammer and sickle. In the western half, democracy is still a weak reed. But there at least the struggle for free speech, free trade unions, free political parties, and free men can go on.

In Japan and China the Soviet government has a legitimate, power-political grievance. Japan is American-controlled territory. A China united under the rule of anti-Communist Chiang Kai-shek would be solidly ensconced in a mighty American sphere of influence.

"The American armed forces defeated Japan," it might be contended. True, but the Soviet armed forces drove Hitler out of the Baltic states, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and shed most blood in crushing Hitler in Germany; and yet Americans object to Russia's pre-eminent political position in those countries.

An End to Empires

WHAT-CAME-FIRST: The-Chicken-Or-The-Egg debates are always fascinating but usually fruitless. Russia staked out her claims for the Baltic region, Poland, the Balkans, and Manchuria long before United States troops landed in Tokyo Bay and before Japan had been driven out of China. Moscow could reply that it was easy to divine American intentions in Japan and China. And had not Churchill proclaimed that Britain would not liquidate the Empire? Then why should not Russia reach out for empire?

My own attitude is that *England should liquidate the Empire, Russia should not acquire an empire, and America should not aspire to empire.* Then war and threats of war would cease.

Britain's imperialism is in retreat. American imperialism is not full-fledged. Russian imperialism is dynamic, expansive, and unconcerned with the destinies of the human beings over whom it spreads like a glacier. Iran, the looting of Manchuria, the annexations at the expense of Poland,

Czechoslovakia, Japan, and Germany, and the oppressive, Soviet-puppet regimes in Europe prove this. It cannot be said that the United States or Great Britain has annexed any continental areas, or partitioned any countries, or looted any, or set up governments and then prohibited the voters from changing them.

The United States is keeping a strong air force and navy, and seeks more island bases. Russia has kept under arms many millions of men, is building a bigger navy, and is concentrating on the expansion of armaments industries. What is decisive is Russia's absorption since 1939 of a vast empire, still growing, where freedom is dead.

Transition to Peace

For many months after the victories over Germany and Japan, innumerable Americans, Englishmen, and others gave Russia the benefit of every doubt that tortured their minds. They could only hope that Moscow's moves in Poland, the Balkans, Austria, Germany, and Asia were a passing phase. They held their tongues, and their breath. They praised Russia while fearing the worst.

At all the wartime conferences—Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, etcetera—Russia's one vote counted for more than the two votes of Great Britain and the United States. Russia could not be antagonized; therefore London and Washington, against their better judgment, gave Russia what she asked.

To make the transition from wartime to peacetime diplomacy, a fundamental change of approach was necessary. In the first postwar conference in London in September 1945, accordingly, Secretary of State Byrnes and Foreign Secretary Bevin tried to teach Commissar Molotov a lesson in peacetime arithmetic: one is one; one is not more than two. Molotov said that was not so. The disagreement was so complete that they could not even agree on a communiqué stating that they had disagreed. Molotov likewise refused to include France and China in the making of the peace. Molotov wanted the Big Three to dominate and

in the Big Three he hoped Russia could dominate by the war-period mathematical paradox of one is more than two.

One is more than two is the arithmetic of dictatorship.

Byrnes decided on another effort; the three foreign ministers met in Moscow in December 1945. Iran and Turkey, bubbling issues under the surface, were passed over in silence. In everything that was officially discussed, Molotov won.

Restraint and optimism still triumphed over doubt. Then the United Nations convened for the first time in London in February 1946. Bevin jousted fiercely with Vishinsky over Greece and Indonesia, but the Russians rejected talks on Iran where his comrades had established an "autonomous" government of Azerbaijan in territory adjacent to Stalin's Soviet Georgia; the territory was under Russian military occupation. Earlier, Russia had demanded an oil concession in northern Iran, and Teheran had refused.

This precipitated a crisis in Anglo-Russian and American-Russian relations. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, returning from London where he served as an American delegate, delivered a widely commented speech in the Senate in which he asked, "What is Russia up to now? . . . Russia," he declared, "is the supreme conundrum of our time." Then Secretary Byrnes, straight from the same UN meeting, revealed his concern in a long address. He referred to "aggression" by Russia and said world conditions were not "sound or reassuring." That same day, another American UN delegate, John Foster Dulles, who on occasions has been the Republican adviser to the Democratic administration, told a Foreign Policy Association audience in Philadelphia: "It is particularly hard to find ways of working together with the Soviet Union, for it seems not to want cooperation."

Columnists, commentators, editors, and the public on both sides of the Atlantic and elsewhere reflected the gathering crisis.

"What to do about Russia?" everybody asked.

Winston Churchill was in Florida for a rest-cure amply earned in his five years as Britain's Prime Minister. With President Truman he traveled to the tiny town of Fulton, Missouri.

"I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war," Churchill speculated. "What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines."

What did Churchill propose?

"The fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples."

"A special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States of America."

"Fraternal association," Churchill explained, "requires . . . the continuance of the intimate relationships between our military advisers, leading to a common study of potential dangers, and similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions and the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges. It should carry with it the continuance of the present facilities for mutual security by the joint use of all naval and air force bases in the possession of either country all over the world. . . . Thus, whatever happens, and thus only, shall we be secure ourselves. . . ."

This looks very much like the text of a military alliance.

The Weapon of Discontent

CHURCHILL and his proposal and the British Labour government were bitterly attacked by Stalin in an interview—a most unusual act. The Soviet press excoriated Churchill with passion. The reaction in America was varied. Some liked his analysis and his projected alliance. Others, including myself, felt that while Churchill had done a service by calling attention to the central problem of our time, his proposal was unfortunate and inadequate.

The peace of the world depends on a steady job at a living wage for all workers, land that yields a livelihood to all farmers, liberty for all individuals of all races and classes, and independence for all countries

and colonies. Alliances do not yield these results.

This is not the age of the common man. It is the age in which the common man has commenced to make insistent demands. If he does not get full employment, a full dinner-pail, education, security, opportunity, and surcease from discrimination, he may become an easy victim of the totalitarians who promise him these things and ask him, in return, to forfeit his freedom first.

All the imperfections of the democratic world will be used by the Communists to destroy it. Here and there, especially in Latin America, the Fascists will pursue a similar strategy.

Moscow holds up a mirror which reflects and often enlarges the misery of those who choose to look into it. Against that, an alliance or any other power-political mechanism is powerless.

Churchill's proposal is a 19th-century power proposal. It might suffice to deal with certain aspects of the Russian challenge. It might either prevent a Soviet military move or serve as one possible device of coping with it. But Russia is not merely a nation; it is not merely Peter the Great. Russia is Peter armed with Marx, a perverted, almost unrecognizable Marx, to be sure, but a Marx who nevertheless still represents the revolt against what is rotten in the *status quo*.

Hitler's Panzers and dive bombers would not have leveled Europe so quickly if Europe had not been eaten through with disease. Japan's path to conquest was likewise smoothed by the unhappiness of Asia's colonials—in Java, Burma, China. The ultimate defeat of Hitler and Japan requires the molding of a better world and of a better human being.

How Meet Russia's Challenge?

HITLER, Mussolini, and Hirohito challenged the democratic world. We smashed the challengers. Now Russia challenges the democratic world. This is the greatest challenge democracy has ever confronted. It is a challenge to improve or succumb.

It does not matter that the challenger has more room for improvement than the challenged. The subjects of the challenger are not accessible to outside challenge; they live behind the iron curtain which hides the high wall and the inmates within it. The challenger is a challenger not because of his superiority but because of our shortcomings.

Russia or no Russia, there would be death in India, discontent in China, dissension in Greece, republicanism in Italy, and anti-Fascism in Spain. The Soviet government merely makes itself the spokesman and champion of all opponents of what is. It collects them and exploits them.

Organize an Anglo-American military alliance and "Stop Russia"? How would that affect Russia's role outside her borders or outside her zone? March an army into the Soviet Union and smash the regime? How many millions of lives would it cost; would it, even if successful, kill the decay in the body of democracy? It might have the opposite effect.

Churchill attacks the problem on the military and diplomatic level, not on the social, economic, and political level. But the problem is chiefly social, economic, and political.

International politics used to be the relationship between governments. It was "foreign" policy. A momentous change has taken place, and as yet few foreign offices have realized it. Diplomacy has been invaded by the people's problems. America's relationship to China is no longer an exclusive relationship with the Chinese chief of state, foreign minister, and foreign traders. America's relationship to China must be, above all, a relationship to the land reform and industrialization. America's and England's and France's relationship to Germany is a question of whether the Social Democrats can survive the attempt of the Communists to merge with and devour them. America's relationship to Great Britain involves Socialism, freedom for India, and tariffs.

That is why diplomats in spats no longer

belong. Diplomacy must descend from the rarefied realm of *démarches*, aide-memoires, "conversations," and notes, into the peasant's hut, the factory, and the political parties. Diplomacy must deal with the frustrations of the middle class and the aspirations of the hundreds of millions, for these are winds in the sails of totalitarian adventurers.

The foreign policies of America and Britain should be as broad, and deep, and inclusive as human life. Then they will come to grips with the great challenge which Russia has flung out to them.

The expansion of the Soviet Union has already induced the United States and British governments to begin mending their broken military bridges and, wherever possible, to do it together. Continued tension between Russia and the West will produce an Anglo-American alliance in fact if not in name.

But if England and America stop there they will not meet the challenge. Russia will try to split every country in the world. In that atmosphere, the fundamental problems of poverty and democracy will not be solved. On the contrary, the people will bend under backbreaking armament budgets, and freedom will languish.

Two Worlds or One

THIS is one world geographically. But politically and ideologically the one world is riven; there are two worlds. Perhaps there are three: Russia, England and America, and the remainder where the contest between them rages.

In the present era of heavy foreign and domestic pressures, few countries in Europe or Asia can stand alone. Within all of them, even in those under complete or partial Soviet domination, the two worlds are struggling for supremacy.

Treaties and alliances will not help. The path from the First World War to the Second World War was paved with non-aggression treaties, peace conferences, solemn and passionate promises to keep the peace, and beautiful descriptions of the benefits of peace.

Treaties and alliances are not enough. We need world government.

The weakness of Poland in comparison with Nazi Germany was the immediate impetus to war. If Poland had had the support of an international organization which, to the certain knowledge of Hitler, would march to Poland's (or any other nation's) defense, the war might have been prevented.

But this truth is an oversimplification of the world situation. The fact is that Poland did not have the support of an international organization and could not have had it at the time because any organization would have suffered from the divisions between the Anglo-French entente and Russia, and from the aloofness of the United States.

The situation is better today because collective security is attainable.

In the sphere where it might be interested in aggrandizement, no practicable combination could stop the United States; but the United States is not likely to go to war for aggrandizement.

England could be stopped from committing acts of aggression.

Given Anglo-American readiness to act, either directly or through an international organization, Russia too could be stopped, at least in the next few years, for Russia is weak from loss of blood and wealth in beating the Nazis. The Soviet government does not want a major war and would try hard to avoid even a lesser war if it knew that such a conflict would grow into a bigger affair by reason of collective-security intercession on the part of other great powers.

Provided Russian territorial expansion does not subject relations within the Big Three to an unbearable strain, the central problem of the next five or six years will not be actual world war but rather the absorption, penetration, and undermining of weak states by big powers in order to extend their spheres of influence; this would later be regarded as a threat by the non-expanding powers and thus might lead to the first atomic clash between nations.

An Anglo-American alliance could very

likely deter Russia from invading a foreign country, and a United Nations with teeth—that is, without the veto—would have the same effect. How, however, could that alliance or the UN keep Moscow from tearing at the inner social and political structure of foreign countries?

The unequal strength of one nation can be corrected by allies or by an effective international collective security body. But the unequal domestic, political, and economic development of nations which makes some eager to expand and others incapable of resisting expansion cannot be eradicated by power instruments—even by international organizations.

The final key to international politics and to peace is the domestic policy of nations and the social character of national regimes.

Russia and World Government

SUPPOSE the United States, Great Britain, and many smaller countries that would follow their lead were prepared to create a world government, and suppose the Soviet Union refused to adhere because it did not want to become part of a capitalist government or because it felt that it would be hopelessly outvoted in such a body? What then?

As soon as the non-Soviet countries are ready for world government—and the sooner the better—they should offer every inducement to the Soviet government to join them in initiating a world state, leaving broad areas of autonomy for the expression of the personality of each country. If Russia wished to remain outside, no pressure and no punitive measures would be applied to her. The non-Soviet countries would merely organize a four-fifths-world government and keep the door always open for Russia.

To obviate the resulting cleavage, some would counsel against world government for the present. That would not end the cleavage. That would simply cover it up. The cleavage already exists. If this were one world we would proclaim it joyously. Since there are two worlds we do well to recognize the fact.

To refuse to organize a world government as long as Russia will not join is to allow Russia to keep the non-Soviet world divided endlessly so that it cannot withstand Russian pressure. It is far healthier for both worlds to admit the division between them than for the democracies to nourish the illusion of oneness—the Soviets have no such illusion—when in fact one part is undermining the other while consolidating and extending its own sphere of influence.

I would rather the world were one world, one decent world. But blindness does not make it so. One World is a great goal, and Willkie, who gave humanity that slogan, was a great man. But one world is not a fact.

The division of the world into two unequal parts does not preclude friendly diplomatic relations between them. Trade, scientific and cultural exchanges, and travel can flourish. The competition of the two worlds can remain non-violent for a very extended period.

What is the nature of this competition? Is it the old Slav, anti-West Messianism harnessed to modern Communist proselytism? Is it that the world cannot be half-slave and half-free? Is it that the Soviet leaders are afraid that they cannot indefinitely maintain their present state-capitalistic tyranny if the rest of the world enjoys personal liberty? Is it that the capitalist nations fear they will be destroyed by Communists and radicals oriented on Moscow?

The Axis powers were lured into aggression and war and destruction by the physical weakness of their prospective victims and the reluctance of the non-aggressors to protect those victims.

The Soviet regime feels that it may succeed where others failed because it is equipped to exploit an additional weakness in the capitalist world: the unsolved social, political, and economic problems of many nations.

When Russia reaches out to China, the Mediterranean, North Africa, Trieste, Greece, and, through her Communist par-

ties, into every capitalist country, she is moved not only by imperialistic arrogance but also by ideological confidence.

The democracies export their goods and are ready to export their ideas. They prefer freedom to dictatorship; many democrats are convinced that capitalism is best. But the democracies have not crusaded for a long time. Perhaps they have lost faith in themselves. Perhaps they do not believe in imposing ideas by force. They are actually mingling their capitalism with Socialism, which shows a readiness to try something else.

The Soviets, on the other hand, are sure they are right and that their way is best. They have not proved it but they assert it very vehemently.

Stalin's ideological offensive stems from his certainty that he can win it. He is buoyed in that faith by the stupidity of the defenders within the fortresses he expects to assail.

An alliance proposal arouses Moscow's ire. "Tough talk" followed by tough acts impresses the Soviet government. But only when Washington and London begin to favor movements for freedom and social democracy throughout the world will Stalin believe that we have understood his intentions and are prepared, by constructive, progressive measures, to block his offensive.

And in the Empires

THE British Labour government's plans for the independence of Asiatic colonies worry Moscow much more than Churchill's Anglo-American entente. Let the Western powers shift their support from the feudal landlords of the Near East to the impoverished peasantry, and Moscow will know that something important has happened. Let the Chinese federal government introduce a land reform and Stalin will say: "They are uniting China and driving me out of it." Let the white race give incontrovertible evidence of a new and honorable attitude towards colored people, and Moscow will realize that it is being robbed of millions of potential political recruits. Let

the democracies demonstrate that they combat anti-Semitism, and those who compare and judge will conclude that the democracies are anti-Fascist. Let England and America work out a solution for Palestine, with justice to Jewish needs and fairness to the Arabs, let England and America befriend the forces of social change in Europe, and Europe will find new vigor to fight Slav-Communist imperialism. Let the Anglo-Americans shun Fascists, clerical reactionaries, royalists, economic royalists, and militarists, and the freedom-loving millions will flock to the Anglo-American banner. Let England, America, France, Holland, and Portugal abjure territorial, oil, and trade imperialism, and they will acquire a fresh moral power to obstruct any other imperialism. Let the West refuse to intervene forcibly in the affairs of weak countries and it will have clean hands in blocking Soviet intervention. Let the spokesmen for Eastern colonial peoples crusade not only for freedom from outside tutelage but for social justice inside; then they can hope to be fully free.

These are the kinds of weapons that can stop Russia's offensive against the democracies. This is ideological competition with Russia. It is a substitute for war with Russia. If the democracies win there will be no war, there will be no war ever, there will be a world government which ultimately will include Russia. If Russia wins, there will be no democracies.

Inevitably, some will say that this proposal for conscious ideological competition with Russia is "anti-Russian," cuts a chasm between Russia and the rest of the world, and makes war unavoidable. I think the opposite is true. Moscow is now actively engaged in a combined territorial-ideological offensive against the non-Soviet world. Not to resist means to help Russia expand to a point where, alarmed, the two great Western powers will seek to call a halt by the use of force.

There are these ways of dealing with the Russian problem. 1) Fight Russia now. I reject that vehemently. 2) Appease Rus-

sia. (Appeasement always includes saying that what you are doing is not appeasement but the only way of getting on with Russia.) I reject that because it will wipe out freedom in many countries and end in war. 3) *Block Russia's territorial expansion by an effective international organization and block Russia's ideological expansion by increasing the contentment and cohesion of the countries in her path.* I defend that. It will be attacked by those who do not wish to block Russia's expansion.

A foreign policy based on conscious ideological competition with Russia will improve the chances of peace, check the inroads of totalitarian thinking among liberals, fortify democracy, raise standards of living, and give the free world a much-needed moral lift. The alternative to ideological competition with Russia is to accept defeat supinely at the hands of Russia.

Ballots Can Make the Peace

BUT foreign policy is not the whim or plan of a foreign minister. What America does abroad is determined by what America is at home. The same is true of England and of other nations.

"Have we got leaders big enough and wise enough to carry out an international, progressive policy?" This question troubles many citizens. The answer is that leaders in a democracy cannot be much bigger or move much faster than the people they lead.

The men and women who make foreign policy, and every policy, are those who sit in legislative halls and behind desks in government offices. They are elected or they are accessible to the will, pressure, and arguments of those who are elected. Thus ballots make foreign policy. Foreign policy, and peace, are made in Peoria, Illinois, in Hamilton, Ohio, in Dallas and Schenectady, in Liverpool, Glasgow, Hull, and Dover, in Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Nice, in every town and village where the voters go to

the polls to vote in free and honest elections.

Peace, like charity, like every virtue, begins at home.

The mass of the people desire the welfare of the mass of the people in all countries. The average person will make many material sacrifices for peace; he puts peace above the interests of tariff-seeking corporations and privilege-seeking cartels. Normally, the common folks are neither militaristic nor imperialistic.

The average citizen wants to do something about peace or war, freedom or dictatorship, plenty or poverty. He does something by producing, distributing, and consuming material values. He does something by his personal conduct. He must do more as a political unit.

"Go west, young man" was the sage advice of one who foresaw the emergence of a great new country. "Go political, young man and young woman, and older man and older woman" should be the slogan of all who hope for the birth of a great new and free world.

A better America, a better England, a better France, a better Germany, a better Russia, a better India, would work together for a better world. There is no magic formula for freedom and peace. It is a matter of hard work and sweat in each family, in each community, in each state and in each nation.

In a better world, there would be freedom and opportunity for all, freedom from the indignity of unemployment, freedom from soul-cramping discrimination, freedom from want where there could be plenty, freedom from insecurity and fear, freedom from too much government and the obsession of too much wealth, freedom from uncontrollable political and economic masters, and the opportunity to learn, to grow, and to be one's self while serving others. In such a world of peace within man and between men there would be peace between nations.

THE EXAMINATION

A Story

HARRY E. WEDECK

SATURDAY afternoon, in Edinburgh, when the autumn mildness had not yet turned to the sharp winds that sweep into the city from the North Sea.

A soft, mellow light filtered through things, giving them cosiness. There was somnolence in the air, and as I sat drowsily over my book my father roused me.

"We're going to Aunt Leah's."

I started up in expectation. Aunt Leah was the rich aunt. In her smug, smoothly-run house she dominated her five nubile daughters and her innocuous little husband. They were rich, as we considered wealth. And those Saturday afternoon visits—which came once every two months or so—were a change and a stimulus. I looked forward hopefully to torte and a glass of sweet red wine . . . and later a plateful of nuts and raisins . . . tea . . . and perhaps crisp, brown, fried haddocks. . . .

My father never made these visits without some concrete reason in mind. Either there was a family dispute to be ironed out, a monologue to be given by my father, explaining the amazing subtlety of an ancient Talmudical commentator, or—and this gave

him most pleasure—an announcement of my gaining a first class certificate at the University; a prize, or, as happened now and then, a medal.

"Don't forget," my father would warn me, "no comments. Don't lose your temper, son. You know your aunt. . . . Well, what could you expect? Epicureans. Money, that's all they have. What else?"

I innocently chimed in, mentally, with my father. What else indeed had they? What else but heavy mahogany furniture and glinting silverware and constant supplies of food . . . rich dainties, meats and cakes that made you faint with desire . . . and comfortable clothes . . . and holidays in London . . . and going to the Empire and the Lyceum as often as you wished . . . and to Aberdour or Rothesay or the Trosachs. What else had they? They could have afternoon tea at the Green Cafe or at Patrick Thompson's in the Bridges. They could attend the concerts at Usher Hall and buy carloads of rock buns and oat scones. . . . What else had they?

Trifles, after all. I, on the other hand, had sources of knowledge—and knowledge is power, said Francis Bacon. I had secret knowledge about ancient Greeks and metaphysical perplexities and the obscurities of exotic tongues. I had, manifestly, superior things—not tangible, of course, not visible or saleable, but far beyond the vulgar reach and understanding of mere money. Aunt Leah and her brood had shrunk to a pitiable state.

SO MY thoughts wandered as I proceeded to my aunt's. The streets hung heavy with malt odors from the breweries. A buckie wife trudged by, her wicker basket of cockles and periwinkles slung across her

BORN in England in 1897, Dr. HARRY E. WEDECK studied in schools in England, Scotland, and the continent before coming to America. At present he is chairman of the classics department at Erasmus Hall High School in New York City and pursues his special interest in Oriental languages. He attended the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, studied at the Sorbonne in Paris, and obtained his doctorate at Columbia. Dr. Wedeck is author of *Humor in Varro and Other Essays*, published in Oxford, *Latin Poetry*, and several textbooks on the classics. Besides these, he has contributed to the *New Republic*, *Tomorrow*, the *Boston Post*, the *Tribune* (Bombay), the *Jewish Chronicle* (London), the *Brazilian-American* (Rio de Janeiro), and other periodicals.

brow. A staggering drayman swayed on the sidewalk, muttering to himself: "Watch where ye're going, Donal." Through the cobbled lanes and out into the newer Town. Past the Royal Infirmary with its red cluster of buildings. Across the Meadows where the fuzzy sheep were grazing dreamily. And along the trim dead-end street with the trim gardens and the trim maids.

In the twilight I recognized the heavy, substantially built house with its shining nameplate and its shining brass bell, its curtained bow-windows.

On Saturday afternoons the house was still, unless the occasion was special or there was company. Now, Uncle Jonah was napping. The five nubile daughters were out, scouring possibilities among relatives.

AFTER the initial family greetings, my father would get set for the dramatic climax. There would be talk of classes at the University, while Aunt Leah would sip tea and tie up her mouth and eyes in pain. My father would enlarge on the labors of study, the supernal brightness of the students competing in intellectual rivalry. . . . They were so brilliant, those students from the heathery Highlands, the farmsteads of Ayrshire, and the lonely Hebridean Isles. All this leading up to the clap of thunder.

"You know," my father would continue innocently, "there was an examination last week . . . a degree examination . . . terribly hard too."

Aunt Leah raised two questioning eyebrows, and a sound like . . . Hm . . . squeezed out of her lips.

"Six hours," my father went on, "six whole hours . . . and all the best students. . . . There was a prize . . ."

A chunky, red-cheeked maid came into the doorway. "Wull we be having kippers the night for tea, mum? Because Bryson's are no having ony kippers the noo. It'll have to be haddies, mum."

Aunt Leah waved her off the doorway.

"See, Menasseh," she provoked my father, "have you a maid? University . . .

nonsense. Books, nonsense . . . so long as you can have a maid."

"There was a prize," my father said, "a gold medal. Well, they all tried. All the best students . . . the very best. Such students, Leah!"

"Now, Menasseh," Aunt Leah rebuked, "have done with it. What is all this nonsense? Talk about prizes, medals, students. Everybody is a student. Everybody has an examination. Here's my Jonah. Last week he had an examination. The doctor said it was gallstones. So what is it, an examination!"

She sniffed loudly. Her thin bloodless lips buttoned up, making a slit across her yellowed face.

My father jumped up from the plush chair. He dashed the cup of hot tea on the sideboard, spilling it in his fury. "What did you say? Gallstones? Rubbish! Jonah taking an examination. Imagine Jonah! I mean a university examination. With professors. . . ."

"Listen, Menasseh. All right, an examination. So he takes an examination. But does he get anything from it? Here's Mrs. Simkowitz' son. He just made a hundred pounds . . . a scholar too! They say he made a book. See?"

THAT was the cue for my father. He couldn't get more excited now. He just maintained that effervescent pitch right through the afternoon. At moments he would make a dash for the sideboard, take a sip of tea, bang down the cup and turn heatedly to Aunt Leah.

"Simkowitz' son! Another genius! Who cares about him? Let him have his hundred pounds."

"He has," chimed in Aunt Leah, opening the mouth slit and unctuously folding it up again.

"Any fool can make money," my father said.

"Well, Menasseh, why don't you? Always needing money. Money for rent . . . for food . . . money for clothes . . . for books. Why can't you make some?"

"Why doesn't he," she turned her head, "make some, instead of all this book nonsense? University! Hmmmmmm."

She gave another violent sniff.

I was never mentioned by name by Aunt Leah. I was "he," a sort of inanimate bone of dispute. She didn't even point to me, or at me. She talked about me as if I were never present.

"Money!" my father spluttered, his eyes blazing, his thin knotty hands restless. "Money! Any race gambler can make it. A thief. A gorger. I suppose the Simkowitz' son made it that way. But who cares about money?" He gave a disdainful wave of the hand, showing the frayed sleeve of his jacket. "Learning . . . knowledge . . . you can't buy that, Leah . . . not with all you have."

"Who eats better, tell me," Aunt Leah taunted. "Who goes on vacations? You and your family or us? Who has a maid? Who can buy dresses for daughters? Who can go to Glasgow for weekends, eh? So you have books. Books. Anyone can have books."

She gave her usual sniff, and nibbled at a macaroon.

"The examination . . . last week," my father went on, as if there had been no interruption. "Last week . . . and now the results come. He is getting a medal!"

It was the parting shaft. My father halted, completely satisfied. There was nothing more to add—he felt.

But Aunt Leah, instead of being impressed or even interested, bleated: "A medal? What medal? Which medal? Did you see it?"

"Don't be foolish. He hasn't got it yet. It's coming."

"Well, so he hasn't got it. And you said he got a medal. Medals. Everybody thinks he gets medals."

"He'll get it. He is top in the examination, Leah. It says so in the paper."

"Who's top? Nonsense. You believe any-

thing. What paper? I didn't see any paper, Menasseh. You just like to feel he gets a medal. Well . . . poor boy . . . he looks so hungry."

My father grabbed me and dragged me out. No goodbye. No parting. He made for the door, banged it hard, and rushed me home.

DURING the week I received the medal, a huge gold object in a red plush case.

My father crowed aloud. All week he went around in a chuckling mood, muttering, rehearsing repartee. He would show her.

The following Saturday, with a slight wind rustling the stripling trees through the Meadows, he took me to Aunt Leah's again. Retaliation. Vengeance.

He took the direct offensive. Without waiting for Aunt Leah to purse her mouth and collect her envenomed battery of vilification and disparagement, he cried from the threshold: "Here, Leah, look! Here it is! The medal!"

He held the case open, so that the round gold plaque shone.

Aunt Leah reluctantly turned to look. Her cheeks flushed into a red tinge of anger and disappointment. But she kept her head.

"Well, medals . . . everybody gets medals. Mr. Fine says he got a medal for attending meetings of the Benevolent Society for thirty years. A gold medal . . . bigger than this."

My father remained speechless, pitifully holding out the case. I stood silent.

"After all, for a few shillings . . . you can buy a medal. When is he getting a new suit? Look, Menasseh, his jacket is all torn."

She pointed to my shabby clothes. My father closed the case and beckoned to me. We went home in silence, across the darkling meadows, with a raw wind scudding against our bent heads.

A PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACH TO ANTI-SEMITISM

The Unconscious Factors at the Root of Mass Aggression

OTTO FENICHEL

THE instinctual structure of the average man in Germany was no different in 1935 from what it was in 1925. The psychological mass basis for anti-Semitism, whatever it may be, existed in 1925 too, but anti-Semitism was not a major political force then. If an understanding of the development that took place in that ten-year period in Germany is sought, then the investigation must be focused on what happened there during those years, and not on the comparatively unaltered unconscious. But the psychoanalysis of individual anti-Semites is nevertheless indispensable if anti-Semitism is to be fully understood. For in order completely to understand the reaction of the masses to happenings in Germany, it is

essential also to understand *that which* reacts, that which is roused or inhibited or displaced in the human structure—and for this psychoanalysis is needed.

IN ORDER to gain this understanding, let us therefore begin at the surface and descend gradually to the depths. The principal thing that changed in the external stimuli during those ten years was the amount of anti-Semitic mass propaganda. The effectiveness of this propaganda was the chief thing that altered the attitude of the masses. But why did this propaganda arise, and how did it work? What was present in the masses that made them believe it?

The first thought is that people are most ready to accept suggestions that bring some advantage to them. What advantage does anti-Semitism bring to the average man? Well, for instance, the prospect of obtaining a job that has been taken from a Jew. This should not be underestimated, but one sees at first glance that such an explanation is not sufficient, that it is too superficial because it is too unspecific. What purpose then does the spreading of anti-Semitic propaganda serve? Here we can perhaps learn more from Czarist Russia than from Germany.

The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion were forged by the Czarist police, who knew for what purpose they forged them. As a result of the general misery extant, there was a rebellious tendency directed against the ruling powers. The police surmised that if the propaganda succeeded, the Jews would be thought to be the cause of conditions, and not the authorities, and the revolutionary tendency would be redirected against the Jews. The terrible pogroms showed that this intention succeeded.

THIS path-breaking study of the deep psychological mechanisms at the core of mass anti-Semitism is here made available to the general reader for the first time. Since its publication in 1940 in the *American Imago*, a psychoanalytical journal, it has exercised wide influence on scientific thinking and research in the field, and its insights still remain fresh and suggestive. At the time of his untimely death last January, at 49, OTTO FENICHEL was one of the foremost psychoanalytical thinkers and practitioners in this country. He was born in Vienna in 1897, received his M.D. from the University of Vienna in 1921, and became a faculty member of the Psychoanalytic Institute of Berlin in 1922. He came to the United States in 1938 and settled in Los Angeles. He was co-editor of *Imago* and the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*. He wrote an *Outline of Clinical Psychoanalysis* (1934), *Problems of Psychoanalytic Therapy* (1941), and *The Psychological Theory of Neurosis* (1945). Fenichel's paper will appear in a collection of studies by various hands, *Anti-Semitism: A Social Disease* edited by Ernst Simmel, which is soon to be published by International Universities Press. A few theoretical passages have been here omitted.

The advantage which anti-Semitism gave to the average person then was different from that of the prospect of a job. The people were in a conflict between a rebellious tendency and the respect for authority to which they had been trained. Anti-Semitism gave them the means of satisfying these two contradictory tendencies at the same time: the rebellious tendency through destructive actions against defenseless people, and the respectful tendency through obedient action in response to the command of the ruling powers. The police plot achieved its goal: the people believed that their enemies were likewise the enemies of the ruling powers.

This undoubtedly correct, but neither sufficiently deep nor sufficiently specific theory of anti-Semitism we shall call the "scapegoat theory." As is well known, the Jews used to load all their sins onto a goat and then drive it out into the desert in order to purify themselves. In the same way the ruling classes laid their sins onto the Jews. Just here, I should like to mention an excellent article by Arnold Zweig ("Der Jude im Dorn," *Die Weltbuehne*, Berlin, 1936), which shows how deeply this conception of the Jews as scapegoats is anchored in the soul of the German people. Zweig analyzes a folk tale by Grimm, "The Jew in the Thorn," which tells of a man-servant who, having been swindled out of his wages, manages to get the money from a Jew instead of from his master; the chief point being that he feels himself to be absolutely right in cheating the Jew—after all, he himself had served his seven years honestly.

Zweig correctly points out that all the features of modern anti-Semitism are strongly marked in this ancient folk tale, which dates at least from the time of the Peasants War in 1500. At that time, too, there was a ruling class that needed to deflect the mass-discontent directed against itself; then, too, apart from this mass-displeasure, there was a mass-preparedness for submission, a change in the structure of the masses brought about by education; their conscience troubled them when they dared to think of proceeding against the authorities. They were

therefore grateful that they could vent their rage without anything happening to their masters or without rousing their anger, and against an opponent who dared not defend himself.

BUT we must go further. This explanation applies to the persecution of all minorities. It needs specification on such questions as: What kind of people tend to accept suggested "scapegoats"? What kind of people tend to reject the suggestion? How do the members of the minority react to their role as scapegoats? Moreover, it is in itself not specific enough as a theory. The next problem that presents itself, a problem not neglected by Zweig either, is: Why are the Jews especially suitable as displacement substitutes? Is it mere chance that in a given situation anti-Semitic propaganda is instituted and not, for instance, propaganda against redheads? Surely not. There must be something in the mass mind that meets anti-Semitism halfway; the Jew must be the "born scapegoat" for his hosts.

Why is this role so fatally suited for him?

The first answer to this question is a rational one. The Jew has always been more defenseless than the redhead. Secondly, when the social order, or rather, disorder, produces undue misery, then the victim of this misery rarely is in a position to discover its origin, partly because the underlying causes are too complicated, and partly because the existing ruling class does everything in its power to obscure the true connections. The point is then to find someone in the environment who appears to the victim to be the cause of his misery. For centuries it has been the Jew, in his role as money-lender and as tradesman, who has appeared to those confronted with financial need as the representative of money, regardless of how much Jewish poverty there prevailed at the same time. It must be remembered that the Armenians, too, who were persecuted by the Turks just as the Jews had been persecuted by the Russians and Germans, were the commercial people among their Turkish hosts.

Still, too much importance should not be placed on this situation; it only serves to strengthen other factors which come from more unconscious depths and which are not yet known. It must also be pointed out that the persecution of minorities for their commercial activities does not hold with respect to other social phenomena analogous to anti-Semitism, for instance the persecution of Negroes in America. The American Negroes were slaves, and in order to understand their ostracism, the history and social function of slavery, and of the fights for and against it, have to be studied. But the Negroes have another trait that makes them suitable as scapegoats: they are black. Jews have also been reviled by anti-Semites because of their cultural or physical "racial" peculiarities. Their hair frequently is black even if their skin is not; moreover, they are foreign in their customs and habits, in their language, in their divine service, and in their everyday life, which is so interwoven into their divine service. This foreignness they share with the Armenians, the Negroes, and the Gypsies; and herein is to be found the secret that has made others believe them to be wicked evil-doers. People of one's own kind, and the ruling powers, one does not suspect of evil, but people who look different and speak and behave differently—they may be capable of anything.

AT THIS point the question of anti-Semitism moves away from the psychology of the anti-Semitic people and goes over to the psychology of the Jews. The obstinacy with which the Jews have resisted assimilation through the ages, although other people in similar situations have during the course of history been absorbed by their hosts, represents a problem too complex for thorough examination here. It is obviously due (1) to the ghetto system, which excluded the Jews artificially from full participation in the cultural life of the host nations, the origin and function of this system presenting a problem of its own, and (2) to a stubborn acceptance of the ghetto system by the Jews themselves. The Jews retained

their peculiarities and their hosts did not understand them.

These peculiarities, however, were conspicuous. They stem partly from the time when the Jews had an independent state, and were adhered to because of their never-ending hope of regaining that state—and partly from much later times. Cult and holy literature stem from that very ancient past and have an oriental stamp. In their clothes and everyday language, however, they were fixated at an entirely different period. The Jewish language, as well as traditional Jewish clothing, resemble the language and clothing used by the medieval Germans. Jewish strangeness gave the Germans the impression of something archaic, of something left over from ancient times—which the non-Jew himself had overcome—similar to the strangeness with which the nomadism of the Gypsies impressed the settled peoples.

What does all this mean psychologically? What underlies the equation of primitive thinking: foreign=hostile? Even today we meet every foreigner in a contradictory or, as we say, ambivalent manner. Foreigners are not yet known; therefore one does not know what to expect from them. Perhaps it would be as well to be on good terms with them, or perhaps it would be better to render them harmless as quickly as possible. How different it must have been in ancient times, when nations had less frequent contact with one another, when the cultural peculiarities of each nation were much more strongly marked. Foreigners might bring advantages through inventions they had made, or be a danger if they were more advanced in the technique of arms. In the ancient world, foreigners were *sacer*, an interesting word that meant both holy and accursed. The strangeness of the Jews was of a special kind because of its archaic character, which often was combined with an indisputable mental superiority in certain spheres, which in turn perhaps was made use of by the commercial Jews to take advantage of other people. The Jews were clever and at the same time

appeared to be connected with old primeval powers with which the others had lost touch. When the authorities said that these "uncanny" people were evil, the others readily believed the authorities because of their own obvious misery.

Therefore, what could one expect from the Jews? What fantastic evils were they capable of? We may begin here with ritual murder and the poisoning of wells, but we must also specify other things. Let us look at any anti-Semitic literature. We read again and again that the Jews are murderers, are filthy, and are debauched.

The first problem again must be to find the rational part of these accusations. Actually there is none. The Jew is a merchant and as such may be a swindler, but criminal statistics show that Jewish murderers are fewer than those of any other race. The religious laws of the Jews prescribe particular cleanliness, and although the impoverished Jewish towns are undoubtedly very dirty, they are no more and probably less so than the Polish, White Russian, and Russian peasant villages; with regard to sexuality, the Jews do not tend to excesses more than any other group.

IN PSYCHOANALYSIS, we are in the habit of saying: "The patient is always right," i.e., even the most senseless neurotic phenomenon has a hidden meaning. In reality, the Jews are not murderous, dirty, or debauched to a greater extent than other groups. The latent meaning in the assertion that they are, implies that murderous, dirty, and voluptuous tendencies are really concealed somewhere, and that once again the Jew is a scapegoat, a displacement substitute. Where are these tendencies? Who is the real sinner?

Freud has taught us that everybody struggles all his life with repressed instincts which continue to exist in the unconscious; that among these original instincts, murderous tendencies and sexual impulses play the chief part, especially those sexual impulses which are considered objectionable, low, and dirty. The lust to kill, love of dirt, and low voluptuousness—these are the things that

people try painstakingly to keep hidden in their unconscious. One means of defense against the striving of one's unconscious is projection, that is, seeing in others that which one does not wish to become conscious of in oneself. This is a manifestation most marked in certain mental diseases, but it is also present in normal people, as for example in the crusader against homosexuality who is really fighting against his own repressed homosexual impulses.

To the anti-Semite, the Jew appears to be murderous, dirty, and debauched; thus the former can avoid becoming aware of these tendencies in himself. To him, the Jew is the incarnation of the lust to kill, of low sexuality. It will shortly become clear how this projection is facilitated. But it is already comprehensible why riotous impulses are so easily deflected against the Jews. For the unconscious of the rioters, the Jew represents not only the authorities whom they do not dare to attack, but also their own repressed instincts, which they hate and which are forbidden by the very authorities against whom they are directed. Anti-Semitism is indeed a condensation of the most contradictory tendencies: instinctual rebellion directed against the authorities, and the cruel suppression and punishment of this instinctual rebellion, directed against oneself. Unconsciously for the anti-Semite, the Jew is simultaneously the one against whom he would like to rebel and the rebellious tendencies within himself. And a racial minority such as the Jews is especially suited to act as the carrier of this kind of projection because of its archaic and emphatic foreignness.

It can be expressed in one sentence: One's own unconscious is also foreign. Foreignness is the quality which the Jews and one's own instincts have in common. This is a particular case of Freud's explanation of the general phenomenon of that which is "uncanny" psychologically (Sigmund Freud: "The Uncanny," *Collected Papers II*, London, 1924). The feeling of uncanniness comes over us whenever something that we once believed to be true and then rejected

proves to be true after all. All happenings are uncanny which seem to prove the existence of magical connections in the world, because we once thought magically and later renounced this way of thinking in favor of the logical one. To the average person, a murderer, in particular a parricide or someone guilty of incest, is uncanny because each of us has felt such impulses—and later repressed them. Conversely, a person or race which is in any way uncanny is capable of murder and incest. The Jew with his unintelligible language and incomprehensible God appears uncanny to non-Jews, not only because they cannot understand him and therefore can imagine him capable of all sorts of sins, but even more because somewhere in the depths they can understand him very well, for his customs are archaic, that is, they exhibit elements which the non-Jews once had, but later lost. The average German regards Jewish language and dress not only as "strange," but as a caricature, a ridiculing of his own language and dress. The Jewish language is to him "German in an ugly disguise."

THERE is also a rational reaction that helps to strengthen the irrational side. The Jews as a racial minority have been oppressed everywhere. It is clear that the ruling people must fear the possible revenge of the oppressed people, particularly when the oppression appears to be unsuccessful, with the oppressed rising again and again in the belief that they themselves are a chosen people, and refusing to give up their peculiarity despite all torture. Jehovah is held to be a revengeful God. And there is no doubt that he is described in many places in the Old Testament as a very revengeful old gentleman. But there is also no doubt that the command: "Love thy neighbor as thyself" does not come from the Christian religion but from the Jewish, that the Jewish God showed many merciful traits, too.

Why have these traits been forgotten by other races, and why do they imagine Jehovah, like the abstract concept of the Jew and of the Jewish people, to be malicious

and revengeful? This concept, being of an irrational nature, is not to be changed by any real experiences with Jews. It is well known that every anti-Semite is acquainted with one Jew who is free of all abominable Jewish qualities, yet this does not make any difference in his anti-Semitism.

The endless vengefulness of the wicked Jews is again a projection. The ruling people cannot imagine that the oppressed are not revengeful. They recognize archaic-deep features in their behavior and they know how revengeful they themselves would be. Rejected instincts and rejected ancient times are revived for them in these incomprehensible people who live as strangers in their midst. That which they had believed overcome appears to rise again and again like a hydra and they try to cut off its heads. At the same time, they despise it in the same way in which they despise their own disavowed instincts. Contempt and disregard are intended to help them overcome their fear. They try to refute their fear by proving to themselves how easy it is to attack the defenseless. But the proof is never definitive. With a curious pride, even with arrogance, the defenseless rise again and again. The fear is not dispelled and therefore they must go on despising and humiliating over and over again to refute this irrefutable fear. And yet they never succeed.

A PART from all this, there are still other circumstances which make the position clearer. One is that Jewish peculiarities and culture center almost exclusively around a common faith, the Jewish religion. . . .

Now the gods have always had not only supernatural traits but also "low" animal and instinctual traits, which evoke fear. One thing seemed to rouse their particular wrath: namely, to be looked at. In the Jewish religion, too, the sight of the Holy of Holies was reserved for the High Priest once a year, and the congregation had to turn away at Yom Kippur when the priest threw himself on his knees before God. The sight of God (among primitive people, the sight of the king, his representative) means death.

From this prohibition against looking it is only one step to the idea that God is a terrible, horror-inspiring—an ugly sight. And, as is well known, many of the gods of primitive people are incredibly ugly. In the higher religions, there are concealed allusions of a similar kind understandable as such through psychoanalysis. It is interesting that the uncanniness of the ugly God is based on his reanimating something that had been overcome. For the ugly features of a god are always animal features, and the first incarnation of the dead chief, the great ancestor who was later made god, was the totem animal, and totemism preceded religion. . . .

This double character of wonder and fear, of highest beauty and terrifying ugliness, attributes of God, merges with the double character of wonder and fear inherent in foreigners—both are *sacer*—in terms of the feeling one has for strange gods and which caused the Romans to erect temples to the conquered gods. It is unbearable, in the long run, to have contradictory feelings for one and the same object. And in the same way that the fairy tale makes it possible for the child to manage the contradictory feelings it has for its mother by introducing two mothers, a wholly good mother and a wholly wicked stepmother, thereby dividing between two people the love and hate felt toward the same person, so the perception of a strange god has been used by all people in all ages to divide the love and hate felt for God between two objects: their own God who is good and beautiful, and the strange one who is wicked and ugly.

Many religious systems are dualistic. They have a good and a bad principle, an Ahriman and an Ormuzd, separate from God—a devil. Theodor Reik has shown that the devil is the degenerate strange God, the God of the strange or the conquered people, whose revenge is feared. The devil is always more uncanny than God, always has more archaic characteristics, namely animal qualities—goats' feet, horns, tail, and ugliness. Therefore, he is always suitable as a carrier of the projection of one's own instinctual im-

pulses; he is murderous, dirty, debauched, a tempter, and a deceiver. It is clear to the anti-Semite that the Jewish God, and thus the Jew, is the devil, the anti-Christ, the wicked principle directed against God which crucified God. The devil, too, characteristically, is despised and dreaded at the same time.

One thing more: this "degraded" strange God is not only animal and ugly—he is usually crippled. The deformed, blind, lame, and hunchbacked are *sacer* to primitive people; they are regarded as being nearer to God, as seers, but also as dangerous; altogether, they are uncanny to the ordinary mortal.

Frequently, we see that people who have longer noses and darker hair than others are therefore regarded as practically deformed. What is the rational essence of the special position of deformed people? The deaf, hunchbacks, and, in particular, red-haired people are regarded as malicious and ill-natured. Why? Because they are really at a disadvantage compared with average people, and because the average people tend to despise and laugh at them, and they in turn tend to protect themselves by aggressiveness. The physically inferior are a badly-treated minority, and, therefore, their revenge is feared. This fear is condensed with the deep feelings of uncanniness entertained toward the devil and the cripple-god, and increases when any physical disadvantage or dissimilarity is combined with superiority in certain mental spheres (think of the uncanny, skilful, lame blacksmith of the sagas). Like the Jewish language, the typical Jewish physical appearance is felt and cartooned as diabolically ugly.

BUT the sight of a cripple not only rouses the fear of strangeness and revenge but also the special fear that he will want to transform others into cripples. It would lead too far to undertake a psychoanalysis of the burial and death customs of the various peoples. But we know that they are all based on the tendency to prevent an unconsciously feared return of the dead, who could

revenge themselves for their dying by fetching the living and causing them also to die. Is there any reason to suppose that other people fear that Jews may want to change them into Jews, too?

Reference is often made to the opinion once expressed by Freud that anti-Semitism is connected with the Jewish custom of circumcision. It is, of course, not my intention to maintain that anti-Semitism consists only of the uncircumcised despising the circumcised as unmanly and fearing that the circumcised will want to circumcise them in revenge. The matter is somewhat more complicated, and circumcision is only one of many customs which are felt to be uncanny. But I should like to elaborate what Freud meant by this remark.

Circumcision is not a purely Jewish custom. Many other races have this archaic custom, too; the problem here is why the Jews have remained conservative in this respect as in so many others. Apart from the Oriental peoples, circumcision is practiced among many primitive races—proof of the age-old nature of this custom. Some primitive races do not practice circumcision but have other analogous customs. . . . It is not easy to determine the meaning of such holy practices. Perhaps it can be guessed by their effect. The youth who has now become a man will be proud of his initiation into the adult community, and his feeling will be increased by his now being allowed the right of sexual intercourse, among others; but the price he has had to pay for this admittance, that of having to endure pain, shows him drastically that he can enjoy the protection of this community only as long as he obeys it and that he can expect unpleasant things if he does not adhere to certain conditions. And in fact, this and analogous social measures have worked. Even today, we find deep in the unconscious of man the fear that his penis may be cut off if he sins, a fear which acts as the chief motor for the instinct-suppression desired by the patriarchal society.

The drastic reminder of the sanguinary puberty rites of the primitives has been re-

placed by less drastic measures during the course of history. The Jewish circumcision, although practiced on the infant, is still comparatively drastic. It has remained a really sanguinary operation on the genitals. The knowledge of this fact on the part of the uncircumcised has undoubtedly increased the feeling of uncanniness which the Jew gives them. It has helped to lend a more precise form to the indefinite fear that a retaliation on the part of these curious people is imminent; this retaliation assumes a sexual form. The Jews will do something to the little girls of other races in the same way that they do something sanguinary-sexual to the little boys of their own race. Psychoanalysts are of the opinion, therefore, that circumcision—which is strange yet familiar in unconscious depths—operates in the same way as the other customs which make the Jew appropriate as a devil-projection.

In addition to stubbornly retaining archaic features and rejecting occasional opportunities for assimilation—or rather accepting the external denials of opportunities for assimilation with a kind of *Gueux* [outcast's] pride—and centering all this around his religion, the Jew does this in a manner which makes him still more apposite as a scapegoat.

WE ASSUME that what is called "national character" is created historically through actual conditions of living which, reflecting traditional ways of child-raising, are perpetuated through the impress of one generation upon the succeeding one. Among the traits of the Jewish national character there is one which is especially striking. It seems as if less direct aggression is permissible to the Jew than to other nations (which may be connected with the fact that the use of arms was prohibited to them for centuries). Instead, they developed many forms of indirect aggression. One of these indirect aggressions is their traditional belief in their being the chosen people, superior to the "barbarian." Jewish tradition is extremely patriarchal. The son is not permitted in any way to rebel against the father. The father, however, is proud of his son when

he himself is surpassed by his son in some intellectual or spiritual accomplishment. Analysts know similar pictures from the study of compulsion neurotics with severe and ambivalent father complexes. Their masochism and guilt feeling is obvious, their latent sadism and rebellion is masked by *Gueux* pride and intellect.

The Jewish patriarchal tradition determined the way in which the Jews through the centuries became accustomed to react to the anti-Semitism of their environment: (a) Superficially: "The more others exclude us, the nearer we are to our God." (b) On a deeper level: "By participating in the power of our God, we are magically superior to our enemies to whom we are physically inferior." This attitude increased the uncanny magical fear the host peoples felt toward the Jews, which in turn gave rise to increased "attack" by the belief in magical superiority on the part of the Jews, and increased attack gave rise to increased fear and anti-Semitism.

What caused Jewish national character to evolve in this way is a problem in itself. Here again, the ghetto system may offer a partial explanation. However, extreme patriarchy is in no way limited to people who have lived in ghettos but is rather generally a sign that in the given culture, the idea of murdering the father is more definitely repressed than in others, which must be due to the social history of the nation in question. Freud, in his book *Moses and Monotheism*, suggested a hypothesis as to why the Christian religion has admitted the idea of "killing God" to consciousness whereas the Jews have repressed it. (This is the reason why the Christians projectively tend to accuse the Jews of this very crime of being the "murderers of God.") For our purpose, it is enough to understand that the ancient history of a people forms and determines the structure of the character of subsequent generations by means of tradition and education.

To sum up: The anti-Semite arrives at his hate of the Jews by a process of displacement stimulated from without. He sees

in the Jew everything that brings him misery—not only his social oppressor but also his own unconscious instincts, which have gained a bloody, dirty, dreadful character from their socially induced repression. He can project onto the Jews because the actual peculiarities of Jewish life, the strangeness of their mental culture, their bodily (black) and religious (God of the oppressed peoples) peculiarities, and their old customs make them suitable for such a projection.

PERHAPS there will be one objection to this formula. If it is true, two premises must be fulfilled before anti-Semitism can become a mass movement. One, a revolutionary mood, or at least an intense discontent of the masses with the existing state of affairs, a discontent that may be channeled in the direction of the Jews as scapegoats; two, a Jewish cultural life and tradition in the midst of a host culture, without there being much connection between the two. Both of these conditions were present in Czarist Russia, which therefore provided the ideal conditions for the development of anti-Semitism. The situation was probably similar in the anti-Semitic movement of the Middle Ages.

However, the conditions do not seem to be fulfilled in modern anti-Semitism, neither in National Socialist Germany nor in the United States. In Germany, the emancipation of the Jews had made considerable progress. The majority of the Berlin Jews had little or no Jewish life or tradition, a fact which the Prague and Viennese Jews, who were nearer to the Eastern Jews, often used to ridicule. The Berlin Jews considered themselves Germans. There was no archaic foreignness appropriate for purposes of projection. However, the success of using the Jews and not redheads as scapegoats proves that the foreignness, or at least the memory of it, was still there. We may assume that discontent of the masses and Jewish separateness form a complementary series in order to produce anti-Semitism. In Germany prior to National Socialism, the

discontent of the masses was so enormous that little Jewish separateness was needed. Jewish emancipation was young and the Middle Ages had been long. Historical changes occur slowly, and memories of "Jewish separateness" were strong enough to permit the development of anti-Semitism when mass discontent became acute.

But what about the United States? At first glance, one may perhaps assume that here the complementary series is reverse in structure. There is no general revolutionary mood, and at least in some parts of the United States, traditional Jewish life is practised by many. However, Jewish peculiarities have certainly not increased recently, whereas anti-Semitism has. Does this mean that there is actually a mass discontent comparable to the discontent in pre-Hitler Germany? It seems as if our theory of anti-Semitism compels us to assume something of the kind. In a certain sense, something of "mass discontent" must be present; the question is, in what sense? . . .

In all fields we hear complaints about lack of enthusiasm among Americans for

our democracy and for their rights, which they take too much for granted. Their intellectual insight into their advantages and into the necessity of fighting for them, as well as the readiness to act according to this insight, exist; nevertheless an emotional enthusiasm for it is generally and strikingly lacking. Probably this is due to the feeling that the hope for a more positive emotional gain, for a reliable end of the insecurities of the present world situation, is lacking and cannot be achieved through any amount of enthusiasm. To understand this, however, one would have to analyze the sociology of democracy and of the factual possibilities, the successes and failures, of democracy.

And so we have come back to where we began, to an admission of the limitations of the psychological explanation. The full utilization of the psychological facts we have studied, so that they may become a real and politically effective power, is only possible under certain economic and political circumstances. These are beyond the scope of this paper. However, this does not mean that they are of secondary importance.

UNDERSTANDING JEWISH RESISTANCE IN PALESTINE

The Aims and Methods of Hagana

SHLOMO KATZ

FOR the first time since the days of Bar Kochba, Jews have appeared on the historical scene fighting with arms for their national rights. Coming on the heels of the Jewish catastrophe in Europe, this manifestation has stirred Jews to their depths. They follow the sensational, often contradictory headlines in the press with bewilderment and mixed emotions: fear of the outcome, scepticism of the wisdom of the Jews' attempt to obtain their demands by the use of force, and many with pride. Under the impact of fast-moving events, the basic facts of the situation tend to be obscured. For the perplexed, of whatever political view, it should be useful to present a clearer picture of the Resistance Movement in Palestine, its origins, aims, and methods.

Easy comparisons have been advanced. Palestine has been compared to Ireland of World War I days, to the Thirteen Colonies of 1776, to present-day India. But such comparisons between Jewish resistance in Palestine and other historic struggles for freedom are misleading, except on the moral plane, and tend to confuse the situation by forcing it into a historical mold that does not fit.

Where other struggling nations have

SHLOMO KATZ, whose article, "No Hope Except Exodus," appeared in our April number, offers here a somewhat different view of the Jewish resistance in Palestine from that presented by Mosche Smelansky in the first article of this issue. Born in the Ukraine, raised in the United States, one-time member of a Palestinian *kibbutz*, Mr. Katz is a close student of Palestine affairs and world politics. From 1936 to 1943 he was managing editor of *Jewish Frontier*, organ of the Labor Zionists, and since then has served four years in the Army Air Forces.

been in possession of their land, the Jewish people is still scattered. Hundreds of thousands of the future citizens of Palestine are in displaced persons camps in Germany and Italy. The Jewish community is still a numerical minority in Palestine, although most significant achievements in the development of the country have resulted from its efforts. And the position of the surviving Jews in Europe, so many of whom are fighting against every obstacle to reach Palestine, must also be kept in mind, since they constitute one of the most significant factors in the Palestine resistance.

ALTHOUGH the establishment of an independent Jewish state is an ultimate objective of the Resistance Movement in Palestine, much more immediate and urgent are its two tasks of *defense and rescue*. Hagana, which has frequently been called the Jewish people's army, and today constitutes the armed backbone of the Resistance Movement, is a defense organization. The idea of Hagana—self-defense—arose in Europe long before there was a considerable Jewish community in Palestine. It developed among the Jewish youth in Russia, who, with the unsparing words of the Hebrew poet Bialik echoing in their ears, began to organize self-defense units against pogroms a decade before the First World War. At about the same time there was formed in Palestine the organization called "Hashomer" (watchman), to protect "Jewish life, honor, and property." Hashomer was an organization of professional watchmen who also had plans for national colonization. They dreamed of establishing a chain of watchmen's settlements on the border of Palestine to protect the Jewish community from Arab marauders.

The Hagana organization was established after the First World War, when the Jewish community in Palestine had grown through immigration, and the British had made it obvious during the Arab attacks of 1921 that the Jews would have to protect themselves.

The primary function of Hagana then as well as now was not to combat either the Arabs or the English, but only to resist attacks. It was not a political organization and had no political aims of its own. The definition and the realization of political objectives remained in the hands of the properly elected Jewish bodies.

But Hagana did not operate in a void. Its members were not professional soldiers, but farmers in the agricultural villages, and students and workers in the cities. The generally progressive atmosphere of the Jewish community, which found expression in the establishment of communes and co-operatives, was reflected in the popular character of Hagana, in its methods, and above all in the moral standards it developed and enforced. Throughout the three years of Arab attacks in 1936-9, attacks inspired and to a considerable extent financed by fascist sources in Europe, the code of *havlaga*—self-restraint—was rigorously adhered to. This code obligated members of Hagana under no circumstances to resort to retaliation against Arabs who might be innocent. It was a difficult code to obey at a time when almost every day brought news of Arab attacks resulting in the loss of innocent lives, and it is noteworthy that it was not broken by members of Hagana at any time.

At this time there came into being another organization which, although small, figures very prominently in the news of the day. This is the Irgun Zevai Leumi (National Military Organization). Originally it was an offshoot of the Zionist-Revisionists who seceded from the World Zionist Organization.

Today the strength of this organization is variously estimated between 2,000 and 4,000. The sweeping tide of fascism in Europe, the daily deterioration of the posi-

tion of the Jews in Europe, and the increasing penetration of fascist ideas and influences among Arab nationalist youth drawing their inspiration from the Mufti, caused a number of young Jews in Palestine to feel that indiscriminate terrorist violence was justified. In addition to its defense activities, Hagana was then called upon to combat these tendencies.

So long as the British government pretended to abide by the provisions of the Mandate, the functions of Hagana remained strictly defensive. But the idea of "defense" was extended to include a much broader field after Great Britain in 1939 issued its White Paper, allowing only a few additional Jewish immigrants to enter the country and restricting the Jewish right to purchase land to a narrow strip of the country, thus confining the Jewish community to a virtual ghetto in Palestine. The concept of defense was then broadened to include a struggle against these regulations, which were held to be more dangerous in the long run than the direct assaults of the Mufti's bands.

AT THAT time Hagana undertook the new task of bringing Jewish immigrants from Europe into Palestine against the regulations of the British administration.

This activity—which served the double function of helping the surviving Jews of Europe and strengthening the Jewish community in Palestine—was intensified after the war, especially after the newly elected Labour Government demonstrated that in fighting Russian influence in the Middle East it was ready to appease Arab rulers at the expense of Jewish rights and aspirations. In carrying out this task, Hagana had to develop new modes of action. Maritime personnel had to be trained and ground forces organized to defend the landing of the "illegal" Jewish immigrants. Anything that directly contributed to the security of the work became important. When the British began to use coast guard stations, warships, planes, and special police to prevent the immigrants from landing,

Hagana forces destroyed their coastal installations. When apprehended immigrants were held in detention camps and there was danger of their deportation, Hagana forces raided these camps and liberated the immigrants by force.

At this time there was no cooperation or understanding between Hagana and the Irgun Zevai Leumi or the Stern Group. The Irgun Zevai Leumi practiced terrorism in the form of attacks on police stations, and even robberies to obtain funds for their activities. The small Stern Group (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), which never had more than a few hundred members, resorted to assassination and claimed responsibility for the murder of Lord Moyne. On this last occasion Hagana took active measures to prevent a repetition of such acts.

With the end of the war the strength of the Resistance Movement, which embraces the bulk of the Jewish community in Palestine, grew. Contributing to the new intensity of feeling were the reports of mass extermination of Jews in Europe, the realization of the hopeless plight of the survivors, and the awareness that England was prepared to sacrifice the Jewish rights in Palestine for the sake of its imperialist interests. Feeling in the Jewish community gained in intensity with the sense of betrayal which came when efforts which recruited tens of thousands of volunteers for the British forces, as well as numerous volunteers from among the ranks of Hagana for specially daring commando missions, brought no change in British hostility to Jewish aspirations. When the British authorities in Palestine began to issue emergency decrees that deprived the population of all democratic rights and began to maltreat political prisoners, the vast majority of the population lined up solidly behind the activities of Hagana.

The pattern of cooperation between the Resistance Movement at large and Hagana found open expression in various ways: while armed units of Hagana protected the landing of Jewish immigrants, masses of the Jewish population would create a diver-

sion by milling around and blocking possible police reinforcements at strategic points; on other occasions they would mingle with the new arrivals, thus preventing their identification and arrest; long-time residents in Palestine would refuse to show their identification papers and therefore be arrested: the time wasted by the police in identifying them gave the newly landed immigrants an opportunity to find refuge; in agricultural settlements the entire population would impede the entry of British forces and refuse to be identified—on several occasions they locked arms and lay down on the ground, compelling the British to force each one individually away from the group and into the barbed wire enclosures where they were searched.

Yet all this time the code of non-retaliation observed in 1936-9 was not abandoned under the political conditions of 1945-6. The code was merely modified and brought up to date. A formulation of the code appeared in an underground publication of Hagana on January 22, 1946. It read:

It is always a tragedy when a people is forced into a struggle in which lives are lost. How to act in such a struggle becomes an extremely important question. . . . For many years fascism has taught its followers to disdain the sanctity of human life. Fascism began by disdaining the lives of Jews and other opponents and ended by applying this attitude to entire nations and classes. . . . The world became accustomed to this attitude. Even many of those who fought in the war against the fascists—but not against fascism—were not immune to this poisonous attitude.

Precisely because we have been forced against our will into a struggle that costs the lives of our own members and those of our opponents, we shall choose only objectives that accentuate the political aspect of our struggle (such as destroying patrol boats or demolishing coast guard stations and other governmental installations that endanger or prevent Jewish immigration) and we shall assign to ourselves tasks that directly aid in the attainment of our goal (the liberation of interned "illegal" immigrants from Athlit, landing operations, etc.). Because we are in this struggle against our will, we shall always accentuate the absolute value of human life. Only the requirements of self-defense

compel us to sacrifice our own lives or cause loss of life to our adversaries. . . .

This insistence on a code that stresses the absolute value of human life was made necessary by a number of factors. For one thing, a growing bitterness against the indifference of the democracies toward the Jews in Europe during the war, and against the postwar repudiation of the legitimate claims of the Jewish people by the British government, resulted in moods of desperation and a consequent inclination to support terroristic acts against the British even if such acts served no immediate or practical purpose. Aside from purely ethical considerations, there was also the realization that a moral letdown could only weaken the Resistance Movement and provide the British with a weapon to discredit it.

In its present form the Hagana code expresses itself in the unusual procedure of informing the personnel of any governmental installation about to be destroyed that they are in danger and asking them to evacuate. This practice has been employed consistently in all cases where lives were endangered. It places a heavy burden on Hagana and in at least one case it resulted in the undoing of its plans. This happened in connection with the British radar station on Mt. Carmel, which was very effective in locating ships approaching the coast with "illegal" immigrants. The station was mined and its personnel were warned by telephone to evacuate it. They used the few minutes of grace to locate and remove the mines, and a second try was necessary before the station was destroyed.

THE nature of the Jewish Resistance Movement in Palestine thus becomes clear: it is engaged in a struggle for survival, with political independence a necessary condition for that survival. Until recently there were still differences of opinion among Jews in Palestine about the wisdom of a policy of open resistance. Those in favor of such a policy urged precisely the activities now practiced. Their opponents main-

tained that the world could still be educated to an understanding of Jewish needs and a realization of the justice of Jewish demands in Palestine, although even they had grave doubts about the "moral resonance" of the world of today. In large measure, it was the British who ended this debate by the intransigence of their anti-Jewish policy.

The British not only ended the debate, they also brought together groups that were formerly very far apart. Under the impact of British terror in Palestine, even Hagana and the Irgun Zevai Leumi are getting closer. It is true that their relationship is still limited to a certain degree of liaison aimed at preventing clashes between their forces when engaged in operational activities. But there appears to be little doubt that unless there is a change in the near future in the British attitude toward the immigration of Jewish survivors from Europe, even the Irgun Zevai Leumi will be brought into closer cooperation with the main Resistance Movement, and the British will create a degree of unity among the Jews of Palestine that could not otherwise be attained.

The objectives of the struggle of the Resistance Movement are explicit. In the memorandum of the Jewish Resistance Movement to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry during its session in Jerusalem, Hagana stated:

We will not permit the implementation of any solution that puts an end to the last hope of our people. The Jewish ethic recognizes the existence of commandments for whose sake one must risk one's life and even take another's life. We have raised the defense of our national existence above all our other commandments. We will not break this commandment. No solution can be enforced against our will: we are strong enough for that. As a result of our opposition there will be created in this country a new problem—a British problem, the problem of British security in Palestine.

The above statement provides the explanation for the acts of resistance practiced in past months, as well as a clue to operations still to come. The blowing up of the

railways on November 1, 1945, the attacks on Mobile Police Stations and the destruction of planes in air bases in February 1946, and the dynamiting of bridges and railway shops in June 1946, do not constitute a declaration of war against England, or even an uprising. They are warnings that the Jewish community in Palestine, through its Resistance Movement, will not acquiesce to a policy leading to the destruction and demoralization of the Jewish people. Each of those operations was carried out in response to a definite anti-Jewish move by the British government. The operations carried out in June had a threefold purpose: to reply to Bevin's claim that an additional division of British troops would be needed to protect the entrance of 100,000 displaced Jews into Palestine, by demonstrating that he would need more troops than that to keep them out; to protest against the "laxity" that resulted in the Mufti's return to the Middle East; to make a show of strength against British plans to disarm the Jewish Resistance Movement. These plans had been uncovered by the counter-intelligence of the Resistance Movement and were to have been carried out within a short time.

The above mentioned memorandum to the Committee of Inquiry states explicitly that the Resistance Movement is not anti-British *per se*:

The Jewish Resistance Movement is not anti-British. We have declared war against the hostile policies of the British government toward us. But we have no animosity either toward the English people or toward the British Commonwealth of Nations. . . . The only opposition that exists between us was created by the British government when it repudiated the Mandate. There is nothing left for us but to take a firm and forceful stand for our interests and rights, and as a last resort, a desperate stand.

This attitude, resting on a firm conviction that law is on the Jewish side and that the British government is guilty of lawlessness, terrorism, and injustice, will determine events in the coming months.

The Arabs, who many suppose to be the main opponents of the Jews, and whose

interests the British ostensibly protect, play no role in this struggle between the Jewish Resistance Movement and British authority. In due course the Mufti, or one of his relatives, may be brought forward as the leader of an Arab "uprising" against the Jews. But the indifference of the Arab masses at this time, and the continued friendly relations between Jews and Arabs, are a true indication of the facts.

Bringing "illegal" Jewish immigrants into Palestine will continue to be the major activity for some time to come. All other operations of a more drastic character will be closely related to this fundamental activity. The degree of violence used in the future depends on whether or not there is a major change in British policy on Jewish immigration. Should there be a favorable change in that policy, there is little doubt that the political struggle for the establishment of a Jewish state would return to normal political channels.

However, should England remain adamant in its determination to stop immigration and enforce the land purchase restrictions, the coming months will bring a noticeable intensification of the struggle. There are numerous indications pointing in this direction, both in the continuing anti-Jewish attitude of the Colonial Administration and in the intransigent policy of the Labour Government. The "last resort," the "desperate stand" referred to in the memorandum of the Resistance Movement, may become a reality.

How long could the Jewish Resistance Movement hold out in such a stand? Here, too, generalizations should be avoided. The specific conditions governing the situation must not be overlooked. One must consider the unanimity that now predominates in the Yishuv. Hagana, with an organized strength of nearly ninety thousand, has the direct support of the vast majority of the Jewish population in the country.

It should likewise be borne in mind that British efforts to liquidate the Resistance Movement as a prelude to the total liquida-

tion of Zionism are very likely to meet with enormous difficulties. Simultaneous raids on most Jewish settlements, seizure of arms caches, and arrest and deportation of thousands of Jewish leaders would, in effect, involve the British in the liquidation of the entire Jewish community in Palestine. Warning to that effect has been given the authorities.

It is obvious that the Jewish Resistance Movement could not withstand the armed might of the British Empire in a showdown battle along conventional lines. But this has been anticipated and no such battle is planned even if resistance to the British becomes intensified beyond anything seen so far. The strategic plan is no secret. In its memorandum the Resistance Movement stated:

The number of our people who are trained and arrayed for military action is not the determining factor, because we are not preparing for one decisive battle between our forces and the forces of the Empire. Our trained forces and our equipment suffice for a long and difficult conflict. But they are not our main strength. The main thing is that all the Jews of Palestine are with us and twelve million Jews are behind us. In place of every hundred or thousand who will be arrested or who will fall there will rise other hundreds and thousands. . . . Those who do not bear arms can also fight with passive resistance and civil disobedience. We are not a secret sect. We are the militant Jewish people. We will confront the British government with a choice: accept our vital demands or destroy us. We will not surrender.

In the face of such a challenge it is difficult to see what the British forces can do. England is today not in a position to incur the animosity of the world by resorting to wholesale slaughter of Jews in Palestine. England needs friends and allies too much to dare risk such a move. It may seek its friends in doubtful, faraway quarters, but the British government is aware that public opinion in England, and in many other countries

whose support England needs, would not tolerate such action. That is why "illegal" immigrants caught off the shores of Palestine are not forced to turn back when they have no port to return to. England cannot afford a repetition of the "Patria" and "Struma" cases. This also explains why England is so anxious to involve the United States in its plans for "disarming" the Resistance Movement. It cannot at this time take that responsibility on its own shoulders.

IN AN effort to justify its actions and to lighten the burden of its responsibility, the British government and various agencies under its influence seek to confuse public opinion about the real issues involved. In Palestine itself there have been numerous attempts to provoke violence of a sort that would discredit the Resistance Movement. Credit is due Hagana that it did not fall into the trap of such provocations and kept to its main task—defense of the Yishuv and rescue of Jews from Europe.

Suspensions are sowed in the outside world by stories concerning great differences between Jewish "moderates" and "extremists." Fears of Arab flight into the supposedly open arms of Russia are suggested to those who will listen, despite the fact that the feudal Arab rulers dread Soviet influence among their people more than almost anything else. Or the world is suddenly advised that thousands of Jews in Palestine are requesting permission to return to their native Austria.

But these moves are signs of weakness, and betray an uneasiness that is not allayed by Britain's military might. The struggle of the Jewish Resistance Movement for free immigration, for the rescue of the Jews of Europe, and for a Jewish State, is not the last-ditch stand of a people that has lost all hope and fights suicidally merely for a dignified end. The Jews of Palestine are not without good grounds for hope that their resistance will be successful.

CESAR TIEMPO: ARGENTINE POET

DONALD D. WALSH

CESAR TIEMPO is the pen name of Israel Zeitlin, a naturalized Argentine born in the Ukraine in 1906. A Russian pogrom drove the Zeitlin family to Hamburg, and soon after, they set sail for America. When the ship reached New York there were difficulties about details of passport regulations that thwarted their hope of entering the United States, so the Zeitlins went on with the ship to Buenos Aires.

Thereby we lost a Jewish poet and Argentina gained a Jewish and a national poet. Israel Zeitlin would have been a Jewish poet in any land, but he has become, in Argentina, not only a poet of his people, but of his adopted country as well.

Jewish writers have played a very important part in 20th century Argentine literature, and it is noteworthy that this contribution to Argentine letters does not come from the Sephardic Jews, who have preserved for centuries the Judeo-Spanish cultural tradi-

tion. The Argentine group is of East-European descent, first- or second-generation immigrants, like Cesar Tiempo, who have come to the New World seeking refuge and freedom. Brought to Argentina at the beginning of the 20th century through the generosity of Baron Moses Hirsch of Austria, who purchased a great extent of territory in the Argentine province of Entre Ríos, these Russian Jews grouped themselves in colonies in this and in other provinces, and soon made a valuable contribution to the economic life of their new country.

And not only economic. In a remarkably short time some of these immigrants and their children became a part, and a leading part, of the literary life of Argentina, in spite of the handicaps of language and of cultural traditions so alien to those of their adopted land. Much of this assimilative *tour de force* was due to the genius of the writers themselves, but conditions in Argentina were peculiarly favorable to it.

It is unlikely that the same writers would have achieved a comparable leadership in Europe or the United States, despite their great talents and their eagerness to fuse their old and their new cultures. For it must be noted that the "assimilation" of this group of writers did not involve a rejection of their Jewish heritage. They were not interested in becoming Argentine instead of Jewish, but in adding Argentine qualities to their Jewishness, and in explaining their Jewishness to the Gentile world. Indeed, the work of these authors, and especially that of Cesar Tiempo, is deeply concerned with Jewish traditions and culture.

WHAT are the factors that made this literary growth less difficult in Argentina than it would have been in Europe or in the United States? One was certainly

DONALD D. WALSH is head of the Spanish Department of The Choate School. Born in Providence, Rhode Island, in 1903, and educated in the Boston public schools and at Harvard, Mr. Walsh has written several Spanish textbooks. His book reviews and articles have appeared in the *Modern Language Journal*, the *Inter-American* and specialized journals on Spanish and Latin American literature. The translations of the poems "Israelite Cemetery," "Harangue," "Prayer," and "Weeping and Singing" are quoted, with permission, from *An Anthology of Contemporary Latin-American Poetry*, edited by Dudley Fitts, New Directions, 1942. Except for the translation of "Israelite Cemetery," which is by Rolfe Humphries and Mr. Fitts, all the translations quoted in the article are by Mr. Walsh. This is the first of a series of articles COMMENTARY intends to publish on the modern Jewish contribution to Latin-American literature. Whatever Cesar Tiempo's present political tendencies may be—and of late they seem to be rather compromising—his poetry is certainly worthy of the appreciation it here receives.

economic. Argentina needed immigrants, especially agricultural workers, and she welcomed those who, like the Russian Jews, were good farmers. Established in colonies, they quickly won respect and friendship through their skill and industry. Twentieth-century Argentina, like the United States a half-century earlier, was a relatively empty land of opportunity, going through a tumultuous evolution. The balance of power was shifting from the feudal, cattle-raising aristocracy of the outlying provinces to the farmers of the provinces near Buenos Aires, and to the merchants and intellectuals of the capital. In this struggle all aid was welcome, and men of foreign birth and ancestry rose quickly to leadership, if they were able men. There was no xenophobia or anti-Semitism; the Jew-baiting that afflicts Argentina in recent years is part of the pseudo-Nazi movement by means of which the reactionary cattle-owning aristocracy hopes to regain its lost power.

The upheaval in Argentine economic life early in the century was paralleled by a revitalized and intensified literary activity. Spanish-American literature as a whole has been slow in maturing, to an even greater extent than in the United States. And the coming of age of Argentine literature was of even more recent date, so that foreign writers were on the scene as modern Argentine literature began to mature and expand. Having taken a full share in the development of other phases of national life, it was natural that they should participate fully in its cultural life as well. The Jewish writers, moreover, were impelled by a desire to explain themselves and their traditions to their fellow Argentines, and by a deep sense of gratitude toward the nation that had offered them a chance to live and grow as free men.

The outstanding figures of this Jewish flowering in Argentine literature are Alberto Gerchunoff, Samuel Glusberg, Samuel Eichelbaum, and Cesar Tiempo. Gerchunoff has perhaps the greatest prestige; through his editorial work in *La Nación* of Buenos Aires, one of the four or five great Amer-

ican newspapers; through his two collections of short stories, *Los gauchos judíos* (The Jewish Cowboys) and *Cuentos de ayer* (Tales of Yesterday); and through a series of critical and philosophical studies. Samuel Glusberg has done a great deal for the spread of Argentine literature with his publishing house, the Editorial Babel, and with his stories and novels, written under the pen name of Enrique Espinoza. Samuel Eichelbaum has written short stories and critical works, but his greatest fame comes to him through his plays, which have won him the unanimous praise of the critics and first place among the dramatists of Argentina, and perhaps of all Spanish America. An excellent study of his work by Theodore Epstein appeared in the summer 1945 *Books Abroad*.

AMONG these authors and many others worthy of mention no one has worked with greater diligence and success than Cesar Tiempo. More than any other of them, he has made himself the interpreter, the defender, and the conscience of the Jews of Buenos Aires. As the publisher of the newspapers *Crítica* and *El Sol*, and the literary review *Columna*, Tiempo opened their pages to young Jewish writers, and he has fought for independence and sincerity, justifying the noble motto of his review: "Ready to make any sacrifice, save that of truth." He did everything possible to fight the infamous anti-Semitic campaign promoted several years ago by Hugo Wast, a campaign and a promoter that at one time enjoyed the official support of the Argentine government, which gives, by this support and by the consequent persecutions, the definitive proof of its barbarity.

In his dramatic and poetic work Cesar Tiempo continues and strengthens his mission of Jewish champion and interpreter. Two plays of his have been produced, *El teatro soy yo* (I Am the Theater) and *Pan criollo* (American Bread), both high in artistic and even poetic value, treating Jewish themes with nobility and sincerity. But Tiempo is above all a poet, and in his poetry

we can see most clearly his double mission of interpreter and champion.

His first book of poems, *Versos de una . . .*, was published in 1923 under the pseudonym of "Clara Baker." The critics received it with praise, and then with amazement on discovering that its author was only seventeen. His second collection of poems, *Libro para la pausa del sábado* (A Book for the Sabbath Pause), won the First Municipal Prize for Poetry in 1930. Since then he has published two other collections: *Sabatión argentino* (Argentine Sabbath) in 1933, and *Sábado Domingo* (Sabbath-Sunday) in 1938.

WHAT are the main themes of Cesar Tiempo's poetry? As an interpreter of his people, he speaks to us of the Jewish Sabbath, of family affection, of Jewish maidens, of life in the ghetto of Buenos Aires. As a defender and champion of the Jews, he speaks of pogroms, of the suffering of his ancestors; he makes us look upward to the greatness of the Jewish tradition, and punishes with the lash of his irony his brothers when they forget this greatness through their petty and worldly concerns.

His principal theme is the Sabbath of pause and meditation, sacred day when the Jews, turning their eyes away from daily worries, forsake the bustle of the streets to withdraw into the synagogue and the home and, by the light of the seven-branched candelabra, contemplate the eternal glory of God. As we have seen, the titles of three of his volumes of poetry refer to this Sabbath pause: *A Book for the Sabbath Pause*, *Sabbath-Sunday*, and *Argentine Sabbath*. The latter refers to the legend of the River Sabbath, whose waters do not flow on the sacred day of rest. In a language filled with religious emotion, his poetry, like a psalm, sings of the sadness and yearning of the Jewish soul, filled with memories. In "Our Sabbath," he says:

*Our Sabbath, channel of festive rest,
candelabra of flames crowded as my days*

*guard your dark-windowed refuge
like a child in the night, alone and afraid, . . .*

and in "The Birth of the Sabbath":

*Sabbath of pause—shabbat—of truce,
of renewal—chadash—of new
moon—neomenia—for the joy
of one who longs to seek refuge,
far from turmoil, in the mercy
of active idleness, of sacred peace,
and putting behind him dizziness and discord
to love God and think of nothing.*

In his "Hymn to Jewish Maidens," he says:

*Against the phantom of war,
with a single, steady faith,
let us give to the earth a Sabbath.
Sabbath is peace. Sabbath is peace.*

And finally, he links the moon and the sun in his beautiful Sabbath "Prayer":

*Moon, mother of the Sabbath, transfuse
your loving
calm, your pollen of peace, your wandering
soul into the wife that awaits
the son's coming like a melodious
paschal consecration of spring fruits.*

*Sunday, son of the sun, let your light not
strike her,
your alabandine light that knows no rest;
let the roar of the street become gentle music
for the son advancing
with the tremor of water seeking its shore.*

*Sabbath-Sunday, the child new as the dance
that dies and is reborn upon the stricken
earth,
comes with its hope to seek your hope;
a Jewish mother brings it to you with her
love,
give her your brightness all the days of her
life.*

The poet's Sabbath meditations do not, however, exclude other interests, both Jewish and Argentine: a love of the street, a

delight in complete and outward living, an infinite good humor, a tremendous capacity to react against the sadness and uncertainty of existence, interests that he has expressed in verses that overflow with the joy of living. So in his poem, "To Be Danced on Friday Evening":

*Friday, bearing in your arms
the Sabbath like a bride,
—Israel counts by evenings
and anticipates the dawn—
puff of blue cloud that loves the street
like the Hellene and the Jew,
peoples of circles and dreams
with a living, present past;
silent peddlers go by,
stray girls and dogs,
under the trees of night
blind angels rest—
the trees, nature's gallows,
and candelabra, still cheerful,
spout yellow lights
upon the suicides of Friday.*

*Friday of stumbling, wandering steps
if your destiny is my destiny
why after loving the Sabbath
do you love Sunday's laughter?*

*The poor pass like instants,
around the hearth are pictured
lovers' luck
and needle's weariness.*

*Friday, bustling father,
Saturday, festive wife,
Sunday, street-loving son
and all around, the living life.*

*The living, living, living life
unified and unrestricted,
hurray, hurray, hurray for all,
God, Friday, Saturday and Sunday.*

and in "Sun Shower in the Ghetto":

*Hallelujah! Hallelujah!
laughs the sun in the rain.
Blond and festive sun
over the Jewish quarter.*

*Hallelujah that unites
Semite and Christian voices.
The tardy trolleys
sing their bright colors.
The ghetto's joy
makes a date in the sky.
Evening preens itself
in Jewish streets.
Gay, golden rain
for wordless love . . .
God pours over all
his fine, golden ash.
Girl, give me your hand.
Let us run and get wet.
Hallelujah! Hallelujah!
laughs the sun in the rain.*

This poem is a good example of Tiempo's humor, a humor frequent in his poetry, though often—and inevitably—tinged with irony, because of his themes. Thus, faced with a world that stubbornly refuses either to receive the Jews as compatriots or to give them the promised homeland, Cesar Tiempo writes his "Israelite Cemetery":

*Deaf to the hurly-burly of the street,
drowsy-content, free from delirium,
face upward, with the down-curved noses,
rest
these souls discharged from Jewry and its
cares.*

*After a crossing by paths without return
their boats have come to mooring here at last;
they have made themselves these beds, this
sprawling city,
in the sure repose of everlasting sleep.*

*The moans of old women with their noisy
grief
cannot disturb this smug and supine world
where throb the rhythms of the whining
dirge
sung for a set price, with beatings of the
breast.*

*Here the days dance their slowly-measured
ease,
the flowers' resurrection confers its grace;*

*the schnorrer has taken title to the land,
the aristocrat his neighbor in the ground.
And while the nights display their decorations
above this dwarfed city's heavy calm,
the Semite flock sleeps without vain ambition,
assured that life will not begin tomorrow.*

In the image of the dead Jews resting "face upward, with the down-curved noses" there is a fine example of Tiempo's characteristic mixture of humor and tenderness. The irony of having to wait for death before becoming landowners and inhabiting the same element as the aristocracy is an irony heightened by the motto that Tiempo used for his poem—Lord Balfour's "A National Home for the Jewish People."

His anger against the oppressors of the Jews can become a lash turned against the Jews themselves when they are guilty of worldliness and ignorance. In his magnificent "Harangue on the Death of Hayim Nahman Bialik," he contrasts the life and death of the great Hebrew poet with the indifference of the Jews of Buenos Aires to the grandeur of their inheritance:

*What other interest than that of the
present moment can a people have
which must drag itself through its
shadows and abysses?*

—Bialik

On July 5th the Associated Press gave the news to the world:

Hayim Nahman Bialik had died in Vienna,

Twenty days later, and in the same city,
they put an end to Dollfuss, the "Milli-
metternich."

Look out for poets
whose fists pound on the desks of hangmen!

The world's dailies
managed to publish the item on the Society
Page

next to the account of the party
with which the Barabanchik family

*celebrated the circumcision of their off-
spring.*

*I have a violent heart
and a harsh voice.*

*I walk the streets of the Jewish Quarter
weighed down by my anger and my grief.*

*Brothers of Buenos Aires:
our proudest poet is dead.
As in the Psalms,
God girded him with strength and made
straight his way.*

*Minkowski was plaintive,
Bialik an imprecation.*

*And both will rot under the earth,
facing the blind eyes of tremendous night.*

*A shirtsleeve sky runs over the roofs.
The pedlars in the Pilsen are at their end-
less game of dominoes.*

*Girls who want to get married don't walk
under scaffolding.*

*You bourgeois who break all the Com-
mandments
and spend your Sabbaths over your black-
bound ledgers,
stroking the spines of the figures
to make them stretch out like cats,
I have seen you in your glittering temples—
ranged like thoroughbreds in sumptuous
stalls—*

*with your round lifeless little eyes,
with your formal top hats and your pure
silk prayer-shawls,
trying to bribe God
who knows you better than your employees.*

Hayim Nahman Bialik is dead.

*There's gefillte fish today in 'The Inter-
national,'
and a good stock of doctors for your poor
drooping daughters.*

*Who remembers the massacres in the
Ukraine,*

the raving storm of the pogroms,
when hooligans raped your mothers
and you stayed trembling in your cellars,
useless
as a ray of light striking a mirror?

Bialik shouted, he thundered across the
black waters,
and his angry laughter ran through the
villages like a wild wind.

'The people are a withered grass,
lifeless as dry timber.'
And there were youths who shook them-
selves like wolf cubs
and their sharp teeth tore our shame to
shreds.

Hayim Nahman Bialik is dead.

The old-clothes dealers smile in the door-
ways of their pandemoniums.
The Lacroze trolleys are greener than ever.

Cast thy bread upon the waters, says
Ecclesiastes.

How nice to hear Mischa Elman from a
soft orchestra seat at the Colón.

Gorki said that with Bialik the Jewish race
had given a new Homer to the world.

Would the Bank of Israel accept his sig-
nature?

Voices:

'Tonight when the store's closed and I'm
dunking my toast in a glass of tea,
I'm going to ask the wife to read me
The Bird and The Garden, and after
supper we're going to the Ombú Thea-
ter: if you want to get on the Committee,
you've got to keep up with things.'

Hayim Nahman Bialik is dead.

'Ma, can I wash my hair with kerosene and
put on my sky-blue dress to go to
the Library?'—'All right, darling, and see

if you can get yourself a young man,
like the rest of the girls: it's about time.'
Hayim Nahman Bialik is dead.

At the door of the People's Kitchen our
brothers, the ones who haven't the
courage to starve to death, are waiting
for their ration.

Hayim Nahman Bialik is dead.

Our legs drag through the deepest marshes
of night and above our heads a pure
light shines.

In Tel-Aviv there was a poet.

And now?

CESAR Tiempo's poetry is very Hebraic in
spirit. He has the qualities that appear
in the work of the great Hebrew poets:
irony, humor, sentiment, pity, an interest in
man and in the reality of his existence, all ex-
pressed with a pure, free lyricism. And at
the same time, this Hebraic poetry of Cesar
Tiempo proves to be very true to Spanish
tradition in its form. There is in his songs
an infectious choral gaiety and in his psalms
the solemnity and the peacefulness of
medieval plainchant. Very Spanish are his
humor and tenderness that often become
bitterness and sarcasm. He has a thoroughly
Spanish stoicism that can accept the hazards
of life and view with equanimity the deep-
est anguish. Very Spanish, too, is his love
for the precise, concrete image, and that
poetic fantasy that couples dissimilar and
improbable elements in bold and striking
metaphors, as in these descriptive verses:
"The roofs hoist flags of smoke," "The cold
sharpens its knife on the wind," "Friday
of fog. The dawn has a handkerchief in
each hand," "The night has its back to the
sky," "Sunday nervously loosens its tie, and
the shadow of an indifferent Monday ad-
vances." Speaking of a deaf-mute painter:

Your hands learned the purest language,
translating into pictures your wordless grief,

*as the clouds tell their pluvial
sorrow with simple water pictures.*

At this uncertain hour, in a world filled with hatred and distrust, it is good to listen to the voice of this Jewish poet who, knowing that to understand is to forgive, devotes himself to banishing the errors and deceits that nourish intolerance. Argentina, and America, North and South, need such voices, now more than ever.

And despite the incredible horrors and injustices that have been, and are still being committed against the Jews, Cesar Tiempo gives to his Jewish brothers, and to the whole world, a note of hope in the last poem of his book *Sabbath-Sunday*, a poem entitled "Weeping and Singing," which bears this motto from the Psalms: "They that sow in tears shall reap in joy":

*From a land of milk and honey,
from hills and rivers clear,
the people of Israel went forth,
weeping.*

*Pillars of fire and cloud
went on before their steps
and Israel crossed the desert,
weeping.*

*The captives lifted up their
cities of mighty walls*

*and they gave thanks to God,
weeping.*

*Their lances became harrows,
their swords were turned to plows,
night and day they labored,
weeping.*

*'The sea of fiery water
they crossed over with their horses,
the tempest fell upon them,
weeping.*

*They were walled about
in the shadow of the ghettos
but they found out the light,
weeping.*

*The Sabbath was their buckler,
their isle, their candelabrum,
and they called the Sabbath holy,
weeping.*

*Taunted and spat upon,
bent low above the earth,
they sow without hate or rest,
weeping.*

*Tomorrow the sun will smile
upon the seed-rich fields
and then, then we shall reap,
singing, brothers, singing.*

THE MONTH IN HISTORY

The Atom

LUCRETIVS held that the world took its origin from the swerving of the atoms. Ever since Hiroshima, many had feared that man's world, at least, might find its end in their splitting.

In the hope that some way to avoid this fate could be found, the United Nations had set up the Atomic Energy Commission. Now, on behalf of the United States, Bernard M. Baruch offered the Commission a plan for the control of the atom.

It was, all things considered, a plan that showed extraordinary breadth of vision. The only nation that as yet commanded the use of atomic energy here proposed to surrender that monopoly to an international body, whose supervision it would accept. And the greatest capitalist nation in the world here proposed that all primary plants producing atomic material, as well as their product, should be the property of an international authority.

But most significant of all, a state that had in the past been among the most jealous guardians of unlimited national sovereignty offered to surrender that sovereignty, and the veto power which was its symbol, in the most crucial field of all. At San Francisco,

MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM writes this department this month in the absence of Sidney Hertzberg, who is in India in connection with famine relief there. Mr. Goldbloom has had lengthy experience in news analysis for which his prodigious knowledge of current history stands him in good stead. He was associate editor of *Common Sense*, and wrote for it the much-discussed department, "Peace in Process." He was born in New York in 1911, and attended Columbia University. In taking over Mr. Hertzberg's assignment, he assumes the difficult task of cutting through every day's sensations and propaganda to the underlying facts and trends beneath. It is his thankless job to report realities, not to give comfort or consolation.

there had been only two nations for which sovereignty was still a reality. To win the consent of the United States and the Soviet Union to the establishment of an international organization, it was first necessary to assure them that it would have no power to hold them in check. This was the meaning of the veto.

But at least the United States was now convinced that it was more important to be alive than to be sovereign. "There must," said Mr. Baruch, "be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes. The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to die. . . . We must embrace international cooperation or international disintegration. . . . The solution will require apparent sacrifice in pride and in position, but better pain as the price of peace than death as the price of war."

To the Soviet Union, however, the Baruch plan appeared as an attempt by the United States to secure world dominion. Particularly obnoxious was the proposal to abolish the veto. In presenting the Russian counter-proposals before the Atomic Energy Commission, Andrei A. Gromyko declared: "Efforts made to undermine the activity of the Security Council, including efforts directed to undermine the unanimity of the members of the Security Council upon questions of substance, are incompatible with the interests of the United Nations created by the international organization for the preservation of peace and security. Such attempts should be resisted."

The Soviet counter-plan provided for a treaty renouncing and forbidding the use of atomic energy for war. But the enforcement of this treaty was to be left to the Security Council with veto intact. The Soviet plan, in short, was based on the assumption of mutual trust among the powers. Or, to be precise, it was based on the assumption that the United States ought to trust the Soviet

Union. But at the same time the Russian demand that the United States destroy its entire stockpile of bombs at once did not bespeak any great Soviet faith in the United States.

It seemed fairly clear that the United States would be unwilling to surrender either its bombs or its knowledge of how to make them unless it first received some guarantee, more effective than a mere international promise on the order of the Kellogg Pact outlawing war, that no other power would be able to use the bomb against it. It was equally clear that Russia was still unwilling, even for the sake of securing atomic information and the destruction of the American stockpile of bombs, to submit herself in any respect to the authority of any international body over whose decisions and activities she had no veto. A way might, and probably would, be found to prolong the life of the Atomic Energy Commission by concealing the irreconcilability of the two points of view. But meanwhile no effective system of atomic control would be set up. Until one or the other yielded—or until some new element such as a Russian-developed bomb entered the situation—the Russians would keep the veto and the Americans would keep the bomb.

While the debate went on in the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States went ahead with its plans to test the effectiveness of the bomb against battleships. At Bikini Atoll a small fleet was assembled, and a bomb named "Gilda" was dropped in its midst. It seemed to many that the United States was expending an unduly large amount of effort on studying the military effects of a weapon it didn't intend ever to use. But perhaps this would provide the admirals with that "moral equivalent for war" of which William James spoke. If so, it might be well worth while.

Mr. Bevin Speaks

To a world desperately seeking for a way of controlling the atom, a world in which hundreds of millions were hungry and tens of millions dying of starvation, the fate of the hills and deserts and colonies of Palestine or even of a few hundred thousand Jews in Germany and Eastern Europe seemed but one of many problems. These people

were, to be sure, the survivors of unexampled persecution. They had suffered greatly, and they were still suffering. But to many the continued clamor of the tormented Jews sometimes seemed to intrude unduly into the midst of their own concerns.

Something of this resentment had crept into Ernest Bevin's speeches more than once; he had not troubled to phrase it in polite terms. Now he was confronted by the pressure of Jewish organizations and the American government for the immediate implementation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry's recommendation for the admission of a hundred thousand displaced Jews into Palestine. This action was asked without regard to the other provisions of the Report—provisions that might perhaps have made the proposal more palatable to the Arabs. And Mr. Bevin was also faced with the more direct action of armed Jewish groups in Palestine.

He exploded. He told the Labour Party's annual conference at Bournemouth: "Regarding the agitation in the United States, and particularly in New York, for 100,000 Jews to be put into Palestine, I hope it will not be misunderstood in America if I say, with the purest of motives, that that was because they did not want too many of them in New York. Those 100,000 did not touch the fringe of the refugee problem. I invited the United States to join with us in grappling with this problem. I am extremely grateful to them for taking part in the commission. . . .

"In Palestine there are illegal armed forces. If we put 100,000 Jews in Palestine tomorrow, I would have to put another division of British troops in there, and I am not prepared to do it. This business grew, I know, out of 1937 and the White Paper and all the agitation, but I must say to the Jews and the Arabs: 'Please put your guns away. Don't blow up the British Tommy, who is quite innocent. You are creating another phase of anti-Semitic feeling in the British Army.'"

This was loose talk of a sort that Jews knew only too well might cost lives. It showed a deplorable lack of understanding and imagination in regard to the effect of a reference to "too many" Jews anywhere, at a time when six million had just been slaughtered.

Whatever its intentions, it could not but give aid and comfort to anti-Semites everywhere. It alienated many whose natural sympathies lay with the British Labour Party and what it was seeking to achieve domestically and internationally. (Thus among those who violently denounced the statement were the Jewish Labor Committee and the New York Liberal Party, not to mention such highly respected individual labor leaders as Max Zaritsky and Joseph Schlossberg.) It gave the Communists—who had themselves denounced the Committee of Inquiry's recommendation on precisely the same grounds—an opportunity to pose as the defenders of the displaced Jews against the "anti-Semitic" Bevin. It weakened those Zionist leaders who had counseled reason and moderation, and strengthened the hand of extremist and terrorist elements. It obscured other and fundamentally much more important sections of Bevin's speech, both in regard to Palestine and in regard to the general international situation.

But perhaps the most unfortunate thing about Bevin's statement was that it contained some uncomfortable grains of truth. Many of the most ardent Congressional supporters of Jewish immigration into Palestine were equally enthusiastic advocates of limiting immigration to the United States. Even American Jewish organizations hesitated at the thought of asking for the liberalization of this country's immigration laws—because they knew, or thought they knew, that any change in those laws would be sure to be for the worse. And when after the Bevin speech a reporter asked President Truman if a gesture toward admitting more European Jews to the United States might not make it possible to get along a little better with Britain in the matter, the President made it clear that he had no intention of proposing anything of the sort.

The readiness of the United States to tell others what they ought to do, while doing little or nothing itself, had long been one of its less endearing characteristics in the eyes of other nations. Britain, an especially favored recipient of this country's unsolicited advice, had never learned to like it. This was perhaps one reason why Bevin's remarks were received with such enthusiasm by the Labour Party conference that the

sponsors of a pro-Zionist resolution withdrew it without a vote. However little Jews or Americans might enjoy the fact, both the tone and the substance of the Bevin statement unfortunately reflected what a very large part of the world felt on the subject.

Yet, as he later sought to make clear, Bevin had not intended to indicate that he would not carry out the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Rather, he appeared to be thinking in terms of implementing the report as a whole—but only after first making sure that the United States was really going to offer assistance as well as advice. Perhaps Mr. Truman's appointment of a three-man Cabinet committee to confer with the British on practical questions connected with the transfer of the 100,000 meant that for once this country was ready to do just that. But perhaps, many feared, it was just another gesture.

In terms of Palestine's future development, other parts of Mr. Bevin's speech were far more significant. His declaration in favor of a self-governing Palestinian state, not racial in character, was in apparent conflict with the Zionist demand for a Jewish state. Yet the terms in which many moderate Zionists defined a Jewish state were such that the conflict might be more apparent than real. At the same time, his emphasis on the importance of settling the problem of Palestine as part of the whole Middle Eastern problem appeared not greatly different from such suggestions as Dr. Judah Magnes' for a bi-national Palestine as part of a Middle Eastern federation.

Perhaps the most interesting of all Mr. Bevin's proposals in regard to Palestine dealt with the land problem.

Here, the Anglo-American Committee had recommended (a) "that the land transfers regulations of 1940 [prohibiting the sale of land to Jews in certain areas] be rescinded and replaced by regulations based on a policy of freedom in the sale, lease, or use of land, irrespective of race, community, or creed, and providing adequate protection for the interests of small owners or cultivators; (b) . . . that steps be taken to render nugatory and to prohibit provisions in conveyances, leases, and agreements relating to land which stipulate that only members of

one race, community, or creed can be employed on or about or in connection therewith." But Mr. Bevin went much further. For he cut the Gordian knot of the land problem by declaring that the proper development of Palestine's land required its nationalization and allocation by government tribunals. Such a solution would accord well with socialist principles; at the same time, it would permit the fullest development of Palestine's agricultural resources for the benefit of all the people, rather than only those with access to capital. And it would at one stroke wipe out restrictive covenants such as those of the Jewish National Fund and its Arab counterparts.

In general, however, Mr. Bevin emphasized repeatedly that Palestine alone was not a solution for the problem of Europe's Jews. He declared: "Apart altogether from Palestine, and not as a substitute for it, there would be a great welcome for much more Jewish brains and ability throughout the Arab world. They possess scientific, cultural, and other abilities which the Middle East requires." And reiterating that no matter how much was done in Palestine, many Jews would still remain in Europe, he said: "I cannot accept the belief that because a man is a Jew he must be hounded out of Europe. He must live there on terms of full equality with other citizens."

Peace Without Passports

More important for the world—and hence for Jews—than anything Bevin said about Palestine, however, were his comments on the general international situation. Here he pleaded passionately for the creation of a healthy and united Europe, declaring: "I want to be able to go down to Victoria Station, get a ticket, and go where the hell I like without a passport or anything else."

To the charge of setting up a Western bloc, he replied: "It ill becomes those who do—when you see an Eastern bloc in existence—to accuse those who have done nothing."

"I have deliberately not pressed for an alliance with France or the Western powers because I have been actuated all the time in this approach not to divide Europe. Next week, that is the issue that has got to be settled in Paris, if it ever is. . . .

"I am not going to be a party, so long as I hold this office, to any design in strategy, in allotment of forces, in arranging our defenses, which we must still have, to attack Russia. I will be no party to it. I don't believe there is a single soul in the Cabinet who would lend one atom of thought to it or allow it to occur."

"Neither will we give one moment's consideration to expansion. This division of Europe, this awful business of drawing a line from Stettin to Albania, and behind that this solidified position—if that happens, God forbid, you will have two camps in Europe by force of events, and that will be the road to another struggle."

Stettin and Points East

Most of Europe's Jews were still in the countries east of the Stettin-Albania line—a line which, if not yet permanently established, was none the less real. But many of them, if not the greater part, were not eager to remain there. They were infiltrating at the rate of some five thousand a month into the American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, where they joined the ranks of the displaced persons already there.

The infiltrators were not the only ones who wished to leave the countries of Eastern Europe; they were merely the hardiest and the luckiest. Every day's news from that area made it clear why Jews—and others—desired to emigrate. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry had urged that steps be taken to implement the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter in order to make it possible for Jews to remain in the countries of Eastern Europe. But in fact, neither these provisions nor those of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements were being implemented.

In Poland, there was virtual civil war. Homer Bigart of the New York *Herald-Tribune* reported that there was no possibility of a free election, because the Communist-dominated government had no chance of winning and no intention of losing one.

In Bulgaria and Rumania, according to Reuben H. Markham of the *Christian Science Monitor*, "the worst that any tyrant ever did in the way of violence, personal humiliation, the breaking up of meetings,

censoring the press, and preventing the expression of public opinion, is now being matched by the Communist-dominated governments."

In Hungary, anti-Semitism was on the rise. Premier Ferenc Nagy told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency: "I wish to stress the fact that the Hungarian Government is not and will never be anti-Semitic. I would appreciate it, however, if the Jews of America and the outside world would consider the fact that the present Hungarian regime was preceded by twenty years of fascism and that in the past era every effort was exerted to stir up anti-Semitism among the masses. Many of the Jews who formerly served in the labor battalions have found employment in the political police and most of them are not inclined towards pardons and reconciliation, but towards vengeance, which, of course, contributes to the anti-Semitic feelings. Impartially judging the situation, I wish the Jews would withdraw from the political police. . . . There is no general anti-Semitism in Hungary and we will punish the instigators of attacks on Jews with the greatest severity. . . . The great poverty of our people makes complete restitution of Jewish property almost impossible."

Despite the presence of the liberating and protecting Red Army, none of these countries was a really attractive place to live. As usual, the Jews seemed cast for the role of scapegoats.

Hope for Refugees

Some faint glimmer of hope for the hundreds of thousands who were fleeing the lands of their birth might be found in the establishment of the International Refugee Organization. This body, set up by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, was as yet without staff, powers, or funds. But it was believed that, by the beginning of 1947, it might be ready to function. If the refugees could last that long, it might be able to help them.

Two main disputes of special interest to Jews arose in connection with its establishment. One dealt with the proposal that German and Austrian Jews be regarded as refugees even when in their native countries. This was adopted over the opposition of the British delegate, who held that it represented

an introduction of Nazi racist doctrine—even if in reverse. The other was a resolution offered by Lebanon's delegate on behalf of the Arab League, which would have barred the organization from aiding any program of resettlement if it would create political difficulties in the country of settlement or in a neighboring country, or if it had been devised without the consent of the peoples of the countries of reception, and full consultation with the members of the United Nations directly concerned. This proposal, which would have prevented the organization from assisting in the resettlement of any Jewish refugees in Palestine, was voted down despite the support of the Ukrainian and Yugoslav delegates.

Terror and Repression

In the United States, Zionist reactions to Ernest Bevin's speech were bitter but verbal. They could be little more. To be sure, American Zionists were able to satisfy their desire for action by sending telegrams to Congress demanding the defeat of the British loan. But these telegrams were more likely to annoy the United States government, a basic element of whose foreign policy they sought to disrupt, than to interfere with the approval of the loan.

In Palestine, however, the situation was different. There the army of self-defense—the Hagana, and the terrorist Irgun and Stern groups, all had guns. All had been using them, but the Hagana at least had shown a certain restraint, all its operations having been directly concerned with the facilitation of illegal immigration. Now, however, it interpreted as a direct challenge Bevin's statement that the admission of 100,000 Jews would require the sending of an additional British division. Setting out to prove that it would require more British troops to keep the additional immigrants out than to let them in, the Hagana began a large-scale campaign of sabotage against railroads and bridges. At the same time the Irgun, perhaps strengthened by new recruits, began to intensify its activities. Not only did it destroy an estimated million dollars' worth of equipment in a raid on the railroad yards of Haifa; it also kidnapped six British army officers, five of them from a service club established for their entertain-

ment by the Jews of Tel Aviv. The Irgun announced that the kidnapped officers were hostages for some of its own members who were under sentence of death under the defense regulations for illegal possession of arms and for firing at British forces.

The British replied to the kidnappings by instituting a twenty-four-hour curfew in Tel Aviv, during which they made a house-to-house search. Responsible Jewish leaders, such as the mayor of Tel Aviv, condemned the kidnapping. David Ben Gurion, in London, described it as lunacy. The Hagana first asked and then ordered the Irgun to release its prisoners. Perhaps under the influence of these various denunciations, appeals, and orders, the Irgun did free two. (One had previously escaped.) But it held the others, and the Hagana seemed either unable or unwilling to enforce its orders.

Suddenly, on June 29, the British government struck back. Moving swiftly, British troops in Palestine occupied the headquarters of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, arrested about two thousand persons, including a number of leading officials of the Agency, and established a state of siege in a large part of the country.

Explaining the reasons for his action, Lieutenant-General Sir Alan G. Cunningham, High Commissioner for Palestine, declared:

"I have to inform the people of Palestine that, especially while discussions are proceeding about the future of the country, His Majesty's Government are determined that law and order is to be maintained in the territory and to repeat that they will not tolerate the use of force by either community. It is, therefore, my duty to give solemn warning that it is firmly resolved to root out terrorism and violence. . . .

"The operations at present in progress . . . are not directed against the Jewish community as a whole, but solely against those few who are taking an active part in the present campaign and those who are responsible for instigating and directing it.

"They are not reprisals: they are not punitive, and are being undertaken against one section of the Jewish community merely because it is from that section that the present violence has emanated. . . .

"It has been necessary, temporarily, to

occupy the premises of the Jewish Agency owing to evidence in our hands as to the part it has played in the organization and direction, and cooperation with, the forces which have carried out acts of violence against the Government. It is not the intention at this time to proscribe or close the Agency. . . .

"It is not the intention to leave either a community or any part of a community without protection, but insofar as it may be prescribed expedient for such protection to be provided by communities themselves it must be brought under proper control of the Government."

General Cunningham's statement had the kind of British soldier's eloquence that might carry weight with the British public, which had in any case become increasingly favorable to "strong measures" as terrorism in Palestine increased. It could hardly, however, improve the temper of Zionists in Palestine or elsewhere. In London, the Jewish Agency immediately denounced the British action as "a clear act of aggression against the Jewish people." It went on to say:

"To present this action as directed only against a small group in the Jewish community of Palestine is as misleading as the statement that the Jewish Agency is involved in acts of violence is false.

"The Jewish community of Palestine cannot give up its right to self-defense; it cannot entrust its fate into the hands of an administration which, according to the Royal Commission for Palestine, has failed to discharge the 'elementary duty of providing public security.'

"This provocative action is the culmination of a policy of violating obligations undertaken by Great Britain under the mandate. It is an effort by the British Government to divert public attention from its policy of barring the doors of Palestine to the remnants of Hitler's extermination campaign. It is designed to destroy both the achievements and the aspirations of the Jewish people in Palestine and could only have been adopted in order to appease the Mufti, who has once more been allowed to escape to freedom, and on the advice of his Arab and British friends in the Middle East.

"The Jewish people and its leaders will

not be intimidated and will continue the struggle for the right of Jews to enter their homeland and live as a free and independent nation in the Jewish state."

In New York, Zionist leaders were even more violent in their phraseology. In Palestine itself, there was at first little active resistance. Leaders of the Hagana went into hiding, and there was talk of a campaign of mass civil-disobedience.

The Outlook

There could be little doubt as to who would win in a contest of unlimited force between Zionists and Britain. The effectiveness of Jewish resistance to the British in Palestine depended entirely on the latter's reluctance to utilize unlimited force. And that, in turn, was the result partly of the unwillingness of the average Briton to approve extreme measures in any cause, and partly of the appeal of the Jewish case to the British mind and conscience.

But intransigence weakened the Jewish appeal to reason; terrorism weakened the appeal to conscience. Had Britain actually wished to bar all "illegal" immigrants, it would be ridiculous to suppose that the British navy could not have placed an airtight cordon across the Mediterranean—especially since all the ports from which immigrants might set out were under either British or Russian control, and the Russians were permitting no unofficial sailings. Now, however, that they were faced with so direct a challenge, a complete stoppage of illegal immigration might well be one of the sanctions the British would impose.

Nevertheless, it was entirely within the realm of possibility that Britain's action in cracking down on the Hagana was intended as a preliminary to the admission of the hundred thousand immigrants recommended by the Anglo-American Committee. The combination of repression and concession was a familiar one in British colonial policy. And, particularly, in view of the situation in the Arab and Moslem world, Britain could not afford to give even the appearance of yielding to Zionist force.

New Arab Forces

The easy Zionist identification of Arab

nationalism with "backward feudal chieftains" was not really accurate. Such chieftains and feudal landowners, represented by the Nashashibis in Palestine, and the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq and Transjordan outside, had in earlier days seemed quite receptive to an accommodation with Zionism for the sake of their own pockets. The most active opposition to Zionism, on the other hand, had come from the rising class of urban Arab intellectuals, who saw an influx of Jewish professionals and entrepreneurs as a threat to their own future. This was a situation paralleled in many another colonial country—in India, where one of the great forces in the development of nationalism was the increasing number of European-trained intellectuals who saw their opportunities for advancement closed by the British monopoly on desirable civil-service positions; in China, where the struggle of the native merchants to displace the foreigners who dominated Chinese business from the Treaty Ports furnished the driving force of the Kuomintang; in Latin American countries, where often one of the first acts of a popular government was to limit the employment of foreign executives and technicians.

But whatever truth the charge once had, it was certainly beyond doubt that Arab anti-Zionism was no longer confined to a small upper-class clique. Throughout the Arab world new forces were stirring. Vigorous labor movements were arising in Egypt and the countries of the Levant, and to a lesser extent in Palestine and Iraq. Some were Socialist, some Communist, some not yet clearly political in their ideology. But all were anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist. For Zionism to them represented the rule of the West, and the Zionists, by placing their reliance on the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate instead of on an accommodation with the Arabs, had unfortunately tended to confirm that impression.

The result was that, as an illuminating article in a recent issue of the Labor Zionist *Jewish Frontier* pointed out, the new Arab labor movement in Palestine was among the most anti-Zionist sections of the Arab population. And because most Zionists wished to identify themselves with the progressive and socialist forces of the world, they were sur-

prised and shocked by such a development.

Yet more sober students of history might have expected it. There were particular factors at work in Palestine that did not apply elsewhere, for the most part reinforcing the trend. Thus the organizers of the Palestinian Arab unions were largely Communists, and Communists everywhere were opposed on principle to Zionism. And even when the Communist parties of other countries—while not ceasing to be anti-Zionist in principle—were actively seeking an accommodation with the Zionists, the Arab Communists of Palestine did not abate their opposition to Jewish immigration, and they actually separated themselves from the Jewish Communist Party of Palestine. Again, the Histadrut's policy of insisting on the exclusive employment of Jewish labor was not calculated to endear Zionism to the Arab masses.

In other Arab countries similar developments were taking place. In Iraq, the rudimentary Communist movement—including its Jewish section—was actively anti-Zionist. In Egypt, where a militant trade-union movement had arisen in close alliance with the opposition Wafd Party, strikes for purely economic ends were interspersed with anti-Zionist demonstrations. In the Levant the situation was similar, though not yet at quite so advanced a stage.

Neither Zionists nor British could afford to disregard these developments. Clearly, the British had no intention of doing so. But the official leaders of Zionism still showed little sign that they were ready to readjust their program to the presence of new trends in the Arab world. Yet some such readjustment seemed necessary to secure that Jewish-Arab harmony which alone could make a Jewish homeland in Palestine anything other than an armed island in the midst of a sea of hostile peoples.

This had been recognized by such leaders as Judah Magnes. It had been recognized, too, by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, whose report had emphasized the importance of developing Arab-Jewish cooperation as a preliminary to the establishment of a democratic Palestine in which neither group would dominate the other. But Judah Magnes was a saint, and there was a woeful shortage of saints among all parties

to the Palestine dispute. And the members of the Anglo-American Committee, collectively at least, were realists. And the shortage of realists seemed only less stringent than that of saints.

Zionist Elections

In the face of developments in Palestine, there was a certain unreality about the elections to the World Zionist Congress. For the real issues in the Jewish community were, for the most part, either questions on which all Zionist parties were in substantial agreement, or questions which cut across party lines. No ticket in the Zionist elections announced itself as favoring either a Russian or an Anglo-American orientation; yet if Jews were going to play power politics, this was the first decision they would have to make. There was no Zionist party that did not pay at least lip-service to the idea of a state, yet among the supporters of both General and Labor Zionists were strong sections that disapproved of this concept as well as wide disagreements as to its meaning. Nor were there any differences in the specific programs of action proposed by the various groups for the immediate future. (Indeed, it was hard to say whether there were any specific programs of action at all.)

Nevertheless, the contest for the support of the shekel-holders was a vigorous one. All groups placed advertisements, not only in the Yiddish press but also in newspapers of more general circulation. The Labor Zionists claimed credit for the accomplishments of the *kibbutzim*. The Mizrachi distinguished themselves from the other parties by resting their case on the Torah rather than the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate—which at least had the merit of removing the embarrassing problem of just what title the British had had to Palestine when they promised the establishment of a Jewish National Home. The Revisionists, recently returned to the fold of official Zionism, had a program (they desired a Jewish state, including Transjordan, from which all Arabs would be expelled), but wisely, perhaps, they chose not to emphasize it. Instead they concentrated on a denunciation of the weaknesses of present Zionist leadership and principles.

The General Zionists, represented by the Zionist Organization of America, were if anything more unspecific than their competitors. One of their advertisements read:

AMERICAN ZIONISTS SAY YES!

- Yes, we are tired of political pussyfooting by the British Colonial Office, tending to antagonize and infuriate the Jews of Palestine.
- Yes, we want immediate admission to Palestine of 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe, as unanimously recommended by the Anglo-American Committee.
- Yes, we resent the manhandling, by occupying British forces, of Palestine men, women and children, as if they were primitive, uncivilized aborigines.
- Yes, we applaud every legitimate and moral effort made by the inhabitants of Jewish Palestine to bring about true peace and justice in that country.
- YES—We support the Zionist Organization of America and its leader, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, in a program of action designed to bring about speedy establishment of the Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.

AMERICAN ZIONISTS UNITE

FOR A JEWISH STATE—

VOTE THE Z.O.A. SLATE

NO. 1 ON THE ZIONIST BALLOT

Elections in Mississippi

Another election, perhaps of more fundamental importance to Jews, was taking place meanwhile in Mississippi. Here Theodore Gilmore Bilbo and John Rankin were facing

the voters in the Democratic primary. Their chances of success were improved by the fact that in Mississippi it was still necessary for all except veterans to pay a poll tax before they could vote. Even more important than the poll tax, however, was the continuance of outright intimidation of Negro voters.

Whatever the outcome of the Mississippi primaries, the situation in that state underlined the necessity for a reorientation of radical and progressive thinking. For the two Mississippi demagogues were not conservatives or reactionaries in the accepted sense of the term, and this rendered them more rather than less dangerous. John Rankin was a long-time advocate of public ownership, foe of the power trust, and co-sponsor of the TVA. And Bilbo had been a fairly consistent supporter of the New Deal in economic questions, a fact that had moved President Roosevelt to give him a sinecure on the Federal payroll in the interval between Bilbo's terms as governor and senator. (In return, Bilbo had squelched the movement to name anti-Roosevelt electors in Mississippi in 1944.)

Clearly, the enemy whom the progressive had most to fear in the 20th century was not the old-fashioned economic conservative. The latter could not really hope to gain and hold power, for he was incapable of offering workable solutions to the basic problems of the day. But the demagogue who could weld a radical economic program to an anti-democratic political doctrine was far more to be feared. And Mississippi was not the only place where such demagogues were to be found.

MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM

FROM THE AMERICAN SCENE

ONE TOUCH OF DELICATESSEN

Symposium on a Jewish Institution

New England Testimony

SAMUEL A. PERSKY

TO DISMISS Ruth Glazer's article on "The Jewish Delicatessen" as merely an amusing and nostalgic little essay, as I fear most readers might, would be a grave mistake.

My professional life, thus far bracketed between the reigns of Theodore and Franklin, has been devoted almost exclusively to the interests of malefactors of small wealth and bush-league economic royalists. Yet here I find myself spiritually attuned to a woman who has devoted her career to the labor movement.

No article yet printed in COMMENTARY has elicited as many comments, oral and written, as RUTH GLAZER's "The Jewish Delicatessen," which appeared in our March issue. Of the many communications of praise, amplification, and correction, we present a few in a kind of informal symposium on a subject that seems to strike a responsive chord in the—shall we say—hearts of so many. Contributors to the symposium: SAMUEL A. PERSKY is a member of the law firm of Stoddard, Persky, and Eagan in New Haven, a Republican leader, and a former corporation counsel of that city. CHARLES YALE HARRISON, the novelist, was formerly with the League for Human Rights. JOSHUA STARR, historian, is managing editor of *Jewish Social Studies*. DANIEL BELL is an instructor in Social Studies at the College of the University of Chicago. WOLF MELAMED is the pseudonym of one of the leaders of a radical party; he lives in New York. J. W. SAVINAR is with the American Produce Company of Portland, Oregon. ORSON WELLES is Orson Welles. BARBARA GOULD is secretary to the editor of COMMENTARY. LOUIS BERG writes short stories, often about Jewish life in the South.

Stop a while and ponder on this. If Jewish delicatessen can bring about any meeting-ground at all for two such divergent philosophies as Ruth Glazer's and mine seem to be, what limits can one dare to place on its possibilities in this troubled world? When one thinks of the bond created between the *goyim* and the Jews in that little Long Island community by her father's pastrami and her mother's gefilte fish and potato latkes (which must have been a gourmet's dream, but hardly to be classed as delicatessen), who is there to say that those much-feared "racial tensions" cannot be allayed if, instead of distributing educational pamphlets dedicated to the truth about the Jew, we can so manage it that every rock and rill in this land of liberty be permeated by the gracious aroma of hot corned beef and pastrami? Don't dismiss all this too lightly. It is worthy of serious contemplation.

And why complain that delicatessen is vitaminless? Let us, instead, thank God for it. Vitamins are for drug stores. They should be taken in pills and capsules exclusively. They have no place in food. And let me tell you, if the vitamin manufacturers were dependent upon delicatessen eaters for patronage, they would starve to death (and who cares?), for nothing is so stimulating, invigorating and healthful as delicatessen. Let the doctors prescribe vitamins.

And why repeat the slanderous canard that delicatessen is bad for the digestion? Such loose, thoughtless statements can do immeasurable harm, especially coming from one who must justly be considered an authority on the basis of such obviously painstaking research and study. You say that

delicatessen is bad for the digestion? Piffle!

It is a cure for digestion. Well do I remember being compelled to board an early evening train for an overnight trip. I did not want any dinner because I had indigestion. The train had no diner. I feared I might be hungry before morning, so I took with me two gigantic, luscious lox sandwiches on fresh rye bread—the kind only a first-class New York delicatessen can produce. Midnight came, and I still had both the sandwiches and the indigestion. I could not bear to waste the sandwiches so, throwing discretion to the winds, I ate them. A few minutes after I finished the last crumb, I had no more indigestion and was wishing I had more sandwiches. Please, Mrs. Glazer, be more cautious in your statements.

To really appreciate what delicatessen means, everyone should once (more often would be too cruel) be deprived of it for at least a full week. I went through that ordeal. I spent a vacation on Cape Cod. They served wonderful fish. I enjoyed it for a day, two, three. By the fourth day my zest for fish was somewhat reduced. By the fifth, I wasn't very hungry—for fish. But I was hungry. My sleep was restless. I had nightmares. The last night (I made it my last night) I dreamed I was about to be sent to earth to be born. The angel in charge gave me the choice of being born a Gentile if I wished. He was very fair with me. He gave me a brief but graphic outline of all the many difficulties and burdens of being a Jew, and then waited for my decision. I asked: "If I am born a *goy* will I appreciate Jewish food—particularly delicatessen?" He was an honest angel. He replied: "To some extent—but not fully—not the finer and more delicate nuances."

The next morning I was on my way to Boston. No more fish for me. I was headed for a delicatessen restaurant. Being a stranger did not stump me in locating my objective. On the outskirts of Boston, I feverishly looked at a telephone directory—Cohen, Levine, Bernstein, Goldberg, Greenstein, etc., etc. Selecting the street where most of these fine people were listed as living, I headed for there and in one shake of a lamb's tail I was seated at a table, with a waiter offering me the familiar, smeared, greasy, fly-specked menu. I spurned it. I knew what I wanted. I wanted no fish.

After a short but agonizing delay, the waiter covered the table with a soul-satisfying array of lox, sturgeon, white-fish, a box of salmon, and a box of sardines. No, I don't mean a can. I mean a box. A can of sardines (or salmon) is one thing and a box tastes altogether different. Such fine judges of food as the management of New York's Hotel Plaza serve a box of sardines—not a can. Take a look at their menu some time and see for yourself.

Please urge Mrs. Glazer not to be discouraged by the occasional note of adverse criticism that seems to have crept into my comments. I could not help it. The subject is too important and too close to my heart. She really should continue her research and writing in a serious way. Any girl who is able to retain so keen an appreciation of Jewish delicatessen despite a stretch in Hunter College, followed by a B.A. from Queens, shows qualities that should not be allowed to go to waste. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers are well enough established so that almost anybody can take care of them. Delicatessen, on the other hand, has never before this been treated with the dignity it merits. Delicatessen needs Mrs. Glazer!

The Old, Old Polo Grounds

WOLF MELAMED

RUTH GLAZER, your lady authority on Jewish delicatessen in your March issue, leaves the impression that it is the most primitive, the "poor relation" delicatessen store that is typical of the lower East Side. She says nothing of the fact, known to millions, that the very greatest of the emporia—Katz's on east Houston Street, and that king of them all, known to everyone on Delancey Street as the store that makes its own Rumanian pastrami and Warsaw salami—are precisely on the lower East Side.

And if one permits oneself the liberty (which was not done in my time) of including in the category of Jewish delicatessen stores those which also sell lox and serve cream and butter, and Ruth Glazer does this, then she is entirely in error when she asserts that apart from the Eastern seaboard "Nowhere else does the delicatessen exist. . . ."

The bonafide delicatessens that she says are "rumored" to be in Los Angeles are there.

And for many years—I frequented it when I was in *goles* in 1937-38—there has been a Jewish delicatessen, as real as any in the Bronx, on the corner of Plymouth Avenue and Newton Street in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

And who ever fobbed off on this young lady the preposterous story that there was a time, before delicatessens served kitchen dishes, when the tips of tongues were sold “to people who had dogs, at ten cents apiece”? I go back in the trade some sixteen years before this lady, and my father before me, and there was no such time; before the tongue omelette, it was one of the more elementary skills of the expert counterman, in making a tongue *sandwich*, to substitute, hand moving quicker than the eye, some slices of cut-up tongue tips for the prized “center cut.” My father would have called Ruth Glazer’s father—you should excuse the expression—a shoemaker, to give it away at ten cents a tip. What was sold for ten cents apiece was the opposite end of the untrimmed tongue, namely the roots, which was known in the trade as a *shlung*.

But “scholars always quarrel,” and I must not labor these points. And I must resist dealing at length with the lost skills of the counterman in the days before the hegemony of slicing machines. In those days the prime skill by which a counterman was judged and his wage fixed was his ability with the knife: both speed and making thin—but substantial-looking—slices were essentials of the art. Have you any idea of the difference between a real *shneider* and a *shlumper*? The difference could amount to fifteen to twenty sandwiches in a single corned beef.

But I don’t want to quarrel. The main point I want to make I cannot blame her for not making, for I note that she was only born in 1922, and could not have known it by her experience. I refer to a profound social transformation in the life of the family and owner of the “one-man store.” Ruth Glazer thinks she is describing an old institution when she correctly says of it: “. . . every one pitches in. As soon as the youngsters of the family are old enough . . . they are pressed into service. . . . The children of the family may be well provided with clothing and food, but their home is a dark place where they go at bedtime. Their

meals, their spare time, their source of parental affection, are all bound up with the store.” In reality, however, this describes an institution which in large part dates back only to World War I.

Before 1914 the “one-man store” family belonged to the élite of the Jewish communities of needle-trades workers. To be sure, the first pants-pressers and stitchers who put together a few dollars and escaped from the sweatshop fled to a not less miserable life of dingy storekeeping. But, by the turn of the century, there was a marked improvement, at least in the delicatessen and the “modern” dairy.

One reason for the change was the epic rise of the needle-trades unions, and the consequent rise in the purchasing power of the customers. Equally important, however, was the flood of unrestricted immigration, which enabled the one-man store to acquire two employees, a “boy” working in the store, and a *shiksa* in the house.

The “boy,” not necessarily in his ’teens, was invariably a *greener* (*er shtinkt noch fon Schiff*—“he still smells of the ship”), for in a very few years he would find a more lucrative field of employment or open his own store. He got his meals with the family, slept on a cot in the cold “front room”, and got very little money. A working day for him was seldom less than twelve hours.

The “boy” was Jewish, but the girl in the house was almost always a *shiksa*, Ukrainian, Polish, Byelorussian or great Russian. Unless she quarreled with the family, she stayed until she married a fellow-countryman. Here, she had the knotty problem of finding the time to meet *landsleit*.

Unhappily her day off was not always every week; it began after feeding and sending the children to school, and she had usually to get back before the family went to sleep. But love could find a way, and one could trundle the youngest child in a baby carriage, ostensibly for an airing, some miles if necessary, to the *goyishe* neighborhood.

One phase of my early childhood is indelibly associated with such queesting journeys; the *shiksa* was very fond of me because I didn’t cry or trouble her during long hours in friends’ homes or the hospitable atmosphere of back-rooms of saloons in the Ukrainian neighborhood. One time she forgot herself in such dallying and it was nearly

midnight when she recollected herself; I still remember her terror-stricken, white, drawn face as she ran carrying me. (I was past the baby carriage stage.)

Soon after 1914 all this came to an end. War, and then legislation, cut off immigration. Industry and commerce expanded; wages went up generally; yesterday's *greeners* could find better work elsewhere. The "boy" disappeared; the *shiksa* easily found a wage-earning husband.

This left the "one-man store" family to its own manpower. Mama had always spent a certain amount of time in the store, but now she had to take over many of papa's duties, as he in turn had to take over the menial chores of the "boy." Perhaps an even more painful part of the transition for them was the new demands they had to make on the children, which tied them to the store. In many cases it meant that the son of thirteen or so now had to get up at six o'clock or even earlier in the morning to deliver the regular breakfast orders to the more fancy customers.

It was a very sharp wrench from the past. It had its good side, of course, as burdens and responsibilities borne by children always have, in the sense that they prepare them better for the cruel world they have to enter later anyway. And in a sense, Ruth Glazer was perhaps better off not to have enjoyed the previous easier life of exploiting the "boy" and the *shiksa* before finding herself working all those hours in the store.

The Silver Cord

CHARLES YALE HARRISON

IN YOUR editorial introduction to Ruth Glazer's article you refer to the Jewish delicatessen as "an important Jewish cultural institution in the American scene." This is a shrewd observation. I have long suspected that the cuisine of a people makes for a unity of identification stronger by far than the more formal aspects of a national culture. I say this at the risk of being termed a callithumpian, one who thinks more of food and the grosser pleasures than he does of loftier matters.

When the American soldier abroad speaks with nostalgia of "God's own country," I suspect he is thinking of New England fish chowder, ham and eggs, and pumpkin pie,

rather than of the Constitution, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, or the Smithsonian Institute. The Frenchman, dreaming of *la belle France*, really has in mind frog's legs à l'Aurore or *suprêmes* of chicken Richelieu and not the Louvre or the Sorbonne. When an Englishman, stationed in one of the Empire's far-flung mandates, dreams of this plot of earth which is England, he is not thinking of the mother of parliaments, Shakespeare, or the British Museum, but of roast beef, boiled-to-death vegetables, and suet pudding—although why I cannot imagine. And so it is with us Jews who frequently speak of the heritage of Israel when what we really have in mind is—yes—Jewish delicatessen.

From Mars

ORSON WELLES

A FRIEND gave me Ruth Glazer's article on Jewish delicatessen to read. It was an unfriendly and cruel thing to do: I am on a reducing diet.

We get a good deal of Jewish delicatessen in Hollywood. Without pastrami sandwiches there could be no picture-making. And I understand there is a project afoot to pipe the *borsht* across the continent from Lindy's.

My view on Jewish delicatessen in general is that it is far too good for the *goyim*, and the Jews are fools not to keep it to themselves. I hasten to add that I have had myself declared an honorary member of the Jewish community, though born a *goy*.

Before I started to reduce, I daresay I was as good an authority on pastrami and lox as any man in the country. I have not been honored, however, as was Clark Gable, by recognition in the Bronx, where I understand Gerson's Appetizer Store carried the slogan: "Bagel's back, and Gerson's got 'em."

Salami Aleichem.

Genealogical Note

JOSHUA STARR

TO THE academician the still-life array behind the familiar glass counter of the Jewish delicatessen has a historical background as exotic as its aroma! For example, pastrami, which sounds deceptively Italian, although it has no place in that language. Our term

is but a slight departure from Rumanian *pastrama*. But even the most ardent Daco-Roman nationalist would not claim it as indigenous to his mother tongue. Just across the Danube the Bulgarians have been eating *pastrama* since the days of Turkish rule, which brings us to the meat of the problem. Our pastrami is the lexical grandchild of Turkish *pastirma*, which is the colloquial form of *basdirma*. The standard dictionary of this language, published in 1890 by Sir James C. Redhouse, who evidently knew his delicatessen, describes *basdirma* as "meat flavored with spices and garlic and cured under pressure." *Touché*, Sir James! Aside from etymology, however, pastrami must be recorded as the lasting contribution of Rumanian Jewry to mankind.

Going somewhat farther afield, I venture to suggest that the earliest evidence of Jewry's weakness for delicatessen is found in the dictum of Rabbi Abba ben Aibo (*Rav*) of the 3rd century. This authority gave his considered opinion that "no meal without a salted dish [fish or meat] is worthy of the name." If I may permit myself to follow the well-known manuscript variant of this passage, as against the less decisive reading of the published editions (Babylonian Talmud: *Berakot* 44a), we may note that Rabbi Abba used the term *meliah*, which is derived from *melah* (salt) in much the same manner as *salame* was coined from *sale* (salt). But be that as it may, among the cult of Rabbi Abba in contemporary Palestine, the password is *naqniq* (delicatessen), which is the Hebraized form of an ancient Talmudic term generally understood to denote sausage.

Lastly, a pungent note on mustard in Jewish lore. When Aristotle dealt with the principle that the interpenetration of bodies is an impossibility, that is, two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, he argued: were it not for this salutary axiom, the world could be squeezed into a "grain of millet." As one may readily learn from Professor Harry Wolfson's opus entitled *Hasdai Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, this homely figure was tacitly abandoned by a number of medieval Jewish philosophers. The Jewish version of the Aristotelian argument cited is reproduced by Hasdai Crescas of Barcelona (14-15th century) thus: "the interpenetration of bodies is impossible, for, were

it not so, the world could enter into a grain of *mustard seed*." Let the habitués of the delicatessen take heed.

Chicago, Chicago

DANIEL BELL

"IN CHICAGO, you can get a hot pastrami sandwich in eateries . . . But they are sad imitations." *How true!* I'm dying for a *real* hot pastrami sandwich, "like I used to get" at Hymie's delicatessen on Fifth Street and Second Avenue. I've walked five miles to Maxwell Street, but phleh! Did you have to remind me. . . .

From the Magnolia Country

LOUIS BERG

I GUESS Ruth Glazer is right. Jewish delicatessen exists but flourishes in few places outside of New York. My father once opened up a delicatessen store in Portsmouth, Virginia, and failed miserably. From Southern Jews it is very difficult to make a living; and Southern Gentiles are not interested in anything that cannot be fried.

We used to get our matzohs and Bismarck herring, our salami, lox, white fish, sturgeon, roll mops and dried mushrooms from H. L. Kaplan, wholesale delicatessen house, in Baltimore, Maryland. My mother corned her own beef, made her own pickles. Pastrami was unknown to us, and I never saw a *knish* (and wish I never had) until I came to New York City.

My family was distinctly *milchigs*, and somewhat obsessed on the subject of natural foods, so that I hardly ever got to eat any of the stuff we sold. The spiced and acrid smells penetrated our living room and spoiled my taste anyway. I cherish the memory of our store only because it introduced me to a man who pursued what is surely the world's most curious profession. He was a herring-*shmecker* or snifter, and he was to the herring business what the wine-taster is to the vintner, or the tea-taster to the importer of rare Chinese teas. His nostrils, I daresay, were no less sensitive than the taste buds of these experts and connoisseurs. Anyway, he was in the employ of H. L. Kaplan, and his function was to sniff the herrings as they were lifted out of the huge tuns, direct from the North Sea, and grade them accordingly.

H. L. Kaplan's herring-*shmecker* was a small man with a dried and scaly skin, impregnated beyond a doubt with the salt from the barrels that preserved the herring—and him, too—to a ripe old age. His nostrils, out of pride or usage, were distended; his eyes were mere slits. Like most authorities, he was an irritable man, and H. L. Kaplan stood in awe of him.

Baltimore, where Kaplan had his huge plant, was then and I understand, still is, a center of Jewish life and delicatessen. It might bear investigating. But what seeped through to us in Portsmouth, via the Old Bay Line, was a pretty pallid imitation of the real thing.

For example, do you know what my mother used to do with lox? She pickled it!

The Bonnie Lox of New Jersey

BARBARA GOULD

A CONTEMPORARY detail, which Mrs. Glazer may wish to add to her research material on Jewish delicatessen:

The very modern frozen foods establishment on our corner has *lox*, frozen.

It is called—I send along the label for verification—"Lox Lomond."

Bei Uns in Oregon

J. W. SAVINAR

I HAVE always felt I should not butt in on COMMENTARY's highbrow stuff. Besides an innate respect for a *harif* per se, I feel it is clear out of my line. So I leaf my dictionary, knit my brow, and keep discreetly quiet. But when a burning *gastronomic* issue is projected I can contain myself no longer.

I am referring to author Glazer's recent blend of saga and conspectus on "The Jewish Delicatessen." With all due respect for the author's erudition, I am constrained to state that it is definitely parochial. I, for one, strenuously object to the use of the in-

clusive term *Jewish* in connection with such a motley fare as salami, pastrami, mustard, etc. I admit affinity for gefilte fish and *kneidlach*, but concerning pastrami I have neither an idea nor the idea of the absence of an idea, and I have made an exhaustive research in three dictionaries, one of them quite a fat one, but could find no trace of this word. And I have polled our leading citizens, orthodox and heterodox, republicans and democrats, but did not get any further than a puzzled look and a shrug of the shoulders. So much for this vaunted ambrosia.

Now as to mustard, the special object of the author's paeans, it pains me to say that I hate it in any form, color, nationality, and dimension, the saving grace of the "cold pickle brine" notwithstanding.

But here in the progressive Far West (and I don't mean Chicago), where men eat like men, and cowboys do their chores in tuxedos, we have long since emancipated ourselves from the Jewish Delicatessen era. Seldom indeed does a Jewish food purveyor here stock so-called kosher meats. His clientele, either curiosity bent or victims of atavism, would be too few and far between. We go here for such cosmopolitans as fried chicken, roast turkey, interfaith cold cuts, imported herrings, salads. To say nothing of such apocrypha as mountain trout, wild duck, pheasant, and venison. We even boast an Orthodox rabbi who during the summer goes into the mountains berry-picking for wild blackberries. How presumptuous to speak of the Jewish Delicatessen as something indigenous!

"Brooklyn Jewish" yes. As the present-day Psalmist would have lamented:

By the river of Brooklyn

There we sat down, yea we ate hot pastrami—

Beyond that one must say it with circumspection.

CEDARS OF LEBANON

CAN JUDAISM SURVIVE IN FREE AMERICA?

ISRAEL FRIEDLAENDER

ISRAEL FRIEDLAENDER was one of the most inspiring and seminitive of modern Jewish scholars and teachers. Born in Siedlice, Poland, in 1876, of a comfortable merchant family, he went to Berlin when twenty years old to study at the rabbinical seminary there and simultaneously at the University of Berlin. At the age of twenty-five he left the seminary, having decided to become a scholar instead of a rabbi, and went to Strasbourg, from whose university he obtained his Ph.D. In 1902 he was appointed instructor in Semitics at that same institution, and a year later was invited to America by the Jewish Theological Seminary of New York to become its Sabato Morais Professor of Biblical Literature and Exegesis.

In 1920 he traveled to Russia on a relief mission. There, at forty-four, he met a violent death at the hands of Ukrainian outlaws.

Friedlaender was an Arabist as well as a Hebraist and published important works in both English and German on Mohammedan sects and Arabic literature and legend. Besides this, he made notable contributions to our knowledge and understanding of Maimonides, on whom he also wrote. These specialized scholarly activities did not prevent him from finding time to translate several of Dubnow's works into German and his *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland* into English; or from

taking an active part in the Zionist movement, in which he propagated Ahad Ha'am's ideas and to which he offered the slogan "Palestine plus the Diaspora." Friedlaender's religious interests remained constant throughout, however, and, as Rabbi Louis Finkelstein says, he insisted always on the essentially and permanently religious character of Judaism. He became one of the founders of "Conservative Judaism."

The essay below was first published in 1908-9 in the *Jewish Comment* and was reprinted in 1919 in a collection of Friedlaender's English essays, published under the title *Past and Present* by the Ark Publishing Company in Cincinnati. Much in the present essay remains surprisingly cogent today—Israel Friedlaender's fears for the survival of the Jewish identity in America have not been borne out though the fears still continue to be echoed; but neither have his hopes for American Jewry been fulfilled. However, his analysis is still very pertinent, especially now that his prophesy of American Jewry's primacy has come true, though from causes he could not have anticipated.

Originally published under the title, "The Problem of Judaism in America," this essay is given here in shortened form with a few minor changes in syntax that were necessitated by the omissions.—Ed.

INSTEAD of reverting to the trodden roads of the past, I find sufficient courage in my heart to venture upon the slippery paths of the present and to take up a subject which is, or ought to be, uppermost in the mind of every thinking Jew: the problem of Judaism in America . . .

In considering the problem of Judaism, I am probably expected to set out with an exact definition of what I understand by the term "Judaism." But . . . definitions are irksome in general, because they represent

the delicate attempt to reduce the phenomena of living, palpitating reality to a dead, stationary formula, and doubly irksome when applied to phenomena which bear the stamp of spirituality on their "ism." . . .

It will, however, suffice for our purposes if I say, vaguely perhaps, but briefly, that Judaism represents the sum total of those inner characteristics, as instincts, sentiments, convictions, and ideals, which are to a lesser or larger degree common to the indi-

viduals of the aggregate known as the Jewish people. If the Jews, or Jewry, represent the ethnological, or physical, appearance of the Jewish people, Judaism may be said to represent its spiritual, or psychological, make-up; in other words, Jewry constitutes the body, Judaism the spirit, or the soul, of the Jewish people. As the soul of the individual, so the soul of a nation is in itself invisible. It finds its visible expression in a certain manner of life, such as customs, habits and ceremonies, and in a certain spiritual productivity, such as literature, art and the like—in short, in the two spheres, which, taken together, form what we call the culture of a nation. . . .

The problem of Judaism would then consist in the fact that the soul, or spirit, of the Jewish people, as manifested in its culture, has in modern times shown symptoms of decay of so alarming a nature as to make us fear for its continued existence. The beginning of this decay is obviously coincident with the beginning of Jewish emancipation, that is to say, with the moment when the Jews left the Ghetto to join the life and the culture of the nations around them

IN Italy, which in times gone by presented one of the finest and brightest phases of Jewish culture, which only two generations ago was still able to produce a personality so profoundly and genuinely Jewish as S. D. Luzzato, and to present American Jewry in our own generation with a man like Sabato Morais, the founder of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America—in Italy, the condition of Judaism at present is one of utter stagnation, and Jewish scholarship . . . is now represented by a few descendants of the Galician Ghetto.

In France, where centuries ago Talmudic Judaism found its most brilliant expounders, Judaism is but a lifeless and, we need scarcely add, an unsuccessful imitation of French Catholicism. Its tiny stream of Jewish life is almost exclusively supplied from the Ghetto of Alsace, where the Jews still speak their own dialect, and has been replenished in recent years by newcomers from Russia.

In German Jewry, the heart of the Jewish people in times of old and its brain in modern times, once celebrated for her saints and martyrs, and later renowned for her scholars and writers—in German Jewry, we

stumble on all sides against indifference and apostasy, and her intellectual productivity shows an appalling decline. The decay of German Jewry would be far more tangible were it not powerfully counteracted by the immigration from the Russian and Polish Ghetto, and, to an extent not in the remotest suspected by outsiders, by the influence of the now Prussian, but formerly Polish, province of Posen, where Jewish life has still preserved many a genuine feature of Polish Judaism. . . .

In England, Jewish emancipation, owing to the intensely religious spirit of the English nation, gave at first the promise of a genuine modern Jewish life. But this promise has not been fulfilled. The decomposition of English Jewry, being effectively checked by the conservative tendencies of England and the stream of Jewish immigration from Poland, proceeds much more slowly than elsewhere, but proceed it does, and no one perhaps is more pessimistic about the future of Judaism in that country than are, to judge by their public utterances, the leading English Jews themselves.

Far more striking and far more painful to record is the effect of modern conditions on Judaism in those countries where the Jews are still isolated and lead, or have till recently led, a genuinely Jewish life. We only have to point to the sudden change in the status of Judaism which has taken place before our very eyes in Hungary, to the terrible decay of Judaism in Galicia and—I say it with a feeling of particular pain—to the frightful ravages in Jewish life and thought caused by the mere glimmer of emancipation in Russia, to realize what Judaism may expect from freedom and the influences of the surroundings.

SO FAR the Old World. As for the New, [the situation] . . . is scarcely different. To be sure, people who are content to tap the surface can easily point to the tremendous growth of American Judaism, to the ever increasing number of Jewish congregations and institutions. But these people seem or wish to forget that this development is the direct or indirect product of the Ghetto, for which this country deserves no credit whatsoever. The expansion of American Judaism is not an organic growth

from within, but a mechanic addition from without. Its gain, to use a Biblical simile, is the gain of one who puts his earnings into a bag with holes. As long as the earnings exceed the holes, the bag seems constantly to swell. But no sooner will the earnings have stopped than the bag will begin to shrink and will finally collapse. The disintegrating influence of American conditions on Jewish life and productivity can be demonstrated most palpably in that section of American Jewry which has for a sufficient length of time been exposed to the life and liberty of this country, and in which the extent of de-Judaization stands in exact proportion to the amount of freedom enjoyed by it. This process of de-Judaization is visible enough among the Children of the Ghetto and, to a far more appalling extent, among the Grandchildren of the Ghetto.

An experienced Jewish minister of New York City, who has for more than a quarter of a century closely watched the marvelous growth of Jewry in that largest Jewish center ever known in history, summed up some time ago, for purposes quite different from those pursued in this paper, the Jewish potentialities of the newly arrived population in the striking dictum: "What will our second and third generation be a quarter of a century hence? American? Yes. Jewish? Perhaps." . . .

Thus, wherever our gaze turns, we witness the same spectacle, the decomposition of Judaism, of Jewish living and Jewish thinking, under the influence of freedom. No amount of high-sounding phraseology can deceive us as to the meaning of this terrible truth. Judaism which was able to subsist and even to develop in the narrowness and darkness of the Ghetto is cut off in its very strength when brought out into the airy expanse of modern life. Judaism which stood out like a rock amidst the storms of hatred and persecution is melting away like wax under the mild rays of freedom . . .

The problem of the Jews, of the physical misery of our nation, engages the heart and the hand of every Jew with a spark of Jewish consciousness or Jewish sentiment in him. Powerful organizations grapple energetically, and more or less successfully, with this problem. But most of us utterly ignore the problem of Judaism, the problem of our

spiritual misery. The majority of modernized Jews still swear by the panacea of Jewish emancipation, and pin all their hope and faith on the political, economic, and social advancement of the Jews. Their policy may be summed up in the words of the Prophet: "When thou wilt deal thy bread to the hungry and bring the poor that are cast out to thy house, when thou wilt see the naked that thou wilt cover him, and thou wilt not hide thyself from thine own flesh, then shall thy light break forth as the dawn, and thy cure shall spring forth speedily."

They are blind to the fact that the dawn of the Jews is the dusk of Judaism; that the nearer the problem of Jewry reaches its solution, the more complicated and the more dangerous becomes the problem of Judaism; that the more emancipated, the more prosperous, the more successful the Jews become, the more impoverished, the more defenceless, and the more threatened becomes Judaism, the only reason and the only foundation of their existence. And while our heart is aroused over the martyrs that fell by the hands of violent mobs, we witness with indifference the disappearance of that for which they became martyrs . . .

HAVING stated the nature of the problem we must now try to search for a solution; but none seems to be forthcoming. We are on the horns of a dilemma: Either return to the Ghetto, or complete absorption. *Tertium non datur!* But of the two openings, the one is impossible, the other unacceptable. For we may recognize as clearly as possible the preserving influences of the Ghetto; we may, when made to shiver in a cold, big world, affectionately dream of its lowly roof, its narrow walls, its cheering fire-side, its peaceful atmosphere; but the Jews who have lived and grown in freedom can as little go back to the Ghetto as the grown bird can return to its eggshell. As for complete absorption, there are thousands among us—in itself the surest symptom of our decay—who coolly or even longingly look forward to this possibility. But those of us who still feel the stream of Jewish life rolling through their veins, who are dominated and actuated by Jewish sentiment and Jewish thought, to whom Judaism is the breath of their nostrils and the fountain of their life, are

struck with a terror that no words can describe at the mere possibility of their spiritual death

But is there really no escape from this frightful dilemma? . . .

Were it proved by the facts of our history, with its unparalleled store of experience, that union between Judaism and freedom is impossible, then our fate would be sealed, and all our protests and agonies would be of no avail. All that we should have to do would be to lie down in our shame, to wrap ourselves in our ignominy, and to await with deathly stupor the verdict of nature.

But, happily enough, our history does *not* prove it impossible.

To be sure, the period in Jewish history preceding the era of emancipation was one of isolation, but this period was in its turn preceded by another, which was one of freedom. The great and glorious Jewish-Arabic period deals a deathblow to the dilemma besetting the problem of Judaism, and is in itself an overwhelming proof and shining example of the compatibility of an active participation of the Jews in the life and culture of the nations around them, with a strong, vigorous, genuine development of Judaism.

The amount of freedom enjoyed by the Jews of the Arabic epoch was in no way inferior to that of our own. The Jews took an honorable and energetic part in the economic, social, and political development of the Eastern as well as the Western Califate. . . . We find Jewish merchants, Jewish financiers, Jewish dignitaries of high standing; and Jewish viziers and ministers of States are more frequently to be met with there than in our own times. The association with the culture and spiritual influences of the age was just as close and intimate.

The Jews made themselves the possessors of all the intellectual achievements of Arabic civilization, with an eagerness and rapidity which reminds us vividly of our own days, and which found a curious echo in the outcry of a fanatic of the early part of that period, which sounds quite familiar to our own ears. "Every day,"—thus runs this lamentation which, characteristically enough, has a Karaite for its author and is written

in Arabic, the language of the new culture—"every day we commit a number of sins and make ourselves guilty of a great many transgressions. We mix with the Gentiles around us and imitate their doings. Our chief aim is the study of the Arabic language and its philology, on which we lavishly spend our money, while we leave aside the knowledge of the holy tongue and the meditation in the commandments of the Lord." The intimate acquaintance of the Jews with the religion of Islam and its highly developed theology may be inferred from the fact that the religious terminology of the Jewish thinkers is largely patterned after that of the Mohammedan dogmatists. . . . The close connection of Judaism with the philosophy of the age, which, rooting in Greek thought, was far from favorable to positive religion, is illustrated by the fact that Aristotle was to the Jews of that period "*the Philosopher*" and was put on a level scarcely inferior to that of the Jewish Lawgiver.

YET the very same age saw a development of the Jewish spirit and Jewish culture so many-sided, so fascinating, and so rich in results as never before or after in the lands of the exile. No department in the spiritual treasury of our people remained untouched by the loving care of its sons. Bible, Talmud, Hebrew literature, Hebrew poetry and philosophy, Jewish philosophy, and everything that constitutes the pride of the Jew found their greatest and most brilliant representatives in that period, and the profound attachment to Judaism went hand in hand with a noble enthusiasm for everything noble outside of Judaism. Hasdai ibn Shaprut, the powerful diplomat of Cordova, was not only a generous supporter of every manifestation of Jewish learning, but took himself a most profound and stimulating interest in the rise of Hebrew philology in Spain. Samuel ibn Nagdela, the Prime Minister of Granada, guided not only the affairs of the State, but also the studies in the Beth Hamidrash, where he delivered lectures on the Talmud, and he is celebrated in Jewish history both as a Talmudic scholar and a Hebrew poet. Solomon ibn Gabirol, who summed up the philosophy of the age in an Arabic work which profoundly influenced medieval Christian philosophy, is one

of the greatest poets of our nation in its sacred tongue. Moses Maimonides, who is a living expression of the whole Arabic culture of the age, is at the same time the greatest scholar and thinker of post-Biblical Judaism, and while in his philosophical standard work, written in Arabic, he "guides the perplexed" of his time in the paths of Aristotelian philosophy, he leads in his religious code the large mass of his people "with a strong hand" to the sources of Judaism. Everywhere we witness harmony and beauty, a full growth of Judaism under the benign rays of freedom and culture . . .

There is nothing in modern life or culture which is more opposed and more dangerous to Judaism than were the conditions of the great Jewish-Arabic period. Modern Christianity possesses no more attraction for the adherents of Judaism than did the highly developed Mohammedan theology of that age, and modern thought is no more irreconcilable with the Judaism of the twentieth century than was the philosophy of Aristotle with the Judaism of the twelfth. But in confronting Judaism with the culture of the surrounding nations we must present it as it is, in its true shape and size, and not as a caricature. It was the fatal mistake of the period of emancipation, a mistake which is the real source of all the subsequent disasters in modern Jewish life, that in order to facilitate the fight for political equality, Judaism was put forward not as a culture, as the full expression of the inner life of the Jewish people, but as a creed, as the summary of a few abstract articles of faith, similar in character to the religion of the surrounding nations. . . .

WE ONLY need recall the truism—almost too trivial to be repeated—that there is no exact equivalent for the term "religion" in Hebrew, or point to the well-known fact that, despite the aptitude of the Jewish mind for theological intricacies, the Jews were never reconciled to the idea of formulating a creed, to realize that Judaism is far more than a mere faith and that it is essentially different in its origin and structure from Christianity and similar religions. Forced onto the Procrustes' couch of a religious denomination, and stripped of all those elements that bore special relation to the

people that produced it, Judaism was crippled in its vital functions and rendered unfit to meet and to resist the new conditions. Jewish living had to be sacrificed for the sake of emancipation. The beliefs of Judaism had to be refashioned so as to purge them of their intimate connection with the Jewish national aspirations. The progress of Judaism was no more an organic development from within, but a mere series of mechanical changes dictated by considerations from without.

The whole structure of Judaism was thus turned top to bottom. Judaism became a church, the rabbis became priests, and the Jews became a flock, not quite as tractable perhaps, though quite as ignorant as other flocks. The Jewish education of the children, which formed the cornerstone of Biblical and Talmudic Judaism, dwindled down to Sunday-school experiments, and the children of Israel often enough know of Judaism and their people no more than what they are told by Israel's enemies. Jewish scholarship, which to an unequalled extent was the possession of the rank and file of our nation, gave place to widespread ignorance, and the name *Am Haaretz*, which in olden times disqualified a Jew for the humblest social position, almost became a title of honor. All those intellectual activities of Judaism which could not be pressed into the mould of theology, though of enormous value for the cultivation of the Jewish consciousness—activities which in Biblical times produced the Song of Songs and in the Middle Ages gave birth to a highly developed literature and poetry—were thrown out of Jewish life, or in the best case confined to the cabinets of a few scholars.

Thus the modern Jew, while partaking of the fullness of modern culture, was made to starve within the precincts of Judaism. He satisfied his highest tastes and desires outside the Jewish camp, while in Judaism he only perceived a few colorless doctrines which could be had elsewhere, and a few cold liturgical ceremonies which seldom appealed to him. He was often forced to ask himself, "Why am I a Jew?"—a question which in its very form implies a negation, and which to our profound shame was and still is heard from official representatives of Judaism in the pulpit. . . .

IF JUDAISM is to be preserved amidst the new conditions; if, lacking as it does all outward support, it is still to withstand the pressure of the surrounding influences, it must again break the narrow frame of a creed and resume its original function as a culture, as the expression of the Jewish spirit and the whole life of the Jews. It will not confine itself to a few metaphysical doctrines which affect the head and not the heart, and a few official ceremonies which affect neither the head nor the heart, but will encircle the whole life of the Jew and give content and color to its highest functions and activities.

Perhaps two illustrations derived from historical facts, the one belonging to the Jewish-Arabic period, the other to our own age, will bring out more clearly than can any abstract exposition the different results of these two different conceptions of Judaism.

There is scarcely any civilization in which poetry, the rhythmic sentence and the rhymed word, occupies so prominent a place as in Arabic civilization and in the cultures dependent on it. All classes and occupations worshiped with equal devotion at its shrine. The starving nomad of the desert, the prince on the throne, the frivolous comedian and the grave scholar, all loved and practiced the art of rhyme. . . .

When the Jews came in contact with Arabic culture, the only poetry they had created outside of the Bible was the so-called *Piyyut*, a more or less uncouth form of poetry which merely served liturgical purposes. But the Judaism of that period, which embraced all that had any connection with Jewish life, soon took cognizance of the new factor. It introduced the form and spirit of Arabic poetry into the Hebrew language, and the medieval Hebrew poetry, the richest after the Biblical, sprang up, singing not only of God, His land, and His people, but also of matters far less divine—of wine, woman, and all the moods and passions of the human heart. Moses Maimonides, who from his high metaphysical observatory looked down upon poetry as a meaningless waste of time, indignantly protested against the use, or abuse, of the sacred tongue for contents of so frivolous a nature. But there can be no doubt that the secular Hebrew poetry, however slight its connection with

Jewish religion, had as much share in attracting and attaching to Judaism the *beaux esprits* of the period as had Maimonides' metaphysics in keeping within the precincts of Judaism the philosophical sceptics of the age.

And now for our own time. There is scarcely anything in modern life which is so characteristic an expression of the soul of a people and so apt to arouse the emotions of its members as is music. The language of the angels, as it has been styled, has now become a means of expression of the whole of humanity. There is no nation, whether standing on the lowest or the highest rung of the ladder of civilization, which does not enshrine its joys and sorrows, its memories and hopes, in song and tune. The Jews have been blessed with an exceptional gift for this divine art. They have as composers and performers enriched the musical repertoire of almost every nation. Dozens of Jewish musicians, though keeping their Judaism in strict incognito, arrive every season in this country. But modern Judaism, which has curtailed its functions down to those of a creed, has no room for the talents of its children. And while even the hapless Ghetto has been able to breathe forth its woe in strains peculiar to it, modern Judaism, with all its freedom and prosperity, is deprived of this sweetest of arts, and even in its places of worship has to depend on the talents of non-Jews.

SUCH a Judaism of freedom and culture as advocated above will not be a mere reproduction of the Judaism of the Ghetto. It will have to take in and digest the elements of other cultures, and will seek and meet new conditions and interests. This modern Judaism will evolve from the Judaism preceding it, as did Talmudic Judaism from Biblical, philosophical Judaism from Talmudism, Mysticism from Jewish philosophy, Hasidism from Rabbinism. It will develop and be modified along the lines of its history, prompted by inner necessity, not by dictation from without.

While the Judaism of isolation accentuated the ceremonial side of Jewish life and crystalized itself by a natural process into an *Orah Hayyim*—a "Mode of Living" (as the ceremonial part of the *Shulhan Arukh*

is entitled)—the modern phase of Judaism will probably tend to emphasize more strongly its cultural aspects. While it will endeavor to preserve all those features of Jewish practice which give shape as well as color and vigor to Judaism, it will develop and call forth all those powers of the Jewish spirit which will be apt to supplement or counteract the influences of modern life. It will give full scope to our religious genius, but will also foster all other departments of the Jewish intellect. It will develop our literature, create or preserve Jewish art in all its functions, stimulate and further Jewish scholarship, so as to make it a powerful factor in the strengthening of the Jewish consciousness. It will reorganize and put on a firmer basis the Jewish education of our children, who are the pledge of our future, and thus create the basis and sounding-board for all other Jewish activities. . . .

If such a Judaism, presenting a harmonious union between the culture of the Jewish people and that of the other nations, is possible in the Dispersion—and that it is possible is convincingly shown by our history—the only place where it has a full chance of realization is America. For America—this even the Zionist, who works and hopes for the establishment of a center of Jewish culture in its native land, will freely and readily admit—America is fast becoming the center of the Jewish people of the Diaspora. Jewish history teaches us that, despite the centrifugal forces of the Dispersion, Judaism was seldom without a center, and that this center, following the wanderings of Jewry, moved from place to place. The Jewish center shifted from Palestine to Babylon, from Babylon to Spain, from Spain to Poland and Russia. It is now shifting before our very eyes to this country. . . .

There is no thinking Jew outside of America whose eyes are not turned towards this country as the center of Judaism in the nearest future. America presents a happy combination of so manifold and favorable circumstances as have seldom, if ever, been equalled in the history of the Diaspora. It has the numbers which are necessary for the creation of a cultural center. It possesses the economic prosperity indispensable for a successful spiritual development. The freedom enjoyed by the Jews is not the outcome

of emancipation, purchased at the cost of national suicide, but the natural product of American civilization. The idea of liberty as evolved by the Anglo-Saxon mind does not merely mean, as it often does in Europe, the privilege of selling new clothes instead of old, but signifies liberty of conscience, the full, untrammelled development of the soul as well as the body. The true American spirit understands and respects the traditions and associations of other nationalities, and on its vast area numerous races live peaceably together, equally devoted to the interests of the land. The influx of Jewish immigrants in the past and present brought and brings to these shores the enormous resources of the Ghetto, and presents American Jewry with a variety of Jewish types which will be of far-reaching significance in its further development. In short, this country has at its disposal all the materials necessary for the upbuilding of a large, powerful center of Judaism. . . .

BUT it is to be hoped that the American Jews will not be forgetful of the task—as gigantic as it is honorable—which lies before them. He who feels the pulse of American-Jewish life can detect, amidst numerous indications to the contrary, the beginnings of a Jewish renaissance, the budding forth of a new spirit. The Jews of America, as represented in their noblest and best, display larger Jewish sympathies, a broader outlook on Jewish life, a deeper understanding of the spiritual interests of Judaism than most of their brethren of the Mosaic persuasion in the lands of assimilation and emancipation. The type of the modern American Jew who is both modern and Jewish, who combines American energy and success with that manliness and self-assertion which is imbibed with American freedom, is becoming a species, while in other countries the same characteristics are to be met with in but a few exceptional individuals. The American Jews are fully alive to the future of their country as a center of Jewish culture. They build not only hospitals and infirmaries, but also schools and colleges; they welcome not only immigrants, but also libraries; not only tradesmen and laborers, but also scholars and writers. . . .

To be sure, we are only at the beginning. . . . The dead capital which we constantly draw from the Ghetto will have to be made into a working capital to produce new values. We first of all have to lay our foundation: to rescue the Jewish education of our future generation from the chaos in which it is now entangled. But we are on the right road. The American Jews will take to heart the lesson afforded by modern Jewish history in Europe. They will not bury Judaism in synagogues and temples, nor imprison it in charitable institutions. They will work and live for a Judaism which will compass all phases of Jewish life and thought; which will not be a faint, sickly hot-house plant, but, as it was in the days of old, "a tree of life for those who hold it fast, bestowing happiness on those who cling to it."

But will a Judaism that does not confine itself to synagogues and hospitals, but endeavors to embrace the breadth and depth of modern life, leave sufficient room in the heart of the Jew for the interests and demands of his country, or, to put it into the mold of a current formula, is Judaism, and a Judaism of the kind advocated above, compatible with Americanism?

The people who thus anxiously inquire betray a poor conception of human psychology. They seem to think that the souls of men are like those cheap musical slot-machines which can only play a single tune. The human soul is characterized not by uniformity but by variety. The higher a human type, the more multifarious its interests, the more manifold its activities, the more varied its affections. That a full and successful participation in all phases of American life is reconcilable with a deep attachment to Judaism in all its aspects is sufficiently warranted by the historical precedent of the Jewish-Arabic period.

To be sure, in blending Judaism with Americanism, the edges and corners will have to be leveled on both sides. Compromises will be unavoidable. But the happiest of marriages is a series of mutual compromises. These compromises may not be exactly identical with those of the Jewish-Arabic era. . . . But these compromises will never be such as to obliterate or mutilate the character of either party. Judaism and

Americanism will not be intersecting, but concentric circles. In the great palace of American civilization we shall occupy our own corner, which we will decorate and beautify to the best of our taste and ability, and make it not only a center of attraction for the members of our family, but also an object of admiration for all the dwellers of the palace.

THERE is an old rabbinic saying to the effect that after the destruction of the Temple the gift of prophecy passed over to children and fools. But prophecy as a matter of hope, the prediction of the future not as it will be, but as it ought to be, is indispensable for all those who have, or desire to have, a clear conception of their duties towards the coming generations.

When we thus try to penetrate the mist that encircles the horizon of the present, a vision unfolds itself before our mind's eye, presenting a picture of the future American Israel. We perceive a community great in numbers, mighty in power, enjoying life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: true life, not mere breathing space; full liberty, not mere elbow room; real happiness, not that of pasture beasts; actively participating in the civic, social, and economic progress of the country; fully sharing and increasing its spiritual possessions and acquisitions; doubling its joys, halving its sorrows, yet deeply rooted in the soil of Judaism; clinging to its past, working for its future; true to its traditions, faithful to its aspirations; one in sentiment with their brethren wherever they are, attached to the land of their fathers as the cradle and resting place of the Jewish spirit . . . not a horde of individuals, but a set of individualities, adding a new note to the richness of American life, leading a new current into the stream of American civilization; not a formless crowd of taxpayers and voters, but a sharply marked community, distinct and distinguished, trusted for its loyalty, respected for its dignity, esteemed for its traditions, valued for its aspirations, a community such as the Prophet of the Exile saw it in his vision: "And marked will be their seed among the nations, and their offspring among the peoples. Everyone that will see them will point to them as a community blessed by the Lord."

THE STUDY OF MAN

GOVERNMENT BY MANIPULATION

The Social Scientist Reports for Service

NATHAN GLAZER

EVERYONE within reach of a radio loud-speaker or a newspaper headline knows of the tremendous advances made by science during the war: atomic bombs, radio-controlled planes, rockets and radar, DDT, new ways of preventing disease, better ways of curing them, etc., etc. But even a very careful reader of magazines would get almost no notion of what the social sciences did and learned in the war, if anything.

It is not merely that the social sciences are backward; they simply do not lend themselves to obvious dramatics. They do not offer staggering figures ("one bomb equals 20,000 tons of TNT"), or pictures ("a gadget that can stop a tank"), or immediate personal relevance ("this may save you from cancer"). Their most important discoveries are as simple, non-technical, and "common-sensical" as their detractors say they are. So were the discoveries of the 16th- and 17th-century physicists and doctors that helped destroy a feudal order and create a bourgeois one. Today key posts in Western society are increasingly occupied by "managers," whose power is derived from their skill in handling men and machines rather

than from any direct control over our economy. This being so, the social sciences, with their war-developed techniques, may well influence future history as importantly as have the physical and biological sciences.

Be that as it may, their war experiences will almost certainly transform the social sciences themselves. Most of the leading American social scientists were employed on government projects, and had access to men, materials, and money such as they never had before. Some of their war-work was only a continuation of their pre-war specialization. Much of it was in the new field of "human relations" or "applied anthropology," to whose development all the traditional disciplines have contributed, and which belongs to no particular one of them. It is this field, precisely, that may become of crucial interest to the "managers."

When the Japanese were evacuated from California, anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists—we will call them "human-relations scientists"—were called in to advise the camp administrations on how to prevent strikes, riots, and rebellions. When a huge labor turnover threatened war production, human-relations scientists were asked to make studies and propose remedies. When the American armed forces moved into Pacific islands and prepared to occupy Germany and Japan, human-relations scientists showed how the occupations could be carried out with the least unrest among the native populations and with the fewest troops.

HUMAN-relations scientists were not just particularly bright and intuitive administrators. They were academicians, social scientists who had worked out certain generalizations about human behavior and were applying them to the problem of making people satisfied under adverse conditions. And where their advice was followed they certainly seem to have

THIS department, a regular feature of COMMENTARY since its first issue, aims to give laymen a running account in non-technical language of new work and thought in the sciences dealing with man and society, particularly as they relate to our lives as human beings and Jews. It has, in the past, presented reports from the fields of social and psychological research, economics, and philosophy. NATHAN GLAZER, assistant editor of COMMENTARY, has written on developments in anthropology, sociology, and social psychology in previous issues. He studied at the College of the City of New York and the University of Pennsylvania.

proved the effectiveness of their "know-how."

This new science—or rather, this practical application of an older science—had been in the making since the more astute British colonial administrations began to attach "government anthropologists" to their staffs twenty or more years ago. A student of native customs and beliefs, they had discovered, could tell them when a minor regulation violated deeper native beliefs, and he could sometimes suggest a substitute that would achieve the same end with less trouble. In the Southwest Pacific, for example, the anthropologists had a hand in getting the natives to substitute wild pigs for human beings on certain ceremonial occasions.

But how did the psychologists and sociologists, never concerned with primitive peoples, get involved in such "applied anthropology?"

A few years before the war all the social scientists had begun borrowing each other's data, techniques, and conclusions. The anthropologists and sociologists had reached a point in their studies of primitive culture and social structure where they were forced to focus on the individual—a field properly belonging to the psychologists; while similarly the psychologists, in their studies of the individual, had finally been forced to expand their focus to the culture and social structure—properly the domain of the anthropologists and sociologists. Not without conflict, a new field of study was staked out in the borderline area where society and individual met. Besides primitive peoples, the principal "laboratories" of this new study became factories, rural areas, and Negro communities. These were chosen on no "theoretical" basis. Research needs money; and it so happened that the Western Electric Company was willing to pay for research in its factories, while the Department of Agriculture needed more pertinent information on rural social life, and various foundations concerned with the problems of the American Negro were ready to finance the study of that problem.

Applied anthropology thus moved out of the jungles and into the factories, fields, and cities.

We can easily see how the highly theoretical question of the interaction between individual, culture, and social structure became of very practical interest to Western Electric and the Department of Agriculture. The industry wanted to know how to raise workers' output; it started its project with physiological tests of fatigue; but when it was discovered that the physiological states of workers have no relation to their output, social scientists replaced the physiologists. "Rational" psychological incentives such as higher wages and better working conditions, they found out, were less important

than "irrational" factors—how workers got along with their fellow workers, foremen, and families, and what cliques they belonged to. The Department of Agriculture, on its part, wanted farmers to take scientific advice and to cooperate with plans to reduce or increase output and conserve soil. Here, too, the human-relations scientists discovered that rational calculation played a very small part in behavior. A Department agent might have conducted the finest demonstration farm for years right under the noses of farmers, and still have been ignored completely. Once, however, the human-relations scientist discovered how the community functioned and made decisions—through its leadership and its own opinion-molders, for instance—and approached it as its structure indicated, the agent would be flooded with requests for information.

SO BEFORE the war, this rather abstract sociological work already seemed to be producing practical results. Consequently, when we entered the war and 120,000 bewildered, frightened, frustrated, and angry Japanese—for reasons we will not go into here—found themselves in half-finished camps in the Western deserts facing a smaller number of hurriedly collected white administrators, it seemed a good idea to send in some human-relations scientists to help prevent unpleasant occurrences. In the end this obscure corner of the vast panorama of war became one of the best laboratories the science of human relations had ever worked in. The first significant book on the social sciences during the war, a landmark in the history of applied social science, Alexander H. Leighton's *The Governing of Men*, (Princeton University Press, 1945) tells us about it.

Dr. Leighton, a psychiatrist who had studied Navajo and Eskimo societies, was sent to the Relocation Camp for evacuated Japanese at Poston, Arizona in June 1942, by the Office of Indian Affairs, which ran it. He was to set up a research unit, to advise the administrative officials, and make general observations useful in operating similar camps in occupied territory. (Even then, perhaps, it was clear that concentration camps were about to become the living quarters of a considerable part of humanity, even on "our side.")

Two-thirds of Dr. Leighton's book chronicles the first year of life at Poston from the point of view of the applied social scientist. For him, the attitudes of the incoming evacuees were of prime importance. He found them distrustful of the government, which had broken its promises to them again and again, and of all its

agencies; uncertain of what would happen to them, and afraid that it would be even worse than the evacuation (in which they had lost jobs, businesses, homes, farms, and property); angry at the disregard of their rights as citizens, frustrated at their inability to help themselves, and bewildered and confused at the disappearance of familiar institutions and lifelong habits and customs. Dr. Leighton describes the different cultural groups among the evacuees: the Japanese-born *Issei*, the American-born *Nisei*, and the American-born and Japanese-educated *Kibei*, and shows us that whether a man was *Issei*, *Nisei*, or *Kibei* had a lot to do with the way he felt and expressed these attitudes.

With the same objectivity, he analyzes the white administrators: we find among them "people-minded" officials, for whom the evacuees are human beings with the same range of traits as any other human beings, and "stereotype-minded" administrators, for whom "a Jap is a Jap." Dr. Leighton describes how the frustrations of the evacuees were intensified by confused and inefficient administration, from Washington down. The barracks are not completed in time, the lumber for partitions never arrives, there are no hospital supplies, the heat is unbearable (the daily maximum did not drop below 100° once in three months), whole families and more are crowded into single rooms, payment for work (\$13 to \$19 a month) is delayed for months, and then reduced by bureaucratic interpretations, there are no coolers, and babies in the hospital die of dehydration—and when the sudden cold of autumn in the desert comes, there are no heaters. All along, the efforts of the evacuees to set up self-government are hampered and frustrated by changes in directives from Washington and by the contempt and disdain of the "stereotype-minded" officials.

For applied social scientists, it was of no great importance whether or not the grievances of the evacuees were just. Many of them were indeed imaginary: Leighton describes the evacuees warming themselves around fires, talking about their "injustices" and "piling one thing on top of another to create accumulations of indignation that grew into monsters out of all true proportion." His interest here is in their reactions as such, not in their objective foundation. The reactions were real enough, and led to action.

Earlier, after he had told the story of the evacuation by means of verbatim quotations and newspaper stories, Dr. Leighton states:

"Some of the quotations are probably not true statements of fact, but, fact or not, all

are true statements of feeling—and that is the point that is of critical significance in the present report. The behavior of the Japanese after they arrived in the Relocation Center was not so much determined by what had recently happened to them as by what they thought had happened to them.

"The administrator has to deal with people as they are, not as they should be. 'People ought . . .' is a phrase he would do well to drop from his thinking and his vocabulary. He may modify his plans to suit the attitudes of the people, or he may modify the attitudes to meet his plans through education and other means, or he may do both."

The Poston administration changed neither plans nor attitudes. "With individual human beings, severe and prolonged frustration frequently leads to aggression in some form." In November, when two evacuees were arrested—unjustly, many felt—all the other evacuees went on strike, displaying an energy and cohesion in action they had never shown before. They established an effective system of self-government for the first time. The official council, limited to the younger *Nisei* group by Washington decree, had never won the respect of the camp and it was swept away in the first few hours of excitement.

How treat the outbreak? The "stereotype-minded" officials were all for calling in the military and "shooting the Japs down in their tracks." But the "people-minded" group prevailed. They negotiated with the elected leaders of the strikers, and got down to questions deeper than that of the two arrested men (who were released for lack of evidence). The result of the strike, paradoxically enough, was to establish real cooperation between the evacuees and the administration. The energy displayed in the strike was harnessed to the end of creating an effective self-government, which, despite Washington rulings, included the older and respected *Issei*, as well as the younger *Nisei*.

The work of the Poston research unit itself is mentioned only in an appendix, which seems unfortunate. The social scientists, aware of the constructive possibilities of the strike as well as of the danger of suppressing it without relieving the underlying frustrations, supported the "people-minded" officials and received much credit—mostly undeserved, according to Dr. Leighton—for the peaceful outcome of the strike.

THE remaining third of the book generalizes the experiences at Poston. In numbered principles and recommendations we are given what seem to be the most effective ways of

administering groups of individuals living under stress. These rules should be applicable to all situations requiring the organization of people—whether it is running a war factory, a colony of newly resettled farmers, or a displaced persons camp, or governing the people of an occupied area. (Applied social scientists in the other fields give rather similar principles. *Applied Anthropology* for Spring 1945, devoted to a report by Burleigh B. Gardner and William F. Whyte on "The Man in the Middle: Position and Problems of the Foreman," contains recommendations for good human relations in industry that often parallel Dr. Leighton's. Another full account of life in a relocation camp, which supplements *The Governing of Men* at a few points, is G. Gordon Brown's "Final Report" on the Gila River project, in the Fall 1945 *Applied Anthropology*.)

These principles and recommendations may appear platitudes as baldly presented here. Human relations, often called "social engineering," do not lend themselves to precise blueprints. But not because, as many people think, "human beings are so unpredictable." Leighton ingeniously points out the real reason: "With a bridge or a building the entire structure can be laid out in advance in the form of a blueprint. For a community this may not be, because the foundations on which the structure is raised and the materials used in the building (that is, the individual people, their needs, reactions, beliefs, and social organization) are in a state of equilibrium that alters as the work progresses. Only by frequent checking for results and for changes in the material can human society be guided in a desired direction. . . ." Leighton shows that clinical medicine has the same problem. There, too, a course of treatment cannot be plotted out in advance, but must be continually altered "so that both the effects of spontaneous alteration and the results of treatment can be taken into account."

It is because of this that these principles appear vague. They cannot be precise rules; they can only indicate the directions it would be well to follow. Only in their elaboration and application may one see how ingenious they are. We will try to give the main points and some of the flavor of Leighton's principles.

(1) The administrative situation must be seen as a whole. Within the limits of the task set by higher authority—in this case the setting up of a functioning and satisfied community—we must see how all factors, both of past conditioning and present situation, affect individuals, sub-groups, and the community as a whole. We must consider not only the "real"

situation, "real" physical surroundings and "real" administrative restraints, but how the systems of belief (culture) of those governed modify the way they see this real situation and how their social structure either prevents or makes possible their doing something about it. If there are no work incentives it may not be enough merely to supply work to a community demoralized by idleness; and it may not be enough to offer wage incentives when there are no social incentives. The whole situation governs, and must be considered.

(2) Seeing the situation as a whole means seeing the administrative authority as part of the situation. Its members, too, are human. And we must be aware likewise of their reactions to stress, their systems of belief, and their social structure. Administrators as well as governed will respond to frustration with aggression, and will only be able to interpret events by their own system of beliefs. It is as natural for them, under stress, to see the striking Japanese as enemy agents as it is for the Japanese to strike.

(3) In the stress situation the chief problem is handling aggression peaceably. If possible, of course, the underlying frustrations should be relieved. (In Poston the simplest way of reducing frustrations would have been to send the Japanese back to their homes, jobs, and farms.) But we must also consider ways of channelling the aggressions, since the given policy may make frustration inevitable.

It is well known, for example, that uncertainty about the future heightens feelings of frustration. Consequently, Dr. Leighton advises administrators to have good lines of communication to those they govern, and to use them as often as possible. The administration should also try to create useful outlets for aggression, such as parliamentary bodies and leisure-time activities. Religious activities, too, may be useful "in creating emotional states of satisfaction, [tending to] mitigate general fear, anger, and restlessness." And if an outbreak of aggression does occur, the administration should take advantage of the feelings of relief that are sure to follow and not pile up new frustrations by punishment.

(4) When the administration introduces changes of whatever sort, some of the things it should do are:

(a) take into account the systems of belief and social organization of the governed, with an eye to whether these make it possible for them to understand and accept the change;

(b) identify and work through the basic social units of the governed—that is, those informal groups of people who know and nor-

mally interact upon each other: cliques, friends, people brought together by common personal interests, etc. These are the "natural building blocks" of society, and it is easier to effect changes through them and their leaders than through the community "as a whole" or some formal organization in it.

(c) introduce the change by stages; the equilibrium of social groups is so complex that we may discover that only a little quantity of change is sufficient to produce the results we want, or that the whole change will produce an unsuspected and undesirable result.

(d) realize the limitations of "rational" appeals—or appeals that seem "rational" to the administrators. "To blame people for being moved more by feeling than by thought is like blaming . . . rivers for running down hill. The administrator's job is to accept these things as they are . . . turn them to advantage if possible, but never ignore them."

PERHAPS the reader has reacted to this account with feelings ranging from discomfort to outrage. Such reactions are shared, at least to some degree, by some human-relations scientists themselves (see Morris Edward Opler's "Social Science and Democratic Policy" in the Summer 1945 *Applied Anthropology*).

In general opinion, Japanese relocation is now recognized to have been one of the most unjust and inhuman actions ever carried out by our government. After having given the Japanese Americans repeated assurances that they had nothing to fear, the government suddenly gave in to the professional Japanese-baiters on the Pacific Coast and liquidated the entire Japanese community. No selectiveness was exercised as between loyal and disloyal, citizen or alien; no question of military security was involved (those Japanese because of whose supposed sabotage the Californian Japanese were uprooted, the Japanese Hawaiians, were untouched); all Japanese on the Pacific coast, purely on the basis of race, were removed from homes, jobs, careers, and farms, and sent to concentration camps. Dr. Leighton gives quotations from the stories of a few individual Japanese; anyone reading them will wonder how unique an historical event, in basic assumptions, the race policy of the Nazis was after all. One cannot help wondering where the liberal organizations and press and the minorities-defense organizations were when all this was taking place.

However, more is lacking to the human-relations approach than a proper display of moral indignation. When the social scientists moved out of the universities and into living commu-

nities for the purpose of changing the lives of those communities, they raised a host of problems for themselves. They have not yet tried, except in a few cases, to pose these problems explicitly, and they are far from answering them.

How do human-relations scientists understand their new role? From the evidence in *Applied Anthropology*, the most important journal for human relations, they seem to think of themselves as "trouble-shooters," less frequently as "social engineers." Their experience with government and industry has made them sharply aware of the differences between policy-making and administration, and of their own limited role as mere aides to administration. Congress, an agency, or a board of directors makes policy; an administrator or manager enforces it; and the human-relations scientist irons out the kinks. When a program fails to work, he discovers what channels in community social organization would lead fastest to the winning over of the recalcitrant individuals.

On a different and higher level, he may show how a policy that might be paying economically or otherwise is at the same time destroying institutions and leading to insecurity and frustration. Yet the human-relations scientist carefully avoids interfering with policy, or even administration in the broadest sense.

As Laura Thompson points out in the June 1944 *Applied Anthropology* ("New Perspectives in Applied Anthropology"), his knowledge does, however, enable the social scientist to do more; he can set intelligent goals for a society, and find out the means of reaching them. Are such roles to be avoided? "Are practical social scientists to become technicians for hire to the highest bidder?" Dr. Thompson asks. "Or are they to develop a code of professional ethics which will orient their work toward the formulation and implementation of specific long-range goals?" Dr. Thompson prefers the latter alternative.

Her position implies that the social scientist should judge policy in accordance with his "professional ethics" and "long-range goals." Otherwise, his ethics would be meaningless. And his ethical judgment might mean, for example, refusing to assist in Japanese relocation. Human-relations scientists could not, if they held Dr. Thompson's position, collaborate with the administration of a death camp. (Those who consider themselves as only "social engineers" would not do such a thing either, I am sure. But collaboration in such situations is a logical consequence of refusing to judge policy.)

BUT Dr. Thompson's position also has its difficulties. Our democratic society does not like experts who presume to tell it what is best for it. At one time every citizen was—at least theoretically—competent in the skills necessary for any government office. Then government functions became complicated, and experts, far from the people and beyond their control, replaced or supplemented popularly elected officials. The new human-relations scientist, who is only a better expert, must expect to feel the force of a long legacy of liberal distrust of the experts. Once every worker, too, could run his own workshop. Then the workshops became larger, their operations more complicated, and the meaning of his work became lost to him. Now he looks with fear, perhaps hatred, upon the time-study engineer, the management's expert who comes around with strange tests and an unintelligible jargon. Will he look more kindly upon the human-relations scientist, who may only be trying to help him re-invest his work with meaning?

Basically, what is and what should be the relation of the social scientist to the object of his skills? Dr. Leighton, when commenting on the human need to know the meaning of an act in order to carry it out well, says: "This does not mean that each man must be convinced of the correctness of an aim as a result of careful reasoning, but only that he must be convinced." This would seem to mean that it is all right to get people to do things by giving them false reasons for doing it. But even if the things we want to get them to do are good for them, even if they will be happier for it, this attitude has obvious dangers. We feel that manipulation is wrong because it violates the highest value in our democratic culture, which lies in the dignity of each individual and in his right to his own choices about his own destiny. And that in turn involves the right to knowledge of the facts. We also believe that when people act without knowing the *real* reasons why, they act irrationally and can do terrible things. If we, who think ourselves good, train them to act irrationally, others who are bad can use our training for their own ends.

The manipulation of human beings has a much longer history than the science of human relations. That science can now make it more efficient. But to use it in this way involves us in an unhappy paradox; for science historically has been, and from its nature should be, the way to break the power of manipulation, the dominance of one group over another.

The physical sciences helped break the power of priestly and magical manipulation.

The human sciences first entered the social arena on a major scale in the late 19th century, when historians, psychologists, and social thinkers worked toward transforming our society by demonstrating how it worked. To attempt to change society by giving men insight into its workings would seem an infinitely more worthy task for science than to help try to preserve it by strengthening the power of manipulation.

The answer to the problem of the democratically uncontrolled expert and the conscienceless manipulator is easy to state and almost impossible to realize. When people know as much as experts, then there will no longer be need of them; when the manipulated know as much as the manipulators, then the manipulators will lose their power. The "knowing" that people need is of a special kind: it is thinking scientifically and understanding some of the important results of scientific thinking.

To be sure, one does not now know how a scientific and critical outlook on society, rare enough among scientists, can be cultivated so widely among people as to make manipulation for bad ends ineffectual, and all manipulation eventually unnecessary. But any such efforts are surely crucially valuable: popular writings on race and culture such as those by Boas, Benedict, and Welfish, the literature of the Jewish defense organizations,* and periodicals like the *Journal of Social Issues* and *Ideas for Action*, in which social scientists experiment in presenting their results to larger social groups. The volume of such publications, in comparison with the prejudiced, stupid, authoritarian, and unscientific assertions that make up most of the content of mass media, is infinitesimal. But it is all to the good.

The answers to the most important questions raised here may seem platitudinous. This only means they are still extremely vague. But these are the questions the human-relations scientists should consider if they are not to become—or remain—the unconscious perpetrators of forms of social life they intellectually oppose, the unconscious tools of forces that are intrinsically unscientific.

It is not too early for the social scientists to begin to ask themselves some of the questions that the atom physicists are now desperately asking themselves, perhaps a little late.

*Some of this literature, while presenting the results of science, uses carefully-planned irrational appeals. Here manipulative techniques are used to prevent people from succumbing to other manipulative techniques. One questions whether such approaches may not in the long run defeat their own ends by further building irrationalities.

LETTERS FROM READERS

Is There a Crisis of the Individual?

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Dissatisfaction with contemporary civilization, its political structures and its culture, has arisen naturally from the war crisis and the events that preceded and followed. The belief that the superior ideals of a previous age or social system have been abandoned or lost through some fundamental error in human nature or social organization is encountered frequently. Such thinking may be a spur to creative action but it also serves to justify the recrudescence of archaic religious and metaphysical beliefs and superstitions which can only obscure current economic and political problems and lead the unwary into intellectual blind alleys.

The premise that "the physical and spiritual dignity of the human being have in this age been debased on a scale and a measure unprecedented for centuries," is, to say the least, vaguely defined and highly debatable, yet it seems to have been accepted as valid by several of the contributors to the COMMENTARY series on the "Crisis of the Individual." Has this "debasement" been general or is it confined to a special locale? Has it occurred in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as in the fascist and fascist-dominated countries?

When did the "debasement" begin? We can admit that we are not living in the Golden Age of mankind and acknowledge the charms of other periods of history without accepting the fundamental premise of this series of articles. Was it in ancient Greece and Rome before their culture turned to extreme cruelty and indifference to slaves and war captives, or in ancient Judea before the practice of decimating one's enemies began? Certainly not in the Dark Ages with its barbarities and horrors, when the human mind was in the grip of nameless terrors and superstitions. Did it begin with the invention and use of steam power, the internal combustion engine, radioactivity, or nuclear fission? The Victorian Age is noted for its advances in science and technology, and also for its incredible impoverishment of workers and unfeeling exploitation of men, women, and children

for profit. Were the social and political revolutions of 1776, 1789, and 1917 unnecessary or have these milestones in our history or any one of them contributed to the debasement of human dignity? Should we not also ask the masses in India or the blacks of the Belgian Congo how recently the process of debasement in the worth of the human being set in?

When did our own American culture begin to treat the weak and the poor with compassion, mitigate its harsh laws, and develop communal responsibility for the sick in mind and body? Has it been several centuries since Indians were being massacred, negroes enslaved, and the unemployed neglected and starved?

If the focus of our interest is the rise of rational humanitarianism, we would be compelled to reject the thesis altogether. It is too recent a period in history, with Rousseau and Thomas Paine and other 18th-century liberals as the advance guard, and still far from its completion with Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal.

No one can deny the terrible pages of contemporary history under fascism with its debasement of the individual, the sadistic terrorism, the insane cruelties unleashed by the Nazis. In comparison, the Indian massacres, our treatment of Negroes, British and Belgian imperialism, and Czarist pogroms seem almost humanitarian. It is to the discredit of this age that Nazi cruelties were scarcely resented except by the victims, and that these were treated with indifference by other governments until they too discovered that they were on the list of intended victims. That we used the modern weapons of war against the enemy, and that civilian populations were not spared in the course of aerial warfare, were concomitants of the war and not a new upsurge of ruthless cruelty or disregard of human values. Had the fascists won, or should they finally succeed at some later period, we could indeed despair, but since it is we who have been victorious, this crisis in our civilization looks as though it has been temporarily averted. The rallying cry of the Allies and of all anti-fascists—for democracy and the four freedoms and for world organization for peace—should give us some hope for civilization. If we have hope for civilization,

why not for individual dignity and security?

It would not be too difficult to make out a rather strong case for the proposition that human beings are on the threshold of immense advances in spiritual dignity as well as in physical well-being; that all past ages in human history offered only limited or circumscribed opportunities for freedom and self-expression, as the class privileges of a small fraction of society, and that the rest were debased and exploited. There are noble heroes and villains and upper-class neurotics in Shakespeare, but the commoners are louts and buffoons too inferior to serve for anything but amusement. It is much later in Western history that the sufferings of common people are presented in literature for the purposes of arousing sympathy. There is a growing rather than a lessening concern with the welfare of masses of people, due in no small measure to widening political enfranchisement and the organization of labor as a class.

In our own culture, there have been enormous gains in the recognition and acceptance of human values which have enhanced the dignity of the individual. It is true that in changing from an agrarian to an industrial and urban society we have created a mass civilization which makes inroads on the space and privacy available to the individual, and forces him to maintain his physical and spiritual dignity in relation to crowds rather than in comparative isolation and small primary groups. It seems belatedly romantic to yearn for a return to the simple life, or to the spiritual dignity of the untutored savage, or the American pioneer overwhelmed by superstitions and fears and groveling before the supernatural and the demoniacal spirits of his own contrivance.

When did our civilization begin to fall into error? When we developed capitalism with its accompanying black pages of imperialist conquest and exploitation of workers? I would not agree. Some of our intellectuals yearn for medieval feudalism, but most rational minds approve of the values gained through capitalism and through the emergence of Protestantism, which challenged the totalitarian institutions of religion. Are war and fascism inherent in capitalist society? There were similar excesses in feudalism. War is our greatest evil and now involves and endangers civilians. But this is a by-product of technical development, not of spiritual degeneration. It is our weapons, not our sense of values, that have changed.

I hope that the reaction to the Editor's questions will not be that we must cling at all costs to democratic capitalism because of the new problems of the individual which come with

collectivism. Thus far only John Dewey has stated the problem clearly, but his answers are not too incisive. The problem of avoiding undue restrictions on the individual in a collective economic system is not insoluble, but it has not yet been solved. We ourselves in this country are not really living in a world of free enterprise; oligarchical control over our economic life through monopolies and cartels influences the conditions of our political freedom. Dictatorship by the few, and the control of the means for mass propaganda, is not absent from any contemporary form of economic organization. It would serve a better purpose if we would examine carefully which of the forms of economic organization suitable for our era is imbued with a concern for the physical security and spiritual dignity of the general population, and which form of organization today and for the future holds forth greater promise that these objectives will be maintained.

Large-scale economic organization and urban living have certainly changed the conditions of life, many of them for the better. We have now reached the stage of development in this country where the state must intervene in many phases of our economic and social organization. It can function in the interests of the whole population as a natural objective of democracy, or it can intervene in behalf of vested interests. This has been a perennial problem in all social organization, but it has become increasingly acute. We have again reached a critical stage, and some of our intellectuals cannot face the issues courageously. They have a nostalgia for the vanished conditions of the earlier forms of capitalist society. They are depressed because these conditions no longer exist, and they do not know how to grapple with the current problems created by the new economic trends. They see in the Soviet Union only a "totalitarian state" inimical to human dignity and freedom. They do not know how to make any state concerned with economic planning and control serve the interests of human beings.

In their hesitation and confusion they are unwittingly willing to sacrifice the real gifts of 18th-century liberalism in the interests of 20th-century reaction. Having had mild flirtations with Socialism in their youth, the more decent intellectuals are restrained from beating the drums for monopolistic capitalism but they have a violent antagonism toward Communism. The result is sterile excursions into mysticism and neo-religionisms and into pessimism. Their faith in human nature is obscured by preoccupation with the dark recesses of irrationality and their own private irritations. The less squeamish become openly reactionary in their politics.

Is there a crisis for the individual? Yes, but it is a crisis in economic and political organization. Has human dignity been debased? Yes, all through the centuries by the age-old forces of reaction and by what we call fascism today. But we can win that fight; we have already celebrated some recent victories and we will gain new ones if we seek out the real enemies.

H. L. LURIE

New York City

Harmonizing Religion and Science

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Sidney Hook's article in the February issue of *COMMENTARY* on the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, filled me with a sense of sadness. I participated with papers in two of the crucial Conferences. Though I cannot speak for the inner circle of control, nor for other theologians, my whole feeling throughout was that the Conferences were based on the principles of free inquiry and a common concern for the democratic way of life. Reasons were always carefully given within a common discourse.

The fact that some of us held that democracy *cannot be taken for granted* in a world like this, that it cannot be presupposed, that the authority on which it rests in the interpretation of history and experience and the motivation needed to effect it are, indeed, the crucial questions, should hurt no one except those who have no answers to give. Our common concern for democracy dictated an investigation into how to effect and sustain it as well as into its implications.

When I spoke the second time I was asked whether my cosmic foundation for democracy was necessary and how such necessity affected the members who could not share my convictions. My answer was clear and direct. I said I believed that the cosmic demand for creative and cooperative community, for the fullest freedom and faithfulness in fellowship, was indeed essential, that I wished all could share my vision and inner compulsion in this truth, but that our business was to assume together as a working ground our common faith in democracy and to further it in life and thought from whatever approach seemed most important and vital to each one. This answer was attacked as unsatisfactory by some members, but I

cannot yet see the logic of the attack, except that possibly it was due to a spiritual restlessness among those who had failed to find for themselves such cosmic security and satisfaction.

Irwin Edman's "Religion Without Tears" is another example of spiritual wistfulness. I do not see how religion can be without tears in days like these. I prefer even morally those who out of great tribulations within have taken their stand to suffer for the world. The ministers in Europe who lost their lives because they refused to accept Jewish extermination, for instance, had the kind of responsible concern for human dignity and freedom in which I believe. They acted through faith in a God who loves all people equally.

Yet Mr. Edman is fair and honest. I am sorry that you think his point of view "modern," in an honorific sense. The most important tendency in modern thought is to discover the proper limits of efficacy on the part of the scientific method. Those who have not been freed from science as metaphysics to science as method, to see clearly the inherent limitations in its finding of truth, and freed by a new and deeper understanding of the truth that modern knowledge involves, cannot, naturally, honestly accept with all their minds, and therefore neither with all their lives, the truth that undergirds a creative and cooperative civilization. In my latest book, *Faith and Reason* (Harpers, 1946), I have tried to show how science and philosophy lead to a religion that gives authority and motivation that are adequate without being arbitrary. Religion must face the test of new knowledge, but the nominalism of the last few hundred years is definitely not the answer.

Some find faith for the heart and fetters for the mind, the defensively orthodox; others find freedom for the mind and only hunger for the heart, the scientific reductionists. The solid truth of real religion by a free mind finds the food for the heart which can nourish, without lack, the fullness of life which we all seek. If you really want to do us all an authentic service, inquire how the old and false antithesis between religion and science can be done away, not from the point of view of value but from the point of view of truth. It can be, fulfilling both.

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

Abbot Professor of Christian Theology
The Andover Newton Theological School
Newton Centre, Massachusetts

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Toward Cultural Totalitarianism

THE FIRST FREEDOM. By MORRIS L. ERNST. New York, Macmillan, 1946. 271 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by JAMES RORTY

WITH the help of four able research assistants, Mr. Ernst has given us in this book an admirably compact and illuminating factual survey of our three major communications industries: the press, the radio, and the movies. Each presents the danger inherent in increasing concentrations of quasi-monopolistic power along the strategic ideological and political life-lines of democracy. The solution, in each case, according to Mr. Ernst, is to break 'em up. To that end he would require some new legislation, but for the most part would merely utilize existing laws and regulatory agencies. He thinks that if we have sufficient diversity and competition within and between the three communications industries, our congested "market place of the mind" will again function and the first freedom will flourish as a kind of inevitable by-product of an uninhibited traffic in facts, opinions, entertainment, and art.

In the opinion of this reviewer, Mr. Ernst greatly oversimplifies the problems; hence his solutions are likely to be either impracticable or inadequate. But first let us skim some of the rich cream that rises from his valuable collections of data.

In 1909 we had one newspaper for every 25,000 persons. Thirty years later, in 1940, we had only one for every 50,000. (The Scandinavian countries before the war averaged one paper for every 12,000 persons.) In 1930 89 cities had a single owner running so-called competing papers. By 1945, mergers had eliminated competition in 161 cities. In that year, 79 per cent of our cities had no newspaper competition and in ten entire states the growth of chains and mergers had completely eliminated all local competition.

Three big press associations, Associated Press, United Press, and International News Service, control the gathering and distribution of na-

tional and international news. All are impassioned defenders of "the first freedom," especially the Associated Press, which, by its anxiety to make the world safe for the AP, prompted Justice Black, in a recent Supreme Court decision, to remark that "freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not."

Newspapers derive from 65 to 75 per cent of their income from advertising, and shared fully in our \$3,000,000,000 wartime advertising spree, 67 per cent of which was paid for by the government through tax deductions. Mr. Ernst estimates that the manpower we expended during the war on turning pulp forests into advertisements about equalled that represented by the married men drafted into the armed services.

Country weeklies diminished in number from 16,899 in 1910 to 11,208 in 1940. Mat services contributed free by the NAM, the AFL, the CIO, and other disseminators of propaganda, pad their columns and sometimes make it unnecessary to influence them by the purchase of advertising space. Nearly 3,000 of them buy ready-to-print editorials, columns, features, and advertisements from the Western Newspaper Union.

Do these trends seem a little ominous? Wait until facsimile radio makes it possible to produce a national newspaper in two or three centers and radio it direct into your home free, the entire cost being borne by the advertisers.

Magazines derive from a third to a half of their income from advertising. Despite paper restrictions, they increased their circulation during the war, seventy-nine magazines totalling a circulation of 72,288,352 in 1944. Of these seventy-nine, ten have a circulation of over 2,000,000 and account for half of the total. *Reader's Digest*, by virtue of its domestic and Canadian circulation of around 9,000,000 and its six foreign editions totaling over 2,000,000—plus its practice of "planting" articles in other magazines—represents perhaps the highest concentration of cultural influence in this field, as well as one of the most developed expressions of the trend toward cartelization and impartial expansion.

Most people have forgotten by this time that our all-but-unique "American system" of advertiser-sponsored radio broadcasting came into being as the result of a cultural accident that occurred during the late twenties, when radio arrived on the scene as a kind of technological foundling. It was adopted by big-hearted advertisers in default of any other more responsible cultural foster-parents, and Mr. Ernst opines that today few people hope or wish to change the relationship. I doubt that, but I am sure Mr. Ernst is right in believing that the question will rarely be discussed on the air.

The American system is in fact a kind of irascible Man Who Came to Dinner who taboos any discussion of dangerous ideas. Such as, for example, the question of his leaving; or of the contribution made to our culture by soap operas, which a fair sample of housewives voted thirty-six to one against; or of who really owns the air—the public—which is what the law says—or the station owners who sell their squatter's rights to wave lengths for seven or ten times the value of the tangible assets; or of "subscription radio," a really liberating idea whereby for 5 cents a day and by inserting a patented gadget in his set, a subscriber could listen, on FM channels, to his choice of classical or popular music or educational and news programs, uninterrupted by "commercials."

All these fascinating subjects are considered too "controversial" by the autocrats of the air, who operate on the theory that (a) papa knows best, and (b) what you don't know won't hurt papa.

Mr. Ernst thinks that the expansion of FM broadcasting may give us more freedom as well as less static. About television he is less confident. Maybe it will prove to have been a big mistake, with or without color. You can't help listening, but you don't *have* to look. Or maybe, heaven help us, the sponsoring of television by advertisers will force the motion picture, too, to become a sponsored art!

In his section on the movies, Mr. Ernst details the familiar objections to block booking and the Hays office—now the Eric Johnston office. Here too his remedy is the divorcement of perpendicular and horizontal combinations that serve to restrain the trade in culture.

What Mr. Ernst fails to note is that the parallel development of all three communications industries represents a kind of counter-revolution of cultural nihilism, moved by the geared inertias of technology and of monopoly capitalism. He rightly observes that the trend of this revolution is toward cultural and ultimately political totalitarianism. But the frail broom of anti-trust prosecution will at best

only check this trend. What is needed is a cultural revolution motivated by fresh values.

And how about the vigorous use of the "yardstick" weapon, which has proved its effectiveness in comparable social situations? It was TVA and other public yardsticks that gave us cheap power. Similarly, what we need in the field of communications is a multitude of new public and private communications yardsticks representing the more or less recognized economic and cultural "estates" that have developed in our society, such as government, the major professions and scientific disciplines, the cooperatives, the churches and the organized minorities, as well as, of course, organized labor, the organized farmers, and organized business. Conceivably, the competition of these yardsticks, each with its press and each claiming its place on the air and on the silver screen, would reverse the totalitarian drift.

It would take another book to develop the yardstick conception as applied to communications—and perhaps the indefatigable Mr. Ernst will give us this book too.

The Economic Founding Fathers

THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: 1606-1865. By JOSEPH DORFMAN. New York, Viking, 1946. Two Volumes. \$7.50.

Reviewed by DANIEL BELL

AS AMERICA moves toward its "manifest destiny," its statesmen and thinkers are striving to redefine a sense of national interests and national ideals so as to present some coherent image to the world and to the historians of the future who will chart the lifelines of empire. There has been an agitated quest for an American heritage. The past few years have seen a search for American roots, a reawakened national consciousness, and a carrying forward into our times of the ideas of many early Americans.

Those who seek these facades for faith will find little reward in Professor Dorfman's book even though it represents the most comprehensive dredging of the American economic mind. The ethical-culture liberal who would seek out only ideals, and the cynical, hard conservative who would search the past for a few phrases to buttress a position that even early conservatives would find untenable, are both doomed to disappointment. In fact one liberal reviewer has vented his disappointment with the moan that the book fails to offer us a "useable past."

Mr. Dorfman has confined himself strictly to scholarship, eschewing synthesis or evaluation—though these may be intended for the later promised volumes. The study is not constructed within a scaffolding of problems; nor does it attempt to read an “economic chain of being”; it sticks to a straight chronological rendering of the writings of Americans on economic affairs. In straightforward manner Professor Dorfman has set forth the views of different men, *in their own context*; which is an important contribution at a time when so many ideas and phrases are being torn from their contexts in the past in order to construct myths. In this simple and honest account, he has given us some fresh views of such notable figures as Roger Williams, William Penn, Benjamin Franklin, Tom Paine, and John Adams—who in many ways appears as one of the most brilliant and even appealing of the early conservatives. Professor Dorfman sees them as men of body as well as spirit, concerned not only with freedom of conscience, but property and order.

The interesting fact that emerges is not their differences but their common preoccupation with the conditions of social stability and their insistence that property was a necessary factor in that stability. (Though considered a conservative notion today, in subtle fashion there is a distinct libertarian flavor to the insistence on property as a condition for freedom; it is the maintenance of property that prevents the alienation from work and the loss of independence so characteristic of our time.) They shared the common platform, too, of economic and political liberalism that saw freedom as possible only in a system of economic and political atomism, a condition in which no man could dominate another. This economic liberalism was not in Adams, as it was later in Mill, coextensive with democracy, or the existence of a mass society.

THE crucial issue of the economic mind has been posed implicitly by Dorfman's master, Thorstein Veblen. In Veblen's complex mirroring of the grossness of modern life, the question emerges: how were the powerful psychological sanctions of puritanism, the norms of conduct which shaped capitalist acquisitiveness, so altered or thrust aside as to permit the easy rise of the gilded age of conspicuous consumption? This dialectical problem frames a whole series of questions, some of which we can pose as follows:

How did the Puritan emphasis that “in the absence of true religion men fail to observe true order and obedience each in their degree and become excessively worldly-minded and self-seeking” finally transform itself into a sanc-

tion for the wordly accumulation of wealth?

How did the religious hierarchial conception of “order and obedience” (which, as Dorfman points out, permeated all colonial conceptions) become translated into a creed of equality of opportunity and free social mobility and in turn succumb to a hardening social stratification?

How did the belief in order and in obedience to authority sanction a revolution against authority, and how could it then be used to denounce further revolution against the newly constituted authority?

What intellectual and economic process allowed the plea for religious toleration from England to be used in attacks against dissenters here?

How could the rationalizations of the colonists' bitter attack on mercantilism be later used by them to create a policy of protectionism?

How was the unity of social thought that characterized the 18th century fragmented and channelized into the isolated streams of today?

Why was the type of economic thinking rooted in matters of practical policy replaced by economic science which, in its adherence to classical theory, shows such little touch with reality?

These are the kinds of questions that suggest themselves when one gains a perspective of the mind of America, as refracted through its economic writings.

THE clue to the answers to these questions, I suspect, lies in the debates over the nature of property. In an emergent capitalist society, property obviously is the hub of the social order. It is central in the Puritan writings of the 17th and 18th century, where property is the basis of status; in the discussions of the Federalists, where property (the concept is broadened from land to commerce) is seen as the basis of freedom and order; in the Utopian writings of Frances Wright, Skidmore, and Evans, where property is the basis of emancipation from wage slavery; in Henry Carey's defense of the corporation as the epitome of free contract, which foreshadows the rise of the legally protected behemoth that crushed the economic atomism of *laissez-faire*.

In the formally religious society of the 17th century, the discussion is cast in a theological mold. Yet property remains the core. The Protestant Reformation freed the individual so that he might become a better Christian; its consequence, however, was to enable him to make the pursuit of wealth the basis of social action. By the 17th century, pursuit of wealth is accepted by such divines as Richard Baxter as a necessary part of one's calling; it

is accepted by such a humanist as William Penn as a "necessary evil."

And toleration, or the right of religious conscience, became important because its alternative was civil war, which could only bring economic destruction. And because the acceptance of persecution as a right of the state becomes a general threat to property, toleration is accepted as the necessary price of social peace. For it is only during social peace that the accumulation of wealth can be safeguarded against arbitrary action. Yet when religious conscience led logically to the Anabaptists in Germany or the Diggers in England, who rejected the notion of property in favor of communalism, then a limit to toleration was justified.

Similarly, note the shift in the arguments of the colonists, who first preached order and authority, then upheld a revolt against authority, and finally sought a rationale against such uprisings against authority as Shays' Rebellion, which particularly frightened property holders with its threat to divide property. Discarding the belief in rule by divine right, liberal theory moved to a concept of power as a contract between prince and people which the latter have a right to abridge if the prince proves to be a tyrant. In the 16th century the mark of a tyrant was the persecution of a subject for doing his duty to his God; by the 17th and 18th centuries, the mark of the tyrant was interference with the "natural right" of property. The criterion had moved from the sublime to the prosaic; from the divine to the utilitarian.

One gets the sense that the fulcrum of ideological change throughout the whole period covered by these volumes was material interest. One need not accept the Marxian doctrine to grant the importance here of the economic factor: we are dealing with the emergence of an *economic civilization*, in which the pursuit of wealth became the goal of all social activity. So it is not cynical for Dorfman to suggest that "the great cry of taxation without representation raised by the colonials against the Stamp Act and duties on colonial trade rested in the last analysis on a matter of geography and not on the right of all taxpayers to elect the people who levy taxes." And it seems quite natural for John Adams to suggest that material forces are dominant in actual life, including all other forces and tendencies, ethical and spiritual.

A reading of the economic *mind* is important, thus, to understand the development of an *economic civilization*. But already many of the discussions seem archaic and unreal. The economic mind had a definite conception of

man and a view of human nature, as all basic theories of social action do. It was a theory of rational calculus that was perhaps epitomized, not in Franklin, as Max Weber thought, but in Alexander Hamilton. But we seem to have moved away from it into new political conceptions. The period Mr. Dorfman discusses might be described as a phase between the theological and the political. We have moved from a time when man was considered sinful because of his fall, and could be redeemed only by grace, through an Indian summer which conceived of man as part of an order of natural harmony, following his self-interest as part of the larger self-interest of society, to our own neo-Hobbesian view that man is brutish and can be restrained (or unleashed) by power.

PROFESSOR Dorfman's volumes are rich in a range of materials for speculation. One can take his discussions of money, a recurrent problem in the Colonies and in the whole of American history, and weave a theory of history about its struggles, as Brooks Adams did; or conceive the money issue as part of the agrarian struggle against commercial interests; or trace its perversion in the hands of the Adams brothers and later more grotesquely in Nazi theorists—in the distinctions between usury and productive capitalism.

The portraits of the economic thinkers of American society are fine and carefully phrased. If there is one weakness it is in the discussions of the "labor literature" of the 1830's and 1840's. Professor Dorfman has seen these writings largely as expressions of agrarian and petty-bourgeois protest. While the solutions proposed by many of these writers lay in land reform, it is a misleading of the intensity of the labor struggles of the period to concentrate on the agrarian content of the proposed reforms. Professor Dorfman has been too attentive exclusively to the writings of individuals; this section might have had greater vitality if he had included various labor documents of the time, such as the wonderfully prescient preamble of the Mechanics Union of Trade Associations of 1827 ("... at the present period when wealth is so easily and abundantly created that the markets of the world are overflowing with it, and when in consequence thereof, and of the continual development and increase of Scientific Power, the demand for human labor is gradually and inevitably decreasing, it cannot be necessary that we, or any portion of society, should be subjected to perpetual slavery").

The men of the colonial period showed a passionate and genuine devotion to freedom. But we find here a curious mixture, or rather

integration, of *ideals* and *interests* in their thinking. There was an ethical implication in economic hedonism—the notion that the fragmentation of power was the best safeguard of liberty. The role of the state was not to be passive, but to guarantee the rule of law. And by accepting a common rule of law binding the external duties of men, individuals were also free to submit to their own moral compunctions rather than to subordinate their moral ideals to law. This formulation abolishes the old antinomy between liberty and law, between freedom and restraint. It also meant a settlement of the political problem of heteronomy, or coordinated authority, versus autonomy. The formulation merges the ideals of freedom and the material interests into one.

If one can draw a unified impression of the economic mind of America, it is that of the moral ambiguity of early liberalism's efforts to harmonize ideals and interests, its efforts to make freedom and wealth compatible by fusing ethics and economics into a unity. Yet the attempt, even if unsuccessful in practice, contained an important principle for a democratic philosophy. For it is in the interplay of ideals and interests that a free society strikes the necessary balance for survival. In Machiavelli's time, as possibly in our own, the dominance of material interests as a political force divorced from any sense of ideals, led to cynicism and corruption. The mere proclamation of ideals, detached, in the totalitarian pattern, from divergent or competing interests, can only lead to a fanaticism typified by the religious wars of the past and the cruelty of fascism and Stalinism today.

It would be unfair to Professor Dorfman to leave the impression that his volumes lend themselves only to this kind of philosophizing. I have preferred to draw out the social implication of the early economic writings for the leads it may offer for our own problems. The early economic mind is part of the roots of our time. It is a rich soil and the roots are wide and varied.

The Wisdom of Fools

THE WISE MEN OF HELM. By SOLOMON SIMON. Translated from the Yiddish "Di Helden fun Chelm," by BEN BEN-GAL and DAVID SIMON. New York, Behrman House, 1945. 135 pp. \$2.50.

Reviewed by PEARL KAZIN

Who are the wise men of Helm? People call them fools, and laugh at their simplicity. Their

gullibility seems bottomless, and their capacity for the absurd is almost fatal. They believe the scoundrels in Warsaw who tell them that fires can be put out by pounding a huge drum. The Helmites exchange their gold for feathers so that it will be easier to carry home. And then it seems even easier to let the feathers float back on their own to Helm. The Helmites build their water mill on the top of a mountain, and wonder why it doesn't work. Their night-watchman lets thieves carry off the goods from the shops because he doesn't want to wake the shopkeepers. After all, why was he hired? A man must do his job well. Gimpel, the "leading citizen," town hero and tyrant because he is never barren of ideas, plans to capture the moon in a barrel of borsht. Think of the riches that will come of such monopoly!

But even though, on a dark night, the moon has escaped, and the borsht is left to run red rivers through the square, the Helmites never stop thinking and they never give up. There must be other ways of getting herring into the empty barrels and stomachs. Do the Helmites ever blame themselves for anything which has gone wrong? No! "It's just that foolish things are always happening to us."

Though these things may sometimes seem foolish beyond belief, the Helmites are not so very different from you and from me. Some of the Helmites grow rich, and the poor resent their fine clothes and good seats in the synagogue. There is a town philosopher, Pinya, who can think for four days and four nights of nothing very much, and who insists at the end that he must have still more time to think. They have their private underdog, Berel the Beadle, who pipes a thin protest of common-sense logic against Gimpel's genius. Yet even Berel is important to the wiser men of Helm, for he is there to prove how futile such complaints as his can be. For we learn, at the end of these Helm legends which Dr. Simon has now retold, that a long time ago, when the whole town was destitute of money and ideas, they hit upon the best scheme of all. A Helmite is never without *some* idea. They went out into the world, and made Helmites of us all.

And so, when we laugh so comfortably at these simpletons, who carried all the logs to the top of the mountain again because they discovered it is easier to roll them than to carry them down, we are forced to remember that the story-tellers smile, and with reason, at our logic. For this is where the brilliance of the Helmites is really to be found. Behind their simple smiles and their ludicrous reasoning is the ironic self-possession which transforms all good Jewish jokes into something more than a clever punch line. The story of the Helmites

becomes the parable of all Jews living in a world that is stupid and powerful. Their intelligence is materially fruitless, and their ingenuity brings no herring for their potatoes.

But they can always defend themselves because the imaginative vitality of their ironic humor does not need such commonplace nourishment. The imagination that turned Jewish intelligence inside-out so that it looked and behaved like fools from Helm, could mock the real fools endlessly. Having used the satiric possibilities of stupidity with such shrewd self-knowledge, the creators of Helm escaped its real weakness through the strength of their myth. Duped, cheated, betrayed, impoverished through no fault of their own, the Helmites are often destitute, but they are never discouraged and—more important—never dull. All the tragedy and humiliation in their world can be made into the stuff of mockery—and understanding. The Helmites can never be discouraged because they never disbelieve themselves. Perhaps gold is only feathers. Their foolishness is always their own creation and their own responsibility, and in knowing this the wise men of Helm are indeed wise.

Three Lives

LIFE, I SALUTE YOU! By BORIS KADER. Cambridge, Sci-Art Publishers, 1945. 368 pp. \$3.00.

MY CARAVAN OF YEARS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By GOLDIE STONE. New York, Bloch, 1945. 252 pp. \$2.75.

THE SON OF THE LOST SON. By SOMA MORGENSTERN. New York, Rinehart and Company, 1946. 262 pp. \$2.50.

Reviewed by MARTIN GREENBERG

THE first of these books, *Life, I Salute You!* is not really a book at all but a loosely connected series of notes, observations, and autobiographical fragments having to do with the author's experiences in Czarist and revolutionary Russia and in Weimar and Nazi Germany. Dr. Kader, in spite of the sufferings he has undergone, "affirms" the value of life and this, together with his exhortations against the temptation of suicide, constitutes the only sort of unity to which the book pretends.

Dr. Kader's political and historical observations, where they are not pedestrian, are merely naive. The author would have been better advised to have written a straightforward autobiography. But he is apparently a Russian-

Jewish intellectual of the old style and felt obliged to compose a tract to contribute to humanity's redemption. Other Russian-Jewish intellectuals have been concerned with socialism or anarchism or education or religion. Dr. Kader is concerned with suicide.

A reluctance to be simple is very much in evidence here. Instead of an unpretentious account of the experiences of a Russian Jew, the author indulges in that grandiloquent rhetoric of humanity so dear to many Jews—a rhetoric ultimately deriving from the Era of Enlightenment, although in this case it has the fervid accent of the Russian intelligentsia—and that two world wars and the extermination of European Jewry have by now rendered anachronistic. The rights of man enunciated by the Enlightenment provided the Jews with a rational justification for equal participation in Western society. Ever since, a certain number of Jews have been constitutionally incapable of saying plain things about themselves without resorting to the high-flown periphrasis afforded them by such words as "humanity" and "mankind." In Dr. Kader's book this rhetoric does not modify in any way the fundamental simplicity of the character of the author. It is timidity, and modesty too, that prevents a Jew from directly speaking of himself, except in these grandiose synecdoches. The important thing for him is not the particular fate of a particular Jew but abstract humanity. This accounts for this book's quality of woodenness, the absence from it of any sense of livingness; without which such a book has no justification.

THE first portion of Mrs. Stone's autobiography, *My Caravan of Years*, is devoted to her childhood and early youth in the Jewish community of a Lithuanian village. Mrs. Stone's emphasis is on the formal and ritual aspect of Orthodox life without, except in a few dutiful phrases, indicating its inner meaning. The picture she paints of the idyllic life of her well-to-do family has the ceremonial prettiness of a fairy tale, in which she figures as the princess. Mrs. Stone, in spite of the fact that she has remained an Orthodox Jew to this day, does not write from inside this life, but from the outside and so inevitably interprets it in picturesque and sentimental terms.

The early death of her father led to her immigration to America. After the first painful years of disorientation in New York's East Side, she went on to Chicago to marriage and to an active life in the Jewish welfare organizations of that city, impelled by her sense of gratitude and obligation to American democracy.

As in the case of many other Jews, Judaism

was no longer able to provide Mrs. Stone with a style of life and she therefore had to invent one. In retrospect, in Lithuania, she was the princess in a folk story. In America, apart from her genuine philanthropic motives, she plays the part of a kind of grand lady of charity in an active, American, feminist style—although one can still detect, with sympathy, the immigrant fear of lack of place and prestige. But what is at work here again, as in the case of Dr. Kader's book, is a failure to be simple. Mrs. Stone has had to "contrive" her life. Her autobiography is therefore inevitably tainted with pretentiousness.

The Son of the Lost Son by Soma Morgenstern is a novel directly concerned with what is a Jew. Judaism is Jewish Law. In the person of Wolf Mohilevski, a rich Polish landowner and at the same time a pious, caftaned Jew, the inner meaning of Jewish Law and ritual is exposed, not merely its picturesque and sentimental aspect, as in Mrs. Stone's work. Every moment of Wolf Mohilevski's existence is dominated by the Law, by the word of God. The elaborate, comprehensive, and exacting ritual of his days testifies to God's ascendancy over him. The Law's dry precepts contain the living presence of the Lord. His whole life is a ceremony in honor of God.

Although something of the beauty of a life lived in accordance with Jewish Law is evident in this novel, the story, unfortunately, turns on something else. Wolf Mohilevski goes to Vienna to attend a Jewish Congress. There he encounters for the first time his young nephew, Alfred, the son of a renegade brother now dead, who years ago had forsworn the Jewish faith to marry into a family of converted Viennese Jews. Alfred, although raised in almost total ignorance of his Jewish ancestry, already feels vague, sympathetic stirrings in the direction of his ancestral people. He witnesses a session of the Congress and is deeply moved by the piety of the Orthodox Jews and by a sense of the unity and intensity of their lives. The "Western" Jews present in modern dress, on the other hand, seem infinitely ludicrous to him in comparison with the figures in skullcap and caftan. Alfred is easily persuaded to renounce his present life and the novel ends with uncle and nephew arriving at the former's Polish farm at sunset on a Friday evening, just in time to avoid the Sabbath prescription against travel.

The glaring fault of the novel is evident even in this bare account of the story. The return of "the son of the lost son" to the fold, the conversion of Alfred, is the dramatic question upon which the plot turns. It is this

question that the author begs. Other than indicating an uncertain *Sehnsucht* in the nephew for his people, Alfred's conversion is unmotivated. What takes place, in fact, is not a conversion, but the confirmation of a tendency already existing in the character of Alfred. What would otherwise be a grave spiritual struggle—between the urban, assimilated, "Western" Jew and the rural, Orthodox, "Eastern" Jew, an opposition the author takes pains to emphasize and on which depends the peripety of the plot—is lightly passed over.

The final effect of the book is therefore sentimental, in spite of the excellent depiction of the importance and supremacy of Law in the old Jewish life.

The Dangers of Intuition

THE CREATIVE MIND. By HENRI BERGSON. New York, Philosophical Library, 1946. 307 pp. \$3.75.

Reviewed by ISRAEL KNOX

BERGSON's philosophy achieved great popularity during his lifetime, aided no little by the limpid clarity of his writing, by its fresh and memorable metaphors, and by the ease with which one could grasp the continuity of his thought through the unity of his method. Bergson's influence in academic circles may have been limited, but it left its effect on William James in America and on his own countrymen. As the prophet of intuition in an age of considerable irrationalism, his doctrine must have had some appeal for men as different from each other as Sorel, Freud, and Shaw. He did not accept the France of Pétain and Laval, and it seems that in his last days he conducted himself with true dignity by scorning Vichy's offer of exemption from the anti-Jewish measures. This was all the more noble since Bergson hardly regarded himself as a Jew and was close to Catholicism. But the truth is that his philosophy suited Vichy and the outlook of Pétain. It could even have suited Hitler. The present book—in some respects, his intellectual autobiography—would tend to confirm this estimate of this Jew's unconsciously ironic philosophical contribution to contemporary culture.

Although this book consists of a series of separate essays and lectures, written at various times between 1903 and 1923, it possesses a quality of wholeness and presents Bergson's philosophy as it developed and took shape in his mind over a period of years.

The book begins with two introductory

essays written especially for it, which constitute a sort of autobiography of Bergson's philosophical method, and resemble in conception and plan, but not in execution, Descartes' *Discourse on Method*. Then follow three lectures on the possible and the real, on philosophical intuition and on the perception of change, in which both his method and his basic themes are discussed. The heart of the book is the famous "Introduction to Metaphysics," in which all the strands of his philosophy are gathered up; here he urges philosophy to forsake its false paths and to undertake with him the task of discovering "life" by means of intuition. The final essays deal with two French thinkers, Claude Bernard and Ravaisson, and with William James, who praised Bergson highly and in whose philosophy Bergson found some kinship to his own.

Bergson was at first drawn to Spencer's theory of evolution, but after a closer examination became keenly aware of its inadequacies. He then rejected Spencer's mechanistic theory in the conviction that evolution is creative, that it is an expression of a cosmic *élan vital*, that is, of universal impulse and desire as active forces in evolution and not as epiphenomena of evolution. In thinking out his view, he also came to realize that intellect is itself a product of evolution and as such is preoccupied with the practical enterprise of "fitting the body to its environment," of "thinking matter." Hence it is little wonder that philosophy—leaning primarily upon intellect—has failed to illuminate "life," that it has fallen—as with Spencer—into the trap of mechanism. It has tried to see life from the outside, to arrest it and render it stationary and immutable, and has refused to look at it from within, to see it with the penetrating vision of intuition.

BERGSON'S basic metaphysical distinction, it would appear, is that between space and time. He ascribes all the difficulties of philosophy to its historical inclination to veer away from time and to seek security in the wasteland of space. His radical cleavage between intellect and intuition is superimposed on this distinction. The fatal defect of intellect is that it spatializes time; it breaks up, in camera-like fashion, the indivisible continuity of life and movement.

The merit of intuition is that it is attuned to time, that it can get hold of duration, that it is at one with life as indivisible movement, as unceasing change. Physics, mathematics, and logic are space-sciences and therefore are unable to reach the truth of life; they immobilize it with their solid perceptions and stable

conceptions. Intuition, however, is capable of grasping and storing up reality, of seizing it as a *mobile* without need of any support. The purpose of philosophy, Bergson holds, should not be an arguing over, and a choosing of, abstract systems, but should be the quest of unique intuitions, of direct perceptions of reality.

Bergson's dualism, it is obvious, is thoroughgoing and irremediable. It sets up impenetrable walls between time and space, between intuition and intellect, between life and matter, between mind and body. (It is even evident in his theory of humor: we laugh at a person in discomfiture because for the moment "spirit" has been defeated by "matter.") Now there is, of course, an element of plausibility in all this. Doubtless there is, in the evolutionary process, a negative factor and tendency, verified on every level of experience. This negative factor stands for the sloth and stagnation of life, for inertia and sheer habit. The upward movement of life is a movement that overcomes "matter"—if matter be identified with this force and tendency. The dualism, however, implicit in the conflict between "spirit" and "matter," is *dialectical* and not *metaphysical*. It does not entail an ascertainable split in reality, but a logical appraisal of the nature of reality and of the tensions within life, environment, and experience.

Bergson's insight into time is especially valuable and imaginative; time is to him an accumulation, a duration, a stretching and an intensification of reality ("with eternity at the limit"). It carries with it the poignancy and flow of life, from which it is inseparable. It is not accidental that Bergson's favorite analogy is that of a melody where the past is prolonged into the present, where there is only movement and becoming, and where the substance of the melody is its movement, and the movement is a measure of, is identical with, and is a conquest of, time.

But here, too, there is no cogent reason to predicate this on an unalterable dualism in being and in knowledge, and to assign to intellect an inferior order of knowledge, and to space an inferior order of being. The notion that because intellect is itself a product of the evolutionary process it is unable to understand that process and to clarify it is unwarranted, especially as Bergson does not hesitate to make use of the categories of science in his own theory of evolution. Bergson's intuition, unlike Spinoza's, is not a completion of reason but is antipodal to it; it does not lead to greater awareness of, and discrimination in, a world that is partly awry and partly ordered.

Indeed, in an age of spiritual obscurantism

and political dictatorship, the undue emphasis on intuition as opposed to reason is a summons "to think with one's blood." Actually, it means the refusal to achieve by common and cooperative effort advances in science and civilization, to bridge the gap between technological progress and intelligent social control. And yet, since social life is inconceivable without some order, it plays into the hands of reaction and totalitarianism, whereby a set of intuitions is proclaimed to be binding for all, whereby authoritarian institutions, standards, and judgments are accorded a supreme place presumably *because* they are trans-rational.

In What Words Speak?

NO TRAVELER RETURNS. By HENRY SHOSKES. Edited by CURT RIESS. New York, Doubleday Doran, 1945. 267 pp. \$2.50.

THE PROMISE HITLER KEPT. By STEFAN SZENDE. New York, Roy Publishers, 1945. 281 pp. \$3.00.

EXPERIMENT E. By LEON SZALET. New York, Didier Publishers, 1945. 284

CALL US TO WITNESS. By HANIA and GAITHER WARFIELD. New York, Ziff-Davis, 1945. 434 pp. \$3.00.

STEPCHILDREN OF FRANCE. By CHARLES ODIC. New York, Roy Publishers, 1945. 181 pp. \$2.50.

NO TIME FOR SILENCE. By SYLVIA LOMBROSO. New York, Roy Publishers, 1945. 166 pp. \$2.50.

THE DUNGEON DEMOCRACY. By CHRISTOPHER BURNEY. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946. 164 pp. \$2.00.

Reviewed by NORBERT GUTERMAN

EYEWITNESS accounts of Nazi atrocities are proffered by authors and publishers as "must reading." Official or semi-official compilations such as *The Black Book of Polish Jewry* are admittedly intended for the serious reader or student; it is assumed that the public at large needs a more popular presentation of these humanity, it is our duty to relive such experiences, and it is certainly true that, even if only for the sake of preserving our own

references for ourselves according to the capacity of our minds.

The problem of presentation involves a paradox. To write so as to make the reader feel a pleasing chill in the spine at the evocation of horrors is obviously out of place. Therefore, the solution generally adopted is that of vivid "human interest" journalism—inhuman experiences are reported as external facts having nothing in common with the mind and soul of the reader. The effectiveness of this journalistic method depends on the shock of the unexpected, the unprecedented, the sensational. It was devised to handle the irruption of the exceptional in the world of the humdrum; incidents such as "man bites dog" or Martian invasion are its ideal stuff. But it is highly questionable whether the public is willing to be as upset by the horrors of a concentration camp as by the terror of a Martian invasion. In the first case, man's psyche and the structure of his society are much more implicated than in the latter; the public apathy toward the atrocity disclosures has deeper causes than the callousness of newspaper publishers who failed to give them sufficient publicity. In addition to the psychological resistance, there is a real incongruity between the journalism of sensational facts and the nature of this particular material. "Man bites dog" really has far greater news value than man's inhumanity to man, which lacking the impact of the unusual is not news.

It is characteristic of the tenacity of the journalistic illusion that the escaped victims themselves often seek the help of professional journalists. Henry Shoskes, author of *No Traveler Returns*, resorted to the expert services of Curt Riess, who quickly realized that in the extermination of the Warsaw Jews and the Battle of the Ghetto he had "a great story, moving, full of life," and did his best to stimulate the imagination of the unimaginative by introducing dialogues, dramatizations, etc., etc. Yet if all this streamlining is disregarded, one still has a substantially exact account of the Polish events, including even some details unpublished elsewhere—although Mr. Shoskes, a Polish patriot whose concern for the good name of the Poles has survived even his experiences, tends to gloss over the role of Polish anti-Semitism in the tragedy. According to him, "only a few, a very few Poles continued to be rabid anti-Semites" by the time of the Battle of the Ghetto. The present re-migration of Jews from liberated Poland to the former concentration camps tells a different story.

The Promise Hitler Kept is based on the account of Adolf Folkmann, who claims to be

the last Jew out of Hitler's Poland. He witnessed the destruction of the Jewish community in Lvov and, disguised as an "Aryan," worked in the German Todt organization. The Hungarian journalist who writes Folkmann's story also indulges in stylistic embroiderings, but the book does cast interesting light on the corruption in the Nazi system—something that no doubt accounts for the survival of some of its victims.

Experiment E is a harrowing day-by-day account, written as well as could be expected from most non-professionals, of the author's life in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where he was interned as a Polish enemy alien in September 1939. In theory, enemy aliens enjoyed certain international rights, but Sachsenhausen was not essentially different from other death factories: the prisoners, supervised by criminals and sadists, were subjected to a regime of physical and moral degradation and made to work to the point of exhaustion and death. For a long time the victims hoped that the Swedish Legation in Berlin would intervene in their behalf; for the Swedish government had undertaken the protection of Polish interests in Germany, and Leon Szalet tells us that the facts had been submitted to it. He was released in May 1940, not thanks to the Swedes who apparently took no action, but to the untiring efforts of his daughters and extraordinary luck.

In *Call Us to Witness*, an American clergyman and his wife, using the diary form, give us a shocked but somewhat prosy account of everyday life in Poland under German occupation. As members of the American colony in Warsaw, they were often able to help the persecuted population; more often they were helpless spectators of crime and horror. Alternately they relate trivial personal experiences (such as the theft of a set of dishes), incidents such as the throwing of a child into a manhole by two German soldiers, and courageous efforts to help that do honor to the authors. In 1942, when they returned to America, their "faith in the natural progress of mankind had died behind the ghetto walls. . . . Only faith in God remained." They became aghast at the spirit of aloof indifference prevailing in this country, and they end their book with the worried question: "In what words can we speak to the people that they will understand us?"

AS ACCOUNTS of the bare facts, none of the books reviewed above is superior to the official compilations. They all suffer from the same diffuseness and from the same lack of a frame of reference. *Faute de mieux* even a moral scheme provides such a reference.

This is true of Charles Odic's *Stepchildren of France*, which deals with the author's reactions to the atrocities against Jews as much as with the atrocities themselves. He gives free vent to his indignation; his disorderly language is the natural rhetoric of passion, and for that very reason he not only succeeds in establishing contact with the reader, but also notes facts that escape observers who concentrate upon effect. Instead of trying to reassure us that only a very few Frenchmen fell victim to the anti-Semitic disease, he admits that while "since the day of the (Franco-German) armistice, all measures taken or prompted by the Germans were unpopular," the internment of all Polish Jews living in France on May 14, 1941, "pleased a number of people. Welcomed with delight by professional anti-Semites in the pay of the enemy, with indifference by the bourgeois, with levity by the working classes, it moved only certain sections of the public that always rally to any noble cause." Such candor is possible only from a man who has really understood what happened, and only from the representative of a nation that was one of the first to correct its mistakes by action.

No Time for Silence, Sylvia Lombroso's diary (she is the daughter-in-law of the famous Italian Jewish criminologist) from October 1938 to March 1945, is interesting as a document on the grimmest period of Italian history. Judging by the author's testimony, the Fascist government's deliberate policy of dehumanization caused less ravages in Italy than in Germany, and least of all affected the "simple and humble" people. Throughout her book she voices the thoughts and emotions of an intellectual aristocrat who preserves her faith in Italy's future despite the scenes of degradation that she witnessed.

Christopher Burney, who spent fifteen months in Buchenwald, has written *The Dungeon of Democracy* in an attempt to discover the "true perspective" behind "the horrible surface of events." Like the traditional Englishman, he admits to "fearing passion in books" and distrusting emotion; his professed aim is not to write another horror story, but to warn us against "the pestilence of inhumanity" that threatens to do away with European civilization. What struck him most in his experiences was that the majority of the camp inmates, instead of offering a united front against their torturers, imitated their behavior. "Cowards aping their coward masters . . . they used all their ingenuity to dominate and oppress each other." This was also true, the author tells us, of prisoners who were members of revolutionary parties; and he concludes

that "ideology cannot replace morality," and that continental Europe holds little prospect of evolving a democratic way of life. While these theoretical views are highly disputable and seem in part influenced by the author's belief in the moral superiority of the British, his book is extremely valuable as a picture of the psychological degradation of the camp inmate, which corroborates and supplements the well-known analyses of Dr. Bruno Bettelheim. It also contains an excellent account of the mechanism by which this effect was achieved. The SS troops ruled the camp by proxy, that

is, they charged certain groups of prisoners with the responsibility of keeping order; these privileged groups in turn granted responsibilities and privileges to others, and as a result a caste system arose in which those who were most ruthless had the greatest chances for survival. Christopher Burney believes that many lives could have been saved if the prisoners had displayed greater moral strength and solidarity. Of all the prisoners, only the Jews were not given even this opportunity—pariahs among pariahs, they were doomed to die no matter what they did.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

JAMES RORTY, the well-known liberal journalist, is now studying the area served by the TVA. His books include *Where Life is Better*, *His Master's Voice: The Story of American Advertising*, and *American Medicine Mobilizes*. DANIEL BELL is an instructor in social studies at the College of the University of Chicago. PEARL KAZIN is on the editorial staff of *Harper's Bazaar*. She formerly did research for *Time* magazine and taught English at Bryn

Mawr.

MARTIN GREENBERG has written reviews for *Partisan Review* and *COMMENTARY*.

ISRAEL KNOX, whose reviews have often appeared in *COMMENTARY*, was formerly editor of the *Workmens Circle Call*.

NORBERT GUTERMAN's work as a critic and translator has appeared in the *New Republic*, *Partisan Review*, and other periodicals.

CURRENT BOOKS ON JEWISH SUBJECTS

AN ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE: ANTI-SEMITISM. By JAMES PARKES. New York, Penguin, 1946. 153 pp. 25c. (Pelican books)

AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM. By MARK VISHNIAK. New York, Research Institute of the Jewish Labor Committee, 1946. 135 pp.

A comprehensive discussion of group defamation which includes historical precedents for legal action outlawing such activities.

EARTH COULD BE FAIR. By PIERRE VAN PAASEN. New York, Dial, 1946. \$3.75.

It includes the story of what happened to the Jewish population of a Dutch town under Nazi occupation.

FAITH THROUGH REASON. By CHARLES and BERTIE G. SCHWARTZ. New York, Macmillan, 1946. 189 pp. \$2.00.

GUSTAV MAHLER; MEMORIES AND LETTERS. By ALMA MARIE MAHLER. Translated by BASIL CREIGHTON. New York, Viking, 1946. 277 pp. \$5.00.

By the former wife of the composer-conductor.

HITLER'S PROFESSORS; THE PART OF SCHOLAR-

SHIP IN GERMANY'S CRIMES AGAINST THE JEWISH PEOPLE. By MAX WEINREICH. New York, Yiddish Scientific Institute, 1946. 291 pp. \$3.50. (Yivo English translation series)

HOME OF THE BRAVE. By ARTHUR LAURENTS. Foreword by ROBERT GARLAND. New York, Random House, 1946. 175 pp. \$2.00.

The recent Broadway play about a battle-shocked and prejudice-scarred Jewish soldier.

IN THE PERPLEXITY OF THE TIMES. By JUDAH L. MAGNES. Jerusalem, Hebrew University, 1946. \$2.00.

A collection of wartime addresses by the Chancellor of the Hebrew University.

THE OLD COUNTRY. By SHOLOM ALEICHEM. Translated by JULIUS and FRANCES BUTWIN. New York, Crown, 1946. 434 pp. \$4.00.

PASSAGE FROM HOME. By ISAAC ROSENFELD. New York, Dial, 1946. 280 pp. \$2.50.

A novel.

PALESTINE: PROBLEM AND PROMISE, by Robert Nathan, listed as selling at \$3.75 in the May issue of "Current Books on Jewish Subjects," actually sells for \$5.00.